Equilibria and outcomes in multiplayer bargaining by Carvalho, Luís
	  
	  
-­‐	  Equilibrium	  Outcomes	  of	  Repeated	  Two-­‐Person	  Zero-­‐Sum	  
Games	  
-­‐	  A	  Constructive	  Proof	  of	  the	  Nash	  Bargaining	  Solution	  
-­‐	  Equilibria	  and	  Outcomes	  in	  Multiplayer	  Bargaining	  
	  
	  
Luís	  Carvalho	  
Nova	  School	  of	  Business	  and	  Economics	  
Universidade	  Nova	  de	  Lisboa	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Supervisors:	  
Guido	  Maretto	  
Guilherme	  Carmona	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
October	  2013	  
	  
Equilibrium Outcomes of Repeated Two-Person
Zero-Sum Games∗
Guilherme Carmona Lúıs Carvalho
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Abstract
We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games. We show that
even when players have different discount factors (in which case the repeated
game is not a zero-sum game), an outcome is subgame perfect if and only if
all of its components are Nash equilibria of the stage game. This implies that
in all subgame perfect equilibria, each player’s payoff is equal to his minmax
payoff. In conclusion, the competitive nature of two-player zero-sum games is
not altered when the game is repeated.
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1 Introduction
In a two-person zero-sum game, one player’s gain is the other’s loss. Therefore, this
class of game is regarded as the prototype example of a strictly competitive game.
A well known result (see, for example, Myerson (1997, Theorem 3.2)) shows that in
all Nash equilibria of such games, every player receives his minmax payoff, i.e., the
lowest payoff that he can guarantee to himself.
It is clear that the same conclusion applies to a discounted repeated two-person
zero-sum game when both players have the same discount factor. Indeed, such a
(repeated) game is itself a two-person zero-sum game. Furthermore, since all Nash
equilibria yield the minmax payoff to both players, it follows easily that all subgame
perfect equilibrium outcomes must consist of repetitions of (possibly different) Nash
equilibria of the stage game. Thus, any departure from competitive, minmax behavior
is impossible.
However, when players have different discount factors, the repeated game is no
longer a zero-sum one. Thus, one may conjecture that the equilibrium set will expand,
in particular, by allowing players to obtain higher payoffs than the minmax one.
Indeed, intuitively, we could think that the player with the smaller discount factor is
willing to bear losses in the future if she is compensated with some gains in the present;
and that the player with the higher discount factor is willing to play accordingly since
his losses today will be compensated with future gains. In short, intuition suggests
that with different discount factors it might be possible to have subgame perfect
equilibria where non stage-game equilibria are played in some periods.
Our main result shows that this intuition is misleading. In fact, for discounted
repeated two-person zero-sum games with possibly different discount factors for both
players, we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes consist of repetitions
of Nash equilibria of the stage game and, consequently, that players receive their
minmax payoff. Our result implies that the competitive character of two-player zero-
sum games is not altered when the game is repeated, not even when the players
discount the future at different rates.
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2 Notation and Definitions
A two-person zero-sum game G is defined by G = (A1, A2, u1, u2), where for all
i = 1, 2, Ai is a finite set of player i’s actions, ui : A1 × A2 → R is player i’s payoff
function and players’ payoff functions satisfy u1(a)+u2(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A = A1×A2.
Let Si = ∆(Ai), S = S1 × S2 and ui : S → R be the usual mixed extension.
Let, for i = 1, 2, vi = mins−i maxsi ui(si, s−i), and NE = {s ∈ S : ui(s) ≥
ui(s̃i, s−i) for all s̃i ∈ Si and i = 1, 2}. The set NE(G) is the set of Nash equilibria
of G, and vi is the minmax payoff for player i.
The supergame of G consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G taking
place in periods t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . At period t the players make simultaneous moves
denoted by sti ∈ Si and then each player learns his opponent’s move.
For k ≥ 1, a k-stage history is a k-length sequence hk = (s1, . . . , sk), where, for
all 1 ≤ t ≤ k, st ∈ S; the space of all k-stage histories is Hk, i.e., Hk = Sk.1 In the
notation H0 stands for the unique 0-stage history. The set of all histories is defined
by H =
⋃∞
n=0Hn.
It is assumed that at stage k each player knows hk, that is, each player knows
the actions that were played in all previous stages. A strategy for player i, i = 1, 2,
is a function fi : H → Si mapping histories into actions. The set of player i’s
strategies is denoted by Fi, and F = F1 × F2 is the joint strategy space. Every
strategy f = (f1, f2) ∈ F induces an outcome π(f) as follows: π1(f) = f(H0) and
πk(f) = f(π1(f), . . . , πk−1(f)) for k ∈ N. Let Π = S × S × · · · = S∞.
Given an individual strategy fi ∈ Fi and a history h = (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ H we denote
the strategy induced by fi at h by fi|h. This strategy is defined pointwise on H: for
all h̄ = (s̄1, . . . , s̄k̄) ∈ H, then (fi|h)(h̄) = fi(s1, . . . , sk, s̄1, . . . , s̄k̄). We use f |h to
denote (f1|h, f2|h) for every f ∈ F and h ∈ H.
We assume that all players discount the future, although with a possibly different
discount factor. Let δi ∈ (0, 1) denote the discount factor of player i, i = 1, 2. Thus
1As in Aumann (1964), we are assuming that players can observe the mixed strategies chosen.
This assumption is not crucial to our work since, as Theorem 1 will show, equilibrium play is
independent of the history.
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the payoff in the supergame G∞(δ1, δ2) of G is given by
Ui(f) =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1i ui(π
t(f)).
Also, for any π ∈ Π, t ∈ N, and i = 1, 2, let V ti (π) =
∑∞
r=t δ
r−t
i ui(π
r) be the
continuation payoff of player i at date t if the outcome path π is played. For simplicity,
we write Vi(π) instead of V
1
i (π).
A strategy vector f ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium of G∞(δ1, δ2) if Ui(f) ≥ Ui(f̂i, f−i)
for all i = 1, 2 and all f̂i ∈ Fi. A strategy vector f ∈ F is a subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) of G∞(δ1, δ2) if f |h is a Nash equilibrium for all h ∈ H. An outcome path
π ∈ Π is a subgame perfect outcome if there exists a SPE f such that π = π(f).
We use EΠ (G, δ1, δ2) to denote the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of
G∞(δ1, δ2).
3 Equilibrium Outcomes
In this section we state and prove our main result. It shows that all equilibrium
outcomes of the repeated game are repetitions of stage game Nash equilibria, im-
plying that, although the supergame is not necessarily a zero-sum game, the strict
competitive character of the stage game is maintained.
Theorem 1 For all two-person zero-sum games G and all δ1, δ2 ∈ (0, 1), EΠ (G, δ1, δ2) =
NE(G)∞ and ui(π
k) = vi for all π ∈ EΠ (G, δ1, δ2), i = 1, 2, and k ∈ N.
The conclusion of Theorem 1 is clear when δ1 = δ2 because in this case the
supergame is itself a zero-sum game. Although this is no longer the case when players
have different discount factors, the above case is still useful. In fact, our proof involves
comparing the payoff of the most impatient player with the payoff he would obtain
were he as patient as his opponent.
The comparison mentioned above requires the following result regarding power
series. Before we state it, we recall the following notions (see, for instance, Rudin
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(1964)). Given a sequence {ak}∞k=0 of real numbers and x ∈ R, the series
∑∞
k=0 akx
k
is called a power series. To the sequence {ak}∞k=0 corresponds r ∈ R such that the
series converges if |x| < r and diverges if |x| > r; the (extended real) number is
called the radius of convergence of the series. For all x ∈ (−r, r) and t ∈ N, define
f(x) =
∑∞
k=0 akx
k and ft(x) =
∑∞
k=0 at+kx
k. Lemma 1 provides a useful formula for
the derivative of ft.
Lemma 1 For all x ∈ (−r, r) and t ∈ N, f ′t(x) =
∑∞
k=1 ft+k(x)x
k−1 .
Proof. We have that f ′t(x) =
∑∞
k=1 kakx
k−1 and f ′t(x) is absolutely convergent
(see Rudin (1964, Theorem 8.1)). Let A = {(i, k) ∈ N2 : 1 ≤ k <∞, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, B =
{(i, k) ∈ N2 : i ≤ k <∞, 1 ≤ i <∞} and note that A = B. Since f ′t(x) is absolutely
convergent, we obtain f ′t(x) =
∑∞
k=1
∑k
i=1 at+kx
k−1 =
∑
A at+kx
k−1 =
∑
B at+kx
k−1 =∑∞
i=1
∑∞
k=i at+kx
k−1 =
∑∞
i=1 x
i−1 ∑∞
k=0 at+i+kx
k =
∑∞
i=1 ft+i(x)x
i−1 and the result
follows.
We next turn to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ (0, 1) and assume that δ1 ≤ δ2. Define
a game G̃ by G̃ = (A1, A2, ũ1, u2) where ũ1(a) = u1(a) − v1. Hence, G̃ is a two-
player, (−v1)-sum game and ṽ1 = 0. Furthermore, Ṽ t1 (π) = V t1 (π) − v1/(1 − δ1) for
all outcomes π. Let M be such that |ui(s)| ≤M for all i = 1, 2.
The following claim establishes that the more patient a player is, the higher is his
payoff of any SPE outcome.
Claim 1 For all SPE outcomes π and all t ∈ N, Ṽ t1 (π; δ1) ≤ Ṽ t1 (π; δ2).
Proof of Claim 1. The conclusion is obvious if δ1 = δ2; hence, we may assume
that δ1 < δ2. Denote ft+k(δ) = Ṽ
t+k
1 (π; δ) =
∑∞
j=0 ũ1(πt+k+j)δ
j for all k ∈ N0. Since
π is SPE, then ft+k(δ1) ≥ ṽ1 = 0 for all k ∈ N0.
We claim that f
(n)
t (δ1) ≥ 0 for all n, t ∈ N0. By the above, we have that f
(0)
t (δ1) ≥
0 for all t ∈ N0. Suppose that f (n−1)t (δ1) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ N0. Then, for all t ∈ N0,
Lemma 1 implies that f
(n)
t (δ1) = [f
(n−1)
t ]
′(δ1) =
∑∞
k=1 f
(n−1)
t+k (δ1)δ
k−1
1 ≥ 0.
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The result then follows using the Taylor series for ft around δ1 (see Rudin (1964,
Theorem 8.4)) since
ft(δ2)− ft(δ1) =
∞∑
k=1
f
(k)
t (δ1)
k!
(δ2 − δ1)k ≥ 0.
If π is a SPE outcome of the supergame of G̃, then Ṽ ti (π; δi) ≥ ṽi/(1− δi) for all
t ∈ N and i = 1, 2. It then follows from Lemma 1 that
v2
1− δ2
=
ṽ1
1− δ1
+
ṽ2
1− δ2
≤ Ṽ t1 (π; δ1)+Ṽ t2 (π; δ2) ≤ Ṽ t1 (π; δ2)+Ṽ t2 (π; δ2) = −
v1
1− δ2
=
v2
1− δ2
Thus, Ṽ ti (π) = ṽi/(1− δi), and so, V ti (π) = vi/(1− δi) for all t ∈ N and i = 1, 2.
Let π(0) be a SPE outcome and let (π(0), π(1), π(2)) be a SPE simple strategy
supporting π0 as the equilibrium outcome (see Abreu (1988, Proposition 5)). Then,
V ti (π
(0)) = ui(π
(0),t) + δiV
t+1
i (π
(0)) ≥ sup
si 6=π
(0),t
i
ui(si, π
(0),t
−i ) + δiVi(π
(i)),
together with V t+1i (π
(0)) = Vi(π
(i)) = vi/(1− δi) (since π(i) and {π(0),k}∞k=t+1 are SPE
outcomes), implies that ui(π
(0),t) ≥ sup
si 6=π
(0),t
i
ui(si, π
(0),t
−i ) for all t and i. Hence, π
(0),t
is a Nash equilibrium of G for all t.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that equilibrium outcomes of repeated two-person, zero-sum games
have the property that in every period a Nash equilibrium of the stage game is played.
This result is interesting because it shows that the strict competitiveness embodied
in two-person, zero-sum (normal-form) games extends to the repeated version even
when players have different discount factors.
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Lúıs Carvalho
2013
Abstract
We consider the classical axiomatic Nash bargaining framework and propose
a constructive proof of its solution. On the first part of this paper we prove
Nash’s solution is the result of a maximization problem; on the second part,
through the properties of maximand’s indifference curves we derive that it must
be equal to xy.
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1 Introduction
In the Nash Bargaining problem introduced in Nash (1950) two players decide unan-
imously on a utility allocation from a set S ⊂ R2+ of possible alternatives, and an
utility pair of x∗ ∈ S is established as an agreement. If they do not cooperate and
fail to reach an agreement the outcome is a vector of predetermined payoff d ∈ R2+,
known as the disagreement point. The bargaining game is a pair (S,d), in which S is
the set of utilities available when a good is being bargained and d is the disagreement
point. A bargaining solution c(S,d) is a map that to each bargaining problem (S,d)
defines an agreement c(S,d) ∈ S ∪ {d}.
Nash Bargaining solution is characterized by fulfilling some principles, the Nash
axioms, is not a descriptive concept, as there is no strategic interaction among players,
but a normative one, the choice function of the bargaining game must, in certain sense,
be well behaved, it is as if there was a ”fair arbitrator”, Mariotti (1999), choosing
what the final allocation should be if the principles were respected. The axioms
Pareto optimality, Symmetry, Affine transformation, and Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives and in particular the relation that they create between the agreement
of different bargaining games, are sufficient for the bargaining solution c(·) to be the
result of a maximization process. That is, the requisite that a choice c(·) respects
Nash axioms gives enough consistency and structure for the bargaining solution to
be the result of the maximization of a function f(x,d) for x ∈ S. This maximand
function f(x,d) can be interpreted as a social function defined on the utility pair
of the players x ∈ R2+. In particular Nash proved that the choice function must be
c(S) = argmaxx∈S f(x,d), the social function is f(x,d) = (x− dx)(y − dy).
Nash The constructive proof this paper will derive is divided in two main parts.
The first proves that the choice function defined on the sets S ⊂ R2+ is the result of
a maximization of a social function defined on the points x ∈ R2+. To establish this
we will use a result from Peters and Wakker (1991) that states when a solution can
be determined by a maximization process:
Corollary 5.7 1. Let c(·) be a Pareto optimal, continuous choice function then the
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following two conditions are equivalent:
1. c(·) satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
2. c(S,d) maximizes a real valued function f on S ∈ S.
So, in order to prove that c(·) is the result of the maximization of a real valued
function f(·), it is necessary to prove that the choice function is continuous. Deriving
that c(S,d) = argmaxx∈S f(x,d).
The second part of the paper proves that the social function being maximized is
f(x,d) = (x − dx)(y − dy). Naturally, any strictly increasing transformation of f(·)
can also be used as the social function. For this reason what is important, when
identifying the social function, is to look their indifference curves, because they must
be constant over all the alternative formulations.
In the next section we present notation and definitions we will use throughout the
text, in section 3 we prove Nash Bargaining solution is a maximization process, in
section 4 that the maximand of this process is u(x, y) and then we conclude.
2 Notation and Definitions
A vector in R2+ will be denoted by a bold letter usually x and its coordinates are repre-
sented like x = (x, y). The set of compact and convex sets of R2+ is S. For a set S ∈ S,
the maximum value of the first coordinate of S is S1 = max {x : ∃y ∈ R, (x, y) ∈ S},
and the second coordinate maximum S2 is defined in the same way. S+ is the set of
the compact and convex subsets of R2+ with S
1S2 > 0. For any S ∈ S+ there is a
function gS : [0, S
1] → [0, S2] that defines the maximum value of the second coordi-
nate when the first is x, hence for any (x, y) ∈ S, y ≤ gS(x). Due to the convexity of
S this function must be concave, next claim is proven on the appendix.
Claim 1. There is a concave function gs(x) : [0, S
1] → [0, S2] such that (x, gS(x)) ∈ S
and if (x, y) ∈ S then y ≤ gS(x).
The bargaining problem is defined for pairs (S,d), in which S is convex and
compact, and it exist a x ∈ S such that x ≫ d. The Nash bargaining solution
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is a correspondence that to each (S,d) gives c(S,d) ⊆ S ∪ d. We will normalize
the disagreement point and work with d = 0. This can be done without loss of
generality because it is assumed that affine transformations of utility do not change
the preference representation. Therefore, a bargaining game, from now on will be
defined just on a utility set S. The hypothesis that exists a x ∈ S such that x ≫ d
becomes x ≫ 0, so S1S2 > 0 and the bargaining game will then be defined on S+.
The bargaining solution is a correspondence c : S+  R2+ with c(S) ⊆ S.
A set is comprehensive if for any x ∈ S, any x′ ≤ x, x′ ∈ S, if for any x ∈ S
the rectangle made by the vertices
{
(0, 0); (x, 0); (0, y); (x, y)
}
is contained in the set.
The comprehensive hull of a set S ∈ S is comp(S) =
{
x′ : x′ ≤ x, for any x ∈ S
}
.
In the first part of the proof, in which we prove that the bargaining solution is a
maximization process, we will work exclusively with comprehensive sets.
The convex hull of S ∈ S is the smallest convex set that contains S:
ch(S) =
{
x′ : x′ = λ1x1 + λ2x2 with λ1 + λ2 = 1, λ1, λ2 ≥ 0, ∀x1,x2 ∈ S
}
A set is symmetric if (x, y) ∈ S implies (y, x) ∈ S. An affine transformation of
x = (x, y) ∈ R2+, for α = (α1, α2) ∈ R2+ and β = (β1, β2) ∈ R2+, is β + αx =
(
β1 +
α1x, β2 + α2x
)
. An affine transformation of a set S is β +αS =
{
β +αx : x ∈ S
}
.
One transformation we need to use intensively in section 3 is to affine transform,
with β = 0, the set S in a way that x ∈ S is transformed into x̃ ∈ R2+. This type of
transformation will be denoted by S(x,x̃) and the proportion factor α is α =
x̃
x
, then
S(x,x̃) = αS =
x̃
x
S =
(
x̃
x
, ỹ
y
)
S.
The metrics we use in this paper are such that the distance between two points
d(x,x′) = max
{
|x − x′|, |y − y′|
}
; the distance from a set to point is d(x, S ′) =
infx′∈S′ d(x,x
′); and the Hausdorff distance between two sets is
d(S, S ′) = max
{
sup
x∈S
d(x, S ′), sup
x′∈S
d(x′, S)
}
.
The Nash axioms are:
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Pareto Optimality(PO) ∀S ∈ S+,@x ∈ S \ c(S) : x ≥ c(S)
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives(IIA) ∀S, S ′ ∈ S+, S ′ ⊆ S with c(S) ∈
S ′ then c(S) = c(S ′)
Symmetry (Sym) ∀S ∈ S+ symmetric then c(S)1 = c(S)2
Affine Transformations(AT) ∀S ∈ S, ∀α,β ∈ R2+, c
(
β +αS
)
= β +αc(S)
The interpretation of the first axiom, PO, is that a point should not be chosen if there
is an option better for one player without damaging the other. IIA states that if the
set of utilities is shrunk to S ′ ⊆ S but the original solution c(S) is still available in
S ′, c(S) ∈ S ′, then c(S) should be the choice of the new bargaining c(S ′) = c(S). All
axioms implicitly assume that the choice of the bargaining is unique, although this
doesn’t have to be the case. We will prove that in fact the choice is unique. Until
then we will use a different version of this axiom that allows for the multiplicity of
choices 1
IIAm ∀S, S ′ ∈ S, S ′ ⊆ S if c(S,d) ∩ S ′ ̸= ∅ then c(S ′,d) = c(S,d) ∩ S ′
The Sym axiom defines the bargaining power of each player, and states that both
players have equal strength, when facing a symmetric set the bargaining solution
should establish an equal division for both. The AT axiom says that the change
in the bargaining solution is equal to the change in the bargaining set, an affine
transformation of players’ utility set changes the agreement in exactly the same way.
3 Maximization of a Social Function
The proof of choice function continuity will be done by reductio ad absurdum, as-
suming that c(Sk) = xk converges to x
′ a point different from c(S) = x∗. Therefore
there is a sequence of converging sets Sk → S, Sk, S ∈ S+, such that c(Sk) 9 c(S),
contradicting the continuity of the bargaining solution.
1All the other axioms can be immediately adapted for the possibility of a multiplicity of agree-
ments
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In this case there is a sequence of convergent comprehensive sets comp(Sk) →
comp(S) such that c
(
comp(Sk)
)
9 c
(
comp(S)
)
, because c
(
comp(X)
)
= c(X) by
PO and IIAm. Hence, continuity of c(·) can be studied through comprehensive sets
and in this section, even if it is not clearly mentioned, the sets are always comprehen-
sive. Notice that in case S is a comprehensive set the function gS(·) is nonincreasing.
What will be shown is that if the solution c(·) was not continuous, c(Sk) 9 c(S),
there would be a set S ′ with the bargaining solution c(S ′) belonging to the interior
of some Sk, being therefore worse than c(Sk); and c(Sk) belonging to the interior of
S ′ and so worse than c(S ′). Thus creating a contradiction, because c(Sk) can not be
worse than c(S ′) that is worse than c(Sk), as it will be prove. The set S
′, that will
show this contradiction, will be an affine transformation of S, one that changes the
point x∗ = c(S) to a point in the interior of S, x̃, so S ′ = S(x,x̃). The next lemma
will prove that such a point x̃, and therefore a set S ′ in the stated conditions, exists.
Lemma 1. ∀x,x′ ∈ S with x ≫ 0 and gS(x) ̸= gS(x′), then ∃x̃ ∈ int(S) such that
x′ ∈ int
(
S(x,x̃)
)
.
To show that x′ ∈ int
(
S(x,x̃)
)
we first need to understand when does a point that
belongs to S also belong to S(x,x̃). We know that x belongs to the set S if its first
coordinate is smaller than the maximum x ≤ S1 and the second coordinate smaller
than the maximum at x, y ≤ gS(x), next claim state sufficient conditions for this to
happen in the affine transformed set S(x,x̃).
Claim 2. If x′ ∈ S, x′ ≤ x̃
x
S1 and gS(x
′) ≤ gS(x,x̃)(x′) then x′ ∈ S(x,x̃).
Proof. For any given set Σ ∈ S+ and α ∈ R2+, if x = (x, y) ∈ Σ, we know that x ≤ Σ1,
and α1x ≤ α1Σ1, consequently (αΣ)1 = α1Σ1. S(x,x̃) = x̃xS then S
1
(x,x̃) =
x̃
x
S1, as, by
hypothesis x′ ≤ x̃
x
S1, then x′ ≤ S1(x,x̃).
By definition of gS(·), if x′ ∈ S we must have y′ ≤ gS(x′), by hypothesis gS(x′) ≤
gS(x,x̃)(x
′), then y′ ≤ gS(x,x̃)(x′). By reason of x′ ≤ S1(x,x̃) and y′ ≤ gS(x,x̃)(x′), x′
belongs to S(x,x̃).
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The next claim states that if the affine transformation changes x to x̃ then, as
long as x̃ is between x and x′, the first coordinate of x′ will always fulfill the condition
established in the previous claim.
Claim 3. For x,x′ ∈ S, with x′ ̸= x for any x̃ ∈
(
min {x, x′} ,max {x, x′}
)
then
x′ < x̃
x
S1.
Proof. If x′ = min {x′, x}, x′ < x̃ < x ≤ S1, S1/x ≥ 1 and x′ < x̃ ≤ x̃(S1/x); if
x′ = max {x, x′}, x < x̃ < x′, then x̃
x
> 1, and x′ ≤ S1 < x̃
x
S1
The following is an intermediate result that will help us prove for the second
coordinate what the previous claim did for the first. If we affine transform the point
x into one point of the frontier of S, x̃ ∈ S with ỹ = gS(x̃), the maximum value of
x′ ∈ [0, S1(x,x̃)] on the new set , gS(x,x̃)(x′), will be bigger than
gS(x̃)
gS(x)
gS(x
x′
x̃
).
Claim 4. ∀x, x̃ ∈ S with x, x̃ ≫ 0 and ỹ = gS(x̃), if x′ ∈ [0, S1(x,x̃)] then gS(x,x̃)(x′) ≥
gS(x̃)
gS(x)
gS(x̄) in which x̄ = x
x′
x̃
.
Proof. In general we know that for any x′ ∈ αS, ∃x ∈ S such that αx = (α1x, α2y) =
(x′, y′) = x′. As y ≤ gS(x) and x = x
′
α1
, y ≤ gS( x
′
α1
), so y′ = α2y ≤ α2gs(x) =
α2gS(
x′
α1
). This inequality is valid for any y′, inclusively for y′ = gαS(x
′) and we can
conclude that gαS(x
′) ≤ α2gS( x
′
α1
).
However we can find a point in S for which the inequality becomes an equality, thus
proving that gαS(x
′) = α2gS(
x′
α1
). For (x, gs(x)) ∈ S, α
(
x, gs(x)
)
=
(
α1x, α2gS(x)
)
=(
x′, α2gS(
x′
α1
)
)
∈ αS, and exists a x′ ∈ αS with y′ = α2gS( x
′
α1
). Therefore
gαS(x
′) = α2gS
( x′
α1
)
(1)
So gS(x,x̃)(x
′) = g x̃
x
S(x
′), using equation (1) with α = x̃
x
= ( x̃
x
, ỹ
y
), gS(x,x̃)(x
′) =
ỹ
y
gS(
x
x̃
x′) = ỹ
y
gS(x̄). With ỹ = gS(x̃) and because y ≤ gS(x)
gS(x,x̃)(x
′) ≥ gS(x̃)
gS(x)
gS(x̄) (2)
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Now we will deduce a result for the second coordinate to fulfill the condition of
claim (2).
Claim 5. ∀x,x′ ∈ S with x ≫ 0 and gS(x) ̸= gS(x′), for x̃ ∈ S such that x̃ ∈(
min {x, x′} ,max {x, x′}
)
and ỹ = gS(x̃) then gS(x,x̃)(x
′) > gS(x
′).
Proof. As x̃ ∈
(
min {x, x′} ,max {x, x′}
)
claim ( 3) is applicable and x′ ≤ x̃
x
S1 =
S1(x,x̃). Therefore conditions to apply claim (4) are satisfied and gS(x,x̃)(x
′) ≥ gS(x̃)
gS(x)
gS(x̄)
taking logarithms and considering w(·) = log gS(·) we get
log
(
gS(x,x̃)(x
′)
)
≥ w(x̃)− w(x) + w(x̄)
As min {x, x′} < x̃ < max {x, x′} there is a 0 < θ < 1 such that x̃ = xθx′1−θ
and x̄ = x
x̃
x′ = x1−θx′θ. Using a particular case of Jensen’s inequality we know that
xθx′1−θ ≤ θx+(1−θ)x′ and as the function w(·) is non increasing w(x̃) = w(xθx′1−θ) ≥
w
(
θx + (1 − θ)x′
)
> θw(x) + (1 − θ)w(x′), the last inequality is derived from strict
concavity of wS(·), (the logarithm is a strictly concave function and gS(·) is a concave
function) and gS(x) ̸= gS(x′). Applying this reason to the entire equation
log
(
gS(x,x̃)(x
′)
)
≥ w(x̃)− w(x) + w(x̄) = w
(
xθx′
1−θ)− w(x) + w(x1−θx′θ)
non-increasing︷︸︸︷
≥ w
(
θx+ (1− θ)x′
)
− w(x) + w
(
(1− θ)x+ θx′
) concavity︷︸︸︷
>[
θw(x) + (1− θ)w(x′)
]
− w(x) +
[
(1− θ)w(x) + θw(x′)
]
= w(x′)
Taking exponentials in this inequality we prove that gS(x,x̃)(x
′) > gS(x
′).
The next result involves almost no derivation, however it is essential for later use,
and for that reason, it has a lemma of its own.
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Lemma 2. ∀x,x′ ∈ S with x ≫ 0 and gS(x) ̸= gS(x′) for x̃ ∈ S such that x̃ ∈(
min {x, x′} ,max {x, x′}
)
and ỹ = gS(x̃) then
(
x′, gS(x
′)
)
∈ S(x,x̃).
Proof. By claim (3) x′ ≤ x̃
x
S1, claim (5) insures that gS(x,x̃)(x
′) > gS(x
′), and with
these conditions we can apply claim (2) and derive that
(
x′, gS(x
′)
)
∈ S(x,x̃).
By now we prepared the sufficient results to prove lemma (1) which will be the
main instrument for proving the continuity of the bargaining solution c(·).
Proof. By claim (2) it is sufficient to find s̃ ∈ int(S) such that x′ < x̃
x
S1 and gS(x
′) <
gS(x,x̃)(x
′). By claim (3) as long as x̃ ∈
(
min {x, x′} ,max {x, x′}
)
, the first inequality
is respected. With ỹ = gS(x̃), by claim (5), gS(x,x̃)(x
′) > gS(x
′) ≥ y′. We saw on claim
(4) that gS(x,x̃)(x
′) = ỹ
y
gS(x
′ x
x̃
), and so is continuous on ỹ, if instead of ỹ = gS(x̃)
we choose a value of ỹ sufficiently close to gS(x̃) the inequality is preserved and the
second condition of claim (2) is satisfied. Concluding x̃ ∈
(
min {x, x′} ,max {x, x′}
)
and ỹ < gS(x̃), hence x̃ = (x̃, ỹ) ∈ int(S).
Up until now we used only the PO and the AT axioms, (jointly with the convexity
restriction of the bargaining set). The next two theorems will bring Sym and IIAm
into play. In theorem (2) the first of these axioms is used to prove that the bargaining
choice of any set has both players receiving strictly positive payoff, that is for any
S ∈ S+, c(S)1c(S)2 > 0. Theorem (1) proves, through the use of lemma (1), that
the IIAm is equivalent to Nash’s IIA, by saying that the set of choices for any set
only has one element, |c(S)| = 1. For this reason after the proof we will use Nash’s
original axiom.
Theorem 1. : ∀S ∈ S, |c(S)| = 1.
Proof. If S = {(0, 0)} the solution must be unique. If S1 = 0 then by Pareto opti-
mality c(S) = (0, S2) and |c(S)| = 1. If Si > 0 for both i = 1, 2 and the choices of
the bargaining function are more than one, |c(S)| ≥ 2, take x,x′ ∈ c(S). Suppose
x = x′ then by Pareto optimality y = gs(x) = gS(x
′) = y′ and x = x′ contradicting
the hypothesis of |c(S)| ≥ 2. For this reason we must have x ̸= x′ and y ̸= y′. Due
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to S1 > 0, S2 > 0 and gS(x) = y ̸= y′ = gS(x′), we can apply lemma (1), ∃x̃ ∈ int(S)
such that x′ ∈ int
(
S(x,x̃)
)
. We know c
(
S(x,x̃)
)
= c
(
x̃
x
S
)
= x̃
x
c
(
S
)
∋ x̃
x
x = x̃. As
x̃ ∈ S then x̃ ∈ S(x,x̃) ∩ S ⊆ S(x,x̃), and, by IIAm axiom, we get x̃ ∈ c
(
S(x,x̃) ∩ S
)
.
Lemma (1) guarantees that x′ ∈ int
(
S(x,x̃)
)
then x′ ∈ S(x,x̃) ∩ S and by IIAm,
x′ ∈ c
(
S(x,x̃) ∩ S
)
. But we have an interior point, and therefore pareto dominated,
as one of the choices of S(x,x̃), contradicting this way PO axiom. Thus we can not
have |c(S)| ≥ 2.
Theorem 2. : If Si > 0 then c(S)i > 0 with i = 1, 2.
Proof. If C(S)1 = 0 due to the non increasing frontier of the set S, gS(·) is non
increasing, gS
(
0
)
= S2, and by PO c(S)2 = gS
(
c(S)1
)
= S2, so C(S) = (0, S2).
Choosing α ∈ R2+ such that α1 = 1 and α2 = S1/S2, then c(αS) = (0, S1). Con-
sider ∆ = ch
{
(0, 0), (0, S1), (S1, 0)
}
,
{
(0, 0), (0, S1), (S1, 0)
}
⊂ αS and αS is convex,
then ∆ ⊆ αS and by IIA, c(∆) = (0, S1). ∆ is symmetric and by symmetry axiom
c1(∆) = c2(∆), we get a contradiction.
After this small digression we go back to proving the continuity of the bargaining
solution. The next very simple claim shows that if a sequence of sets
{
Sk
}∞
k=1
converge
to S then a convergent sequence of points with xk ∈ Sk must converge to a point in
S, the limit of Sk.
Claim 6. : If Sk → S and Sk ∋ xk → x then x ∈ S
Proof. if x /∈ S, define d(x, S) = ϵ. As xk → x, ∃K ∈ N where xk ∈ Bϵ/2(x),∀k >
K. By triangle inequality
d(x, S) ≤ d(xk,x) + d(xk, S) ⇔ d(xk, S) ≥ d(x, S)− d(xk,x) ⇔ d(xk, S) ≥ ϵ/2
Then d(Sk, S) ≥ ϵ/2, ∀k > K, meaning that Sk 9 S, a contradiction.
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An immediate and simple implication of the IIA axiom is that two sets with
different bargaining choices cannot simultaneously contain the other’s solution. The
next claim, which will be used in the next theorem, proves it.
Claim 7. : S, S ′ ∈ S+, c(S) ̸= c(S ′) and c(S) ∈ S ′, then c(S ′) /∈ S.
Proof. c(S) ∈ S ′, so c(S) ∈ S ∩ S ′, then by IIA c(S ′ ∩ S) = c(S). If c(S ′) ∈ S then
by IIA c(S ′ ∩ S) = c(S ′), we get a contradiction once c(S ′) ̸= c(S).
Theorem 3. The function c(·) is continuous on S+.
Proof. Assume c(·) is not continuous, then exists a sequence of sets Sk ∈ S+ conver-
gent to S ∈ S+, Sk → S, but the bargaining choice c(Sk) = xk does not converge
to x∗ = c(S), xk 9 x∗. Let’s start by also assuming that {xk}∞k=1 is convergent to
the point x′ ∈ R2+. As S ∈ S+, S1 > 0 and S2 > 0, theorem (2) insures x∗ ≫ 0.
With α = (1, x∗
y∗), αSk → αS, and c(αSk) = αc(Sk) → αx
′ ̸= αx∗ = αc(S), with
αc(S) = (x∗, x∗). Therefore, if the sets Sk → S and c(Sk) 9 c(S), then exists sets
S ′k → S ′ with c(S ′k) 9 c(S ′) with the additional property c(S ′)1 = c(S ′)2. So we will
assume that x∗ = (x∗, x∗).
Case 1: x∗ = x′ or x∗ = y′
We will show that exists a point in x̄k ∈ Sk, and in the line x = y, so x̄k = (xk, xk),
such that for large k x̄k it is better than the choice c(Sk). To prove that such point
exist we will start by claiming that there is a sequence of points (dk, dk) ∈ Sk which
converges to the solution of set S, x∗ = c(S).
Claim 8. If c(S) = (x∗, x∗), Sk → S, then dk = max{d : (d, d) ∈ Sk} → x∗
Proof. Define Sk|1 = {s : (s, s) ∈ Sk} and S|1 = {s : (s, s) ∈ S}. As d(Sk, S) → 0,
for any s̃ ∈ S|1, d(s̃, Sk) → 0, that is, for any ϵ > 0, ∃s̃k ∈ Sk with d(s̃, s̃k) < ϵ.
Take s̄k = (1, 1)min{s̃k,1, s̃k,2}, due to the comprehensive nature of the sets Sk,
if s̃k ∈ Sk then as s̄k ≤ s̃k, s̄k ∈ Sk. The distance between s̄k and s̃ at each
coordinate is the same, as they both belong to the line x = y and d(s̄k, s̃) =
11
max
{
|s̄k,1 − s̃1|, |s̄k,2 − s̃2|
}
= |s̄k,1 − s̃1| = |min
{
s̃k,1, s̃k,2
}
− s̃1|. Thus we con-
clude that d(s̄k, s̃) ≤ max{|s̃k,1− s̃1|, |s̃k,2− s̃1|} = d(s̃k, s̃) < ϵ. The same calculation
could be done for any point in s̃k ∈ Sk|1, we then find a point s̃ ∈ S with d
(
s̃k, s̃
)
< ϵ
and for s̄ = (1, 1)min{s̃1, s̃2}, d
(
s̃k, s̄
)
< ϵ for k big enough, proving that Sk|1 → S|1.
Notice that due to pareto optimality x∗ = max {s : (s, s) ∈ S} = max{s : s ∈ S|1}
and dk = max{s : s ∈ Sk|1}. As the maximum function is continuous dk = max{s :
s ∈ Sk|1} → max{s : s ∈ S|1} = x∗.
The points we are looking for, points x̄k which are better than c(Sk), will be created
by defining the mean of the coordinates of c(Sk) = xk = (xk, yk), so x̄k =
xk+yk
2
. The
next result shows that the point on the line x = y with coordinates equal to x̄k,
x̄k = x̄k(1, 1) does, for large k, also belong to set Sk.
Claim 9. ∃K ∈ N : k > K, x̄k ∈ Sk
Proof. By hypothesis
{
xk
}∞
k=1
is a convergent sequence, by claim (6) limxk = x
′ ∈ S.
Without loss of generality assume x∗ = x′ (in the present case, either this is true or
x∗ = y′) as x∗ ̸= x′, by pareto optimality y′ < y∗ = x∗. Defining, consistently,
x̄′ = x
′+y′
2
we have that x̄k → x̄′ = x
′+y′
2
< x
∗+y∗
2
= x∗. By claim (8) dk → x∗, so
∃k ∈ N such that x̄k < dk. By definition of dk, dk = (dk, dk) ∈ Sk also 0 ∈ Sk, and
∃α ∈ (0, 1) such that x̄k = αdk+(1−α)0, hence x̄k ∈ Sk due to Sk being convex.
We know x̄k ∈ Sk and that c(Sk) = xk, we will now find a set Ak with c(Ak) = x̄k
and xk ∈ Ak, contradicting in this way claim (7). The setAk = ch {(0, 0); (xk, yk), (yk, xk)}
is symmetric, and by axiom Sym, c(Ak) must be such that c(Ak)1 = c(Ak)2, by PO
axiom c(Ak) = x̄k. By the previous claim (9) c(Ak) = x̄k ∈ Sk for large k, and by
construction of Ak, c(Sk) = xk ∈ Ak, but x̄k ̸= xk, (remember x̄k = ȳk but xk ̸= yk
for large k because x′ ̸= y′), we get a contradiction.
Case 2 Now we will consider the case in which x∗ ̸= x′ and x∗ ̸= y′. If we prove
that it exists x̃ ∈ S, such that for at least one k ∈ N, xk ∈ S(x∗,x̃) and x̃ ∈ Sk we
get a contradiction, because c
(
S(x∗,x̃)
)
= x̃ and c(Sk) = xk contradicting claim (7),
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as long as xk ̸= x̃. As Si > 0 and lemma (1) is applicable, ∃x̃ ∈ int(S) such that
x′ ∈ int
(
S(x∗,x̃)
)
, therefore, as xk → x′, xk ∈ int
(
S(x∗,x̃)
)
for large k. Because
x̃ ∈ int(S) and Sk → S, then x̃ ∈ Sk for large k. The contradiction is obtained, and
therefore c(·) must be continuous.
We started by assuming that {xk}∞k=1 was convergent, if it is not convergent, as
Sk → S, for big values of k, Sk ⊂ R =
{
s : 0 ≤ s ≤
(
S1 + 1, S2 + 1
)}
. The rectangle
R is compact and for the sequence {xk}∞k=1 ⊂ R not to converge is because it has
(at least) two subsequences converging to different values. However, as we just saw,
any converging subsequence must converge to x∗, hence it is impossible to have two
subsequences converging to a value that is not x∗.
Corollary 1. If c(·) is symmetric, pareto optimal, IIA and ILT then c(S) maximizes
a real valued function f on S ∈ S
Proof. As c(·) is symmetric, pareto optimal, IIA and ILT then by theorem (3) c(·)
is continuous in S, and by corollary 5.7 in Peters and Wakker(91) c(S) maximizes a
real valued function.
4 The Social Function is u(x, y) = xy
Thus far we discovered that the choice function c(·) is the result of the maximization
process of a social function f(·). In this chapter we will deduce the shape of this func-
tion, but as it is well known f(·) is not unique, any positive monotonic transformation
of it can be used as a social function. To unveil the shape of one of those functions, we
will initially concentrate on properties of the curves that represent the lower bound of
the upper contour set, yk(·). Later we will prove that these curves are the indifference
curves of a particular social function h(·), and it is supported on this function that
the Nash bargaining solution will be derived. But first of all, we will prove that any
function f(·) representing the bargaining solution c(S) = argmaxx∈S f(x) must be
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strictly quasiconcave, this is a basic stepping stone on the following derivation. In
this section we will use intensively lines with negative slope as the bargaining set, so,
before advancing, some results and definitions need to be introduced.
Definition 1. Let L− be the set of negatively sloped lines in R2+
L− =
{
S ∈ S+ : ∃a > 0, b ≤ 0,∀(s1, s2) ∈ S, s2 = a+ bs1
}
(3)
The following set of results for lines in L− are proved in the appendix. a[L] is the
constant coefficient, b[L] is the slope of L; Li is the maximum value assumed by the
ith argument.
Proposition 1. For L,L′ ∈ L−, and for α = (α1, α2) ≫ 0
1. a[L] = L2 and b[L] = −L2
L1
2. αL ∈ L− and a[αL] = α2a[L] and b[αL] = α2α1 b[L]
3. ∃α ∈ R2+ such that αL = L′ with α2 =
a[L′]
a[L]
and α1 =
a[L′]
a[L]
b[L]
b[L′]
4. ∀x ∈ R2+ , ∃L ∈ L− such that c(L) = x
4.1 f(x, y) is strictly quasiconcave
Theorem 4. If c(S) = argmaxx∈S f(x) then f(x, y) is strictly quasiconcave.
Proof. A direct implication of the PO axiom is that the function f(x, y) must be
strictly increasing in both arguments. For any L ∈ L−, with gL(x) : [0, L1] → [0, L2]
such that (x, gL(x)) ∈ L, define t(x) = f
(
x, gL(x)
)
. We will prove that ∃x2 ∈
[0, L1] such that t(·) is strictly increasing for x ∈ [0, x2] and strictly decreasing if
x ∈ [x2, L1]. Choose x2 = c(S) =
(
x2, gL(x2)
)
, if, for any x0 < x1 < x2 with
xi = (xi, gL(xi)), x0 ∈ L(x2,x1) then t(·) is strictly increasing for x < x2. Because
x1 = c
(
L(x2,x1)
)
= argmaxx∈L(x2,x1) f(x), then f(x1) > f(x),∀x ∈ L(x2,x1). So
we only need to prove that x0 ∈ L(x2,x1). In lemma (2) we proved that when x̃ ∈(
min {x, x′} ,max {x, x′}
)
, ỹ = gS(x̃) and gS(x) ̸= gS(x′) then
(
x′, gS(x
′)
)
∈ S(x,x̃).
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Replacing x, x′, x̃ by x2, x0, x1, then x1 ∈ (x0, x2) and we obtain the desired result
that x0 ∈ S(x2,x1). To prove that f(·) is decreasing when x > x2 we use the same
reasoning, this time with x1 ∈ (x2, x0), and prove again that x0 ∈ S(x2,x1).
For the function f(·) to be strictly quasiconcave, for any x0,x1 and any α ∈ (0, 1),
xα = αx0+(1−α)x1 we have that f(xα) > max{f(x0), f(x1)}. Let L[x0,x1] ∈ S+
stand for the line that passes through x0 and x1. Let x2 be the point at which
t(x2) > t(x), ∀x ∈ [0, L1]. When:
• x0 < x1 ≤ x2, as previously seen, t(x) is increasing between x0 and x1 and, as
x0 < xα < x1, f(xα) = t(xα) > t(x0) ≥ min{f(x0), f(x1)}.
• x2 ≤ x0 < x1 then x0 < xα < x1, as t(·) is decreasing for x > x2, t(xα) > t(x1),
f(xα) > f(x1) ≥ min{f(x0), f(x1)}.
• x0 ≤ x2 ≤ x1, and x0 < xα ≤ x2, t(xα) > t(x0) and f(xα) > f(x0) ≥
min{f(x0), f(x1)}.
• x0 ≤ x2 ≤ x1 and x2 ≤ xα < x1, t(xα) > t(x1) and f(xα) > f(x1) ≥
min{f(x0), f(x1)}
We conclude that f(xα) = t(xα) > min{t(x1), t(x2)} = min{f(x1), f(x2)} and
for any possibility f(xα) = f(αx1 +(1−α)x2) > min{f(x1), f(x2)}, the function is
strictly quasiconcave.
4.2 The Properties of yk(x)
The curves yk(·) are built on the following way: for a fixed x ∈ R+ and for a possible
value of f(·), k, we find the set of y’s such that f(x, y) ≥ k, and from this set we
choose the infimum. Firstly, we need to prove that yk(·) is well defined, that is, that
for the relevant values of k, the sets
{
y ∈ R+ : f(x, y) ≥ k
}
are non empty for all
x. The next theorem will show it. In the proof of this result we will use an operator
T (L) which transforms a line L ∈ L− into another line T (L). The new line T (L) is
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such that it passes through c(L), this way we guarantee that the choice of the new
line c
(
T (L)
)
is better than c(L), and also, due to theorem (4) better than any point
on the line T (L) between c(L) and c
(
T (L)
)
.
What T (L) will do, for a given line L in L−, is to pick the points c(L) = (x∗, y∗),
the bargaining solution, and the point (x
∗+xm
2
, 0), in which xm = L1, and with these
two points define a new line L′ = T (L) that passes through them. L′ is such that it’s
parameters a = a[L′] and b = b[L′] solve the following equations:
y∗ = a+ bx
∗
0 = a+ bx
∗+xm
2
⇔
b = −2
y∗
xm−x∗
a = −bx∗+xm
2
(4)
In theorem (2) we derived that c(L′) ≫ 0 so xm > x∗, hence b < 0 and a > 0,
meaning that L′ ∈ L−. Lets define the operation of transforming a line L in the new
line L′ formally.
Definition 2. Let T : L− → L− with x∗ = c(L) ∈ T (L) and (x∗+xm
2
, 0) ∈ T (L).
We can apply the operator T (·) to a line that is already the result of an application
of the operator, and have T
(
T (L)
)
= T 2(L). We can proceed like this n times and
getting the line T n(L). The next result establishes that the application of the T (·)
operator n times is like multiplying the initial line L by a constant α ∈ R2+ n times.
Lemma 3. ∀n ∈ N and ∀L ∈ L−, T n(L) = αnL with α1 < 1
Proof. We will prove this result by induction. First, for n = 1, we will derive the
value of α such that L′ = T (L) = αL. The maximum in the first coordinate of L′
is, due to the negative slope of L′, when y = 0, and this is by definition (2) of T (·),
x′m = x
∗+xm
2
. By lemma (2) y∗ > 0 then x∗ < xm, and x′m = x
∗+xm
2
< xm. Also as α
is such that αL = L′ has, by (3) of proposition (1), α1 =
a[L′]
a[L]
b[L]
b[L′]
using number (1)
of the same lemma we get that
α1 =
L2
′
L2
[
−L2
L1
−L
′2
L
′1
]
=
L
′1
L1
=
x′m
xm
=
1 + x∗/xm
2
< 1
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.
Any point (x, y) belonging to the initial line L must, due to the equality (1) of
proposition (1), satisfy the equation y = ym − ym
xm
x, then y∗ = ym − ym
xm
x∗. Re-
placing this on equation (4), we obtain the formula b = b[L′] = −2y
m− y
m
xm
x∗
xm−x∗ =
−2ym xm−x∗
xm(xm−x∗) = −2
ym
xm
= 2b[L], the new line has twice the slope of the initial
one. We know the slope of any line is the ratio of the maximums, this ratio of line
L′ = T (L) is y
′m
x′m
and so y
′m
x′m
= 2 y
m
xm
. Using this equality on equation (2) of proposition
(1) we derive α2 =
a[L′]
a[L]
= L
′2
L2
= y
′m
ym
= 2x
′m
xm
= 2α1, α = (α1, 2α1). The claim is true
for n = 1.
Suppose the claim is true to n − 1 and T n−1(L) = αn−1L. T n(L) = T
(
T n−1(L)
)
so T n(L) passes by c
(
T n−1(L)
)
= c
(
αn−1L
)
= αn−1c(L) = αn−1(x∗, y∗). If the
maximum of the first coordinate in L is xm the maximum in αL is α1x
m, consequently
the maximum in T n−1(L) is αn−11 x
m, and T n(L) passes also by
(
αn−11 x
m+αn−11 x
∗
2
, 0
)
=
αn−11
(
xm+x∗
2
, 0
)
. As T n(L) and T n−1(L) are in L− by proposition (1), ∃β ∈ R2+ such
that T n(L) = βT n−1(L), we will find the value of such β.
The coefficients, an and bn, of the line that passes by α
n−1
1
(
xm+x∗
2
, 0
)
andαn−1(x∗, y∗)
solve the following system of equations
α
n−1
2 y
∗ = an + bnα
n−1
1 x
∗
0 = an + bnα
n−1
1
x∗+xm
2
⇔
 bn = −2
(
α2
α1
)n−1 y∗
xm−x∗
an = −bnαn−11 x
∗+xm
2
We already saw that y∗
xm−x∗ =
ym
xm
and bn = −2n y
m
xm
, because α2 = 2α1. Due to
bn =
β2
β1
bn−1, and to bn−1 = −T
n−1(L)2
Tn−1(L)1
= −2n−1 ym
xm
we get 2n y
m
xm
= β2
β1
2n−1 y
m
xm
, deriving
β2
β1
= 2. β1 is the ratio of the maximums in the first component of T
n−1(L) and
T n(L), β1 =
αn−11
xm+x∗
2
αn−11 x
m = α1. β1 = α1 then β2 = 2β1 = 2α1 = α2. Concluding
T n(L) = βT n−1(L) = αT n−1(L) = αnL.
Lemma 4. ∀x0 = (x0, y0) ∈ R2+ and ∀0 < x1 < x0, ∃y1 : f(x1) > f(x0).
Proof. Let us first define c
(
T n(L)
)
= zn = (zn1 , z
n
2 ). Due to the way T (·) was
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built, in particular to zn−1 = c(T n−1(L)) ∈ T n(L) and zn ̸= zn−1 we know that
f(zn) > f(zn−1), and we can conclude that f(zn) > f(z0). Choosing L in a way
that (x0, y0) ∈ L we have that f(z0) > f(x0, y0) and f(zn) > f(x0, y0). zn1 = αn1z01 ,
as α1 < 1, it is possible to find an n such that z
n
1 = α
n
1z
0
1 ≤ x1 < αn−11 z01 = zn−11 .
Chose y1 in a way that x1 = (x1, y1) ∈ T n(L). Due to theorem (4) we know that
the function f(·) is decreasing along the line T n(L) for x > zn1 , as zn1 ≤ x1 < zn−11
then f(x1) > f(z
n−1) because both x1 and z
n−1 belong to T n(L). Finally f(x1) >
f(zn−1) ≥ f(x0).
Theorem 5. ∀x ∈ R2+, ∀w ∈ R+ the set {z : f(w, z) ≥ f(x)} is non empty.
Proof. x = (x, y) if w < x by lemma (4) ∃z such that f(w, z) > f(x) and the set
{z : f(w, z) ≥ f(x)} is non empty. If w > x then, due to pareto optimality, the
function f(·) increasing in both arguments f(w, y) > f(x).
Now we can define the function yk(·) for any k ∈ ch
{
f(x) : x ∈ R2+
}
, knowing it
is well defined for any x, once an immediate implication of the theorem (5) is that
the set Y kx = {y ∈ R+ : f(x, y) ≥ k} is non empty.
Definition 3. Let U = ch
{
f(x) : x ∈ R2+
}
, for k ∈ U then
yk(x) = inf{y ∈ R+ : f(x, y) ≥ k} (5)
The two next claims prove that yk(x) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex.
Claim 10. The function yk(x) is decreasing and strictly decreasing if yk(x) > 0.
Proof. When x > x′, f(x, y) ≥ f(x′, y) and Y kx ⊇ Y kx′ , hence inf Y kx ≤ inf Y kx′ , meaning
yk(x) ≤ yk(x′), and yk(x) is decreasing.
Assume yk(x) = yk(x
′), then ∀x̃ ∈ (x′, x), yk(x′) ≥ yk(x̃) ≥ yk(x) = yk(x′), and
yk(x̃) = yk(x). Also ∀ϵ > 0, f
(
x̃, yk(x̃) + ϵ
)
> k, if f
(
x̃, yk(x̃) + ϵ
)
≤ k, as f(·) is
strictly increasing for any ϵ′ < ϵ, f
(
x̃, yk(x̃)+ ϵ
′) < f(x̃, yk(x̃)+ ϵ) ≤ k, meaning that
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f(x̃, y) ≥ k only if y ≥ yk(x̃) + ϵ, then yk(x̃) = inf{y ∈ R+ : f(x̃, y) ≥ k} ≥ yk(x̃) + ϵ,
and we get a contradiction yk(x̃) ≥ yk(x̃)+ϵ. By a similar argument f
(
x̃, yk(x̃)−ϵ
)
<
k, otherwise yk(x̃) ≤ yk(x̃)− ϵ.
Pick a point x̃ ∈ R2+ such that x̃ ∈ (x, x′) and ỹ = yk(x̃), let the line L ∈ L−
be such that c(L) = x̃ and chose x̄ = (x̄, ȳ) with x < x̄ < x̃. As x̄ < x̃ and
b[L] < 0 we have that ȳ = a[L] + b[L]x̄ > a[L] + b[L]x̃ = ỹ, define ỹ
ȳ
< α2 < 1. With
α = (1, α2) the choice c
(
αL
)
= αc(L) =
(
x̃, α2yk(x̃)
)
, and as α2yk(x̃) < yk(x̃) we
have, for some ϵ = yk(x̃) − α2yk(x̃) > 0, f
(
c
(
αL
))
= f
(
αc(L)
)
= f
(
x̃, α2yk(x̃)
)
=
f
(
x̃, yk(x̃) − ϵ
)
< k. However α(x̄, ȳ) = (x̄, α2ȳ) and α2ȳ > ỹ = yk(x̃), yk(·) is con-
stant in (x, x′) yk(x̃) = yk(x̄), hence α2ȳ > yk(x̄). And with ϵ = α2ȳ − yk(x̄) > 0,
f(x̄, α2ȳ) = f(x̄, yk(x̄) + ϵ) > k. So f(αx̄) = f(x̄, α2ȳ) > f
(
c
(
αL
))
, we got a
contradiction because f
(
c
(
αL
))
should be the biggest in αL, yk(·) must be strictly
decreasing.
Claim 11. The function yk(x) is strictly convex.
Proof. Pick two points x,x′ in R2+, with both points on the same indifference curve,
x =
(
x, yk(x)
)
and x′ =
(
x′, yk(x
′)
)
, for any α ∈ [0, 1] define xα = αx + (1 − α)x′.
Take two converging sequences {ynx}∞n=1 and {ynx′}∞n=1 with ynx → yk(x), ynx′ → yk(x′)
and ynx > yk(x), y
n
x′ > yk(x
′). As we saw in the previous proof f(x, ynx) > k and
f(x, ynx′) > k, with y
α
n = αy
n
x +(1−α)ynx′ , by function f(·) quasiconcavity, lemma (4),
we know that f(xα, yαn) ≥ min{f
(
x, ynx
)
, f
(
x′, ynx′
)
} > k. Therefore yαn ∈ Y kxα , and
yk(x
α) = inf Y kxα ≤ yαn , and yk(xα) ≤ limn yαn = limn αynx + (1− α)ynx′ = αyk(x) + (1−
α)yk(x
′). This result is verified for any x, x′ and xα, consequently the function yk(·)
is convex.
If yk(·) is not strictly convex, exists x and x′ such that yk(xα) = αyk(x) + (1 −
α)yk(x
′), as yk(·) is convex we know Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang (2010, p.17)
that the function R(x′, x) = yk(x
′)−yk(x)
x′−x is nondecreasing in x for a fixed x
′, (and
nondecreasing in x′ for a fixed x). Then R(xα, x) = yk(x
α)−yk(x)
xα−x =
(1−α)
(
yk(x
′)−yk(x)
)
(1−α)(x′−x) =
R(x′, x), as the functionR(x′, x) nondecreases for xα ≤ xβ ≤ x′, R(xα, x) ≤ R(xβ, x) ≤
19
R(x′, x), then R(x′, x) = R(xβ, x), which is equivalent to yk(x
β) = βyk(x) + (1 −
β)yk(x
′). By a similar argument to the one used in claim (10), we know f
(
xβ, yk(x
β)−
ϵ
)
< k < f
(
xβ, yk(x
β) + ϵ
)
, for any ϵ > 0.
Pick a point x̃ over the line yk(·) such that: x̃ ∈ (x, x′) and ỹ = yk(x̃); pick the line
L̃ such that c(L̃) = x̃ and b[L] ̸= b = yk(x)−yk(x
′)
x−x′ . A point x̃ and a line L̃ with those
conditions always exists. Consider the line L =
{
(x, y) : y = 2− x
}
, it is symmetric
and c(L) = (1, 1), so x̃ = c(x̃L). If the initial point chosen x̃ is such that the slope
b(x̃L) = b, pick x̄, another point over the indifference curve yk(·), so ȳ = yk(x̄). The
line x̄L, that has x̄ = c
(
x̄L
)
can be rewritten as x̄
x̃
x̃L, with α = x̄
x̃
=
(
x̄
x̃
, ȳ
ỹ
)
and
using point (2) of proposition (1), b[x̄L] = b[αx̃L] = α2
α1
b[x̃L] = α2
α1
b. Calculating
α2
α1
= ȳ/ỹ
x̃/x̄
= ȳ/x̄
ỹ/x̃
= a/x̄+b
a/x̃+b
̸= 1, and b[x̄L] ̸= b, because ỹ = yk(x̃) = a + bx̃ and
ȳ = yk(x̄) = a+ bx̄.
Having chosen the point x̃ and the line L̃ and knowing that yk(·) is a line for
any value between x and x′, we can write that yk(x̄) = a + bx̄ for any x < x̄ < x
′.
The point x̃ = (x̃, ỹ) is on both lines, L̃ and yk(·), so yk(x̃) = a + bỹ = a[L̃] + b[L̃]x̃.
Suppose that b[L̃] > b, pick a point x̄ such that x < x̃ < x̄ < x′ and let x̄ = (x̄, ȳ) ∈ L̃,
as the point is on the line L̃, ȳ = a[L̃] + b[L̃]x̄. Calculate ȳ − yk(x̄)
ȳ − yk(x̄) =
[
a[L̃] + b[L̃]x̄
]
−
[
a+ bx̄
]
=
[
a[L̃] + b[L̃]x̃+ b[L̃](x̄− x̃)
]
−
[
a+ bx̃+ b(x̄− x̃)
]
=b[L̃](x̄− x̃)− b(x̄− x̃) = (b[L̃]− b)(x̄− x̃)
As b[L̃] > b and x̄ > x̃, ȳ − yk(x̄) > 0. Chose α2 with yk(x̄)ȳ < α2 < 1 and
α = (1, α2), we know c(αL̃) = (x̃, α2ỹ) and α2ỹ < ỹ = yk(x̃), so f
(
c
(
αL̃
))
< k.
However, αx̄ ∈ αL and α2ȳ > yk(x̄), therefore f(αx̄) > k and we get a contradic-
tion, because f
(
c
(
αL̃
))
< k < f(αx̄), c
(
αL̃
)
is not the best. yk(·) must be strictly
convex. If b[L̃] < b the proof follows the same lines but choosing a point x̄ with
x < x̄ < x̃ < x′.
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Convexity of yk(·) implies that lateral derivatives of yk(·) exist everywhere Avriel,
Diewert, Schaible, and Zang (2010, p. 20). The next theorem will prove that yk(·) is
differentiable, and from there goes to show that it is at the tangency between L and
yk(·) that the maximum is attained. This theorem starts to unveil that the curves of
yk(·) are the indifference curves of the social function.
Theorem 6. The point x = (x, y) ∈ R2+ is the choice of a line L = {(x, y) : y = a+ bx},
c(L) = x, if and only if for k = f(x), y′k(x) = b
This theorem assumes one strong fact not yet proven, namely the differentiability
of yk(x), so we will need to show that this is true. Before that, however, we need to
prove a milder version of the necessary condition of the theorem, that the point x̃ on
the line L with y′k(x̃
−) ≤ b ≤ y′k(x̃+) must be the choice on the set L, x̃ = c(L).
Claim 12. If the line L = {(x, y) : y = a+ bx} is such that x̃ =
(
x̃, yk(x̃)
)
∈ L and
y′k(x̃
−) ≤ b ≤ y′k(x̃+) then c(L) = x̃.
Proof. As x̃ ∈ L then yk(x̃) = a+ bx̃. We know Rk(x, x̃) = yk(x)−yk(x̃)x−x̃ is increasing in
x, so y′k(x̃
−) = limϵ↓0 Rk(x̃− ϵ, x̃) > Rk(x, x̃) for x < x̃. Then Rk(x, x̃) < y′(x̃−) ≤ b,
and after some easy calculation we get that b(x − x̃) < yk(x) − yk(x̃), using that
yk(x̃) = a+ bx̃, a+ bx < yk(x) for any x < x̃. So the function gk(x) = yk(x)− (a+ bx)
is positive whenever x < x̃. The function gk(·) is, due to yk(·) convexity, also convex.
And R̄k(x, x̃) =
gk(x)−gk(x̃)
x−x̃ is increasing in x. For x0 < x1 < x̃, R̄k(x0, x̃) < R̄k(x1, x̃)
due to gk(x̃) = 0 we get
gk(x0)
x0−x̃ <
gk(x1)
x1−x̃ and as x0 − x̃ < 0, gk(x0) > gk(x1)
x0−x̃
x1−x̃ ,
as x̃−x0
x̃−x1 > 1 we get gk(x0) > gk(x1). The function gk(x) is decreasing for x < x̃.
Applying the same calculations for x > x̃ we conclude gk(x) is increasing in this
case. Therefore, for any given ϵ > 0, we can chose the maximum of gk(x) in a closed
neighbourhood of x̃, cl
(
Nϵ(x̃)
)
, and we know from the increasing-decreasing nature
of gk(x) that the maximum will be on one of the most distant point from x̃, we define
aϵ = sup
x∈cl
(
Nϵ(x̃)
) gk(x) = max{gk(x̃−ϵ), gk(x̃+ϵ)}. Let Aϵ = {x : gk(x) ≤ aϵ} be the
set of points x for which the line L is at distance aϵ or less from yk(x). Again by the
nature of gk(x), those points must belong to the ϵ neighbourhood of x̃, Aϵ ⊆ cl
(
Nϵ(x̃)
)
.
Define
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Laϵ =
{
(x, y) : y = a+ bx+ aϵ
}
For the points (x, y) ∈ Laϵ : if x ∈ Aϵ then gk(x) ≤ aϵ ⇔ yk(x) ≤ a + bx + aϵ = y
and f(x, y) ≥ k; if x /∈ Aϵ, gk(x) > aϵ ⇔ yk(x) > a + bx + aϵ = y and f(x, y) < k.
Hence with c(Laϵ) = argmaxx∈Laϵ f(x), c(Laϵ)1 ∈ Aϵ ⊆ cl
(
Nϵ(x̃)
)
. gk(x) is contin-
uous then aϵ ↓ 0 when ϵ ↓ 0, and Laϵ → L, by theorem (3) c(Laϵ) → c(L). As
c(Lϵ)1 ∈ cl
(
Nϵ(x̃)
)
→ {x̃}, c(L) =
(
x̃, yk(x̃)
)
= x̃.
The previous claim is sufficient to establish that functions yk(·) are differentiable
everywhere.
Claim 13. ∀k, yk(·) is differentiable.
Proof. If yk(·) is not differentiable ∃x such that y′k(x−) < y′k(x+), pick two lines L and
L′ to which
(
x, yk(x)
)
belongs, and y′k(x
−) < b[L] < b[L′] < y′k(x
+). By claim (12) the
optimal point is c(L) = c(L′) =
(
x, yk(x)
)
, but the α ∈ R2+ such that αL = L′ must
be different from (1, 1), otherwise L = L′, therefore c(L′) = C(αL) = αc(L) ̸= c(L),
a contradiction. It cannot exist x with y′k(x
−) < y′k(x
+).
We can now prove the theorem (6)
Proof. By claim (13) the curves yk(·) are differentiable, using this result on claim
(12) we get that if x = (x, y) ∈ L, with y = yk(x) and b[L] = y′k(x) then c(L) = x.
To prove sufficiency, assume that it is possible for (x, y) = c(L) with yk(x) = y but
b[L] = b ̸= y′k(x). Let’s assume y′k(x) > b, then limϵ→0
yk(x+ϵ)−yk(x)
ϵ
> b, meaning that
there is an ϵ̄ > 0 such that for any |ϵ′| < ϵ̄, yk(x+ϵ
′)−yk(x)
ϵ′
> b, for the point x we know
yk(x) = a+ bx and for ϵ
′ < 0, we get yk(x+ ϵ
′) < yk(x)+ bϵ
′ = a+ b(x+ ϵ′), in which,
naturally, as a = a[L] and b = b[L],
(
x + ϵ′, a + b(x + ϵ′)
)
∈ L, if x + ϵ′ > 0. But by
theorem (2) c(L) ≫ 0 and for small ϵ′, x + ϵ′ > 0, due to a + b(x + ϵ′) > yk(x + ϵ′),
f
(
x+ ϵ′, yk(x+ ϵ
′)
)
> k = f(x), a contradiction, x can not be c(L).
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Claim 14. ∀b < 0, ∀k ∈ U , ∃x ∈ R+ such that y′k(x) = b.
Proof. If condition is not satisfied then either b ∈ ch
{
y′k(x) : x ∈ R+
}
or b /∈
ch
{
y′k(x) : x ∈ R+
}
. If it is the first case then yk(·) must be discontinuous at one
point x̄, and limx→x̄− y
′
k(x) > limx→x̄+ y
′
k(x), by an argument equal to the one used
in claim (13) we prove such a discontinuity creates a contradiction with AT axiom.
If b /∈ ch
{
y′k(x) : x ∈ R+
}
, lets assume that b ≤ inf
{
y′k(x) : x ∈ R+
}
, as the y′k(·)
is increasing (a convex function derivative is increasing) then b ≤ limx→0+ y′k(x). For
x > 0, b < y′k(x), and we know R(x, x
′) = yk(x)−yk(x
′)
x−x′ is increasing in x
′ for a fixed x, so
limϵ→0R(x, x+ ϵ) > b, then R(x, x
′) > b, for x′ > x. So yk(x)−yk(x
′)
x−x′ > b, and noticing
that x− x′ < 0, yk(x)− yk(x′) < b(x− x′) as this inequality is valid for any positive
x, we can take limits, limx→0 yk(x)−yk(x′) < −bx′. Then limx→0 yk(x) < yk(x′)− bx′,
and the function yk(·) is bounded near the origin, let θ = limx→0 yk(x).
Let the line Lϵ =
{
(x, y) : y = θϵ + bx
}
with θϵ = yk(ϵ) − bϵ. If (x, y) ∈ Lϵ
and x < ϵ , as R(ϵ, x) is increasing and y′k(x) > b then R(ϵ, x) > y
′
k(x) > b. So
yk(ϵ)−yk(x)
ϵ−x > b and yk(ϵ)−yk(x) > b(ϵ−x), replacing yk(ϵ) = θϵ+bϵ, θϵ+bx > yk(x), and
f(x, y) = f(x, θϵ + bx) > k. If (x, y) ∈ Lϵ and x > ϵ then f(x, y) = f(x, θϵ + bx) < k.
Therefore c(Lϵ)1 ≤ ϵ. And L =
{
(x, y) : y = θ+bx
}
is the limit of Lϵ, and by theorem
(3) c(Lϵ) → c(L) and c(L)1 = 0, contradicting theorem (2). Therefore it must exist a
x ∈ R with y′k(x) = b.
If b ≥ sup
{
y′k(x) : x ∈ R+
}
the reasoning is similar. We know R(x, x′) is in-
creasing in x and R(x, x′) < R(x′ + ϵ, x′) < y′k(x
′) < b < 0, for any x < x′. Then
yk(x)−yk(x′)
x−x′ < b, and yk(x
′) < yk(x) + b(x
′ − x). As b < 0 then the last inequality
means that for a big value of x′, with a fixed x, yk(x
′) < 0, a contradiction as yk(·) is
positive.
4.3 The Function h(x)
Any increasing transformation of the social function also represents the same prefer-
ences, meaning that we can be dealing with different kinds of functions. I will use
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one particular function to represent the choice c(S). This function h(x) is based on
the values of f(x) when x = 1. For a given f(x), such that c(S) = argmaxx∈S f(x),
for any point x we pick γ(x) = inf{z : f(1, z) ≥ f(x)}. That is, along the vertical
line x = 1, we are picking the smallest y among those that have a f -value bigger then
f(x). That γ(x) is well defined is an immediate consequence of lemma (4), and we
can now define h(x) = f
(
1, γ(x)
)
. We will show that h(·) represents the same choice
as the function f(·) for any set S ∈ S. For that we need first to establish the function
h(·) is strictly quasiconcanve.
Theorem 7. h(x, y) is strictly quasiconcave.
Claim 15. If f(x) > f(x′) then h(x) ≥ h(x′); and if f(x) = f(x′) then h(x) =
h(x′)
Proof. If f(x) > f(x′) and z ∈ R+ is such that f(1, z) ≥ f(x) then f(1, z) ≥ f(x)
meaning that {z : f(1, z) ≥ f(x)} ⊆ {z : f(1, z) ≥ f(x′)} and γ(x) = inf{z :
f(1, z) ≥ f(x)} ≥ inf
{
z : f(1, z) ≥ f(x′)
}
= γ(x′). From this we conclude
h
(
x
)
= f
(
1, γ(x)
)
≥ f
(
1, γ(x′)
)
= h
(
x′
)
. If f(x) = f(x′), the equality of the
sets {z : f(1, z) ≥ f(x)} = {z : f(1, z) ≥ f(x′)} establishes γ(x) = γ(x′) and natu-
rally h
(
x
)
= h
(
x′
)
.
Claim 16. If h(xα) = min{h(x), h(x′)} then h(xβ) = min{h(x), h(x′)} either for
all β with 0 ≤ β ≤ α, or for all β, with α ≤ β ≤ 1
Proof. If x ≪ x′ and h(xα) = min{h(x), h(x′)} = h(x) then h(xα) = h(x), and due
to the f(·) being strictly increasing in both arguments, for 0 ≤ β ≤ α, x ≪ xβ ≪ xα
and f(x) < f(xβ) < f(xα), by claim (15) h(x) ≤ h(xβ) ≤ h(xα) = h(x).
If x ̸≪ x′ and x′ ̸≪ x the line passing through both points L[x,x′] has negative
slope: (x̃, ỹ) ∈ L[x,x′], ỹ = y+ y′−y
x′−x(x̃−x), therefore the slope of the line b
[
L[x,x′]
]
=
y′−y
x′−x is negative. According to theorem (4), there is a x
∗ ∈ (x, x′) such that for points
in L[x,x′], f
(
x̃, ỹ) is increasing for values of x̃ < x∗ and decreasing for x̃ > x∗.
If xα ∈ [x, x∗] thenf(x) < f(xα) and ∀0 ≤ β ≤ α, f(x) < f(xβ) < f(xα) and
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min{h(x), h(x′)} ≤ h(x) ≤ h(xβ) ≤ h(xα) = min{h(x), h(x′)}, hence h(xβ) =
h(xα) = min{h(x), h(x′)}.
If xα ∈ [x∗, x′] then∀β, α ≤ β ≤ 1, x∗ ≤ xα < xβ < x′, by theorem (4), f(xα) >
f(xβ) > f(x′), and min{h(x), h(x′)} = h(xα) ≥ h(xβ) ≥ h(x) ≥ min{h(x), h(x′)},
hence h(xβ) = h(xα) = min{h(x), h(x′)}.
Claim 17. If ∃x,x′ ∈ R2+ such that h(xβ) = h(x), ∀β ∈ [θ1, θ2] then, ∃γ ∈ R+ with
f(1, γ − ϵ) < f(xβ) < f(1, γ + ϵ),∀ϵ > 0 and ∀β ∈ [θ1, θ2]
Proof. As h(xβ) = f
(
1, γ(xβ)
)
and f(1, z) is strictly increasing in z, when h(xβ) =
h(x) then γ(xβ) = γ(x) = γ. Therefore γ = inf
{
z : f(1, z) ≥ f(xβ)
}
, so for any
ϵ > 0, ∃γ′ < γ + ϵ such that f(1, γ′) ≥ f(xβ) and as the function is increasing
f(1, γ + ϵ) > f(1, γ′) ≥ f(xβ) for any β ∈ [θ1, θ2]. Any γ′ < γ is not in the set{
z : f(1, z) ≥ f(xβ)
}
meaning that for any ϵ > 0, f(1, γ − ϵ) < f(1, γ) ≤ f(xβ).
Lemma 5. For any k0 < k1 such that ∃x ∈ R+ with yk1(x) = yk0(x) then ∀x′ ∈
R+, yk1(x
′) = yk0(x
′)
Proof. Suppose a x′ with yk1(x
′) ̸= yk0(x′) exists, and without loss of generality as-
sume x′ > x. Pick the maximum from the set A = {x̃ ∈ R+ : yk1(x̃) = yk0(x̃) and x ≤
x̃ ≤ x′}. The maximum exists because: the set is nonempty, x ∈ A; it is limited,
because x ≤ x̃ ≤ x′; and it is closed, as a result of yk1(·) and yk0(·) being differen-
tiable by claim (13), and hence continuous functions. The existence of a maximum
is guaranteed by Weirstrass extreme value theorem, and for simplicity let’s assume
the maximum is x. The function g(z) := yk1(z) − yk0(z) is differentiable, it is the
difference of two differentiable functions, and using the mean value theorem we know
that ∃c ∈ (x, x′) such that g(x
′)−g(x)
x′−x = g
′(c). Noticing that g(x) = yk1(x)−yk0(x) = 0,
and, as k1 > k0, yk1(x
′) > yk0(x
′), we conclude that b = g(x
′)−g(x)
x′−x > 0. Therefore
∃c ∈ (x, x′) such that y′k1(c) = b+ y
′
k0
(c) and y′k0(c) ≤ y
′
k1
(c). Due to convexity y′k1(x̃)
is increasing, then the point d such that y′k1(d) = y
′
k0
(c), must be d < c.
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We now will pick two parallel lines L, L′ with a slope equal to y′k0(c) = y
′
k1
(d),
L passing by (c, yk0(c)) and L
′ passing by (d, yk1(d). By claim (12) that c(L) =(
c, yk0(c)
)
and c(L′) =
(
d, yk1(d)
)
. We will then see that the relation L′ = αL creates
a contradiction with d < c. The line L =
{
(x, y) : y = yk0(c)+y
′
k0
(c)(x−c), ∀x, y ≥ 0
}
is tangent to yk0(·) at the point c, c(L) = c(L) =
(
c, yk0(c)
)
. The line L′ =
{
(x, y) :
y = yk1(d) + y
′
k0
(c)(x − d),∀x, y ≥ 0
}
is tangent to yk1(·) at the point d and has
c(L′) =
(
d, yk1(d)
)
. It is possible to find α ∈ R2+ such that L′ = αL, and we know
by proposition (1) that b[αL] = α1
α2
b[L]. b[L] = b[L′] so α1 = α2. By the same lemma
a[L′] = a[αL] = α1a[L], and α1 =
a[L′]
a[L]
. From L and L′ definitions we know that
a[L] = yk0(c)− y′k0(c)c and that a[L
′] = yk1(d)− y′k1(d)d = yk1(d)− y
′
k0
(c)d.
We will study the the sign of a[L′]− a[L], knowing d < c
a[L′]− a[L] =
[
yk1(d)− y′k0(c)d
]
−
[
yk0(c)− y′k0(c)c
]
=yk1(d)− yk0(c) + y′k0(c)(c− d)
>yk0(d)− yk0(c) + y′k0(c)(c− d)
=(c− d)
[
y′k0(c)−
yk0(c)− yk0(d)
c− d
]
For a strictly convex function R(x̃, x̃′) =
yk0 (x̃)−yk0 (x̃
′)
x̃−x̃′ is strictly increasing in x̃
′
for a fixed x̃ so as d < c, R(c, c+ ϵ) > R(c, d) and y′k0(c) = limϵ↓0 R(c, c+ ϵ) > R(c, d).
And so we conclude that a[L′]− a[L] > 0 for the case d < c, and α1 = a[L
′]
a[L]
> 1.
With c(L′) = c(αL) = αc(L) , then d = c(L′)1 = α1c(L)1 = α1c > c but this
contradicts the previous conclusion that d < c, so we can’t have yk1(x
′) ̸= yk0(x′).
We have now gathered sufficient results to prove theorem ( 7).
Proof. That h(·) is quasiconcave is straightforward, xα = αx + (1 − α)x′, by f(·)
quasiconcacvity f(xα) ≥ min{f(x), f(x′)} and by claim (15) we derive h(xα) ≥
min{h(x), h(x′)}.
If h(·) is quasiconcave but not strict quaisconvave function then ∃x,x′ ∈ R2+
and α ∈ (0, 1) such that xα = min{h(x), h(x′)}, and by claim (16), h(xβ) =
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min{h(x), h(x′)} either for all 0 ≤ β ≤ α or for α ≤ β ≤ 1. Let’s assume that
it is the first case 0 ≤ β ≤ α. Function f(·) is strictly quasiconcave and we know
it is increasing-decreasing along any line, therefore it has a maximum and a min-
imum along a limited line, m = min
β∈[0,α]
f(xβ) and M = max
β∈[0,α]
f(xβ). By claim
(17), ∃γ > 0 such that for any ϵ > 0, f(1, γ − ϵ) < m < M < f(1, γ + ϵ), hence
γ = inf {y : f(1, y) ≥ m} = inf {y : f(1, y) ≥ M}, which is the same as ym(1) = yM(1)
and by lemma (5) we know ym(x) = yM(x) for any x. Due to m ≤ f(xβ, yβ) ≤ M ,
yM(x
β) = inf
{
y : f(xβ, y) ≥ M
}
≥ yβ and ym(xβ) = inf
{
y : f(xβ, y) ≥ m
}
≤ yβ.
Due to ym(x
β) = yM(x
β) we get that yβ ≤ yM(xβ) = ym(xβ) ≤ yβ, and therefore
ym(x
β) = yβ. For any β ∈ [0, α], ym
(
βx + (1 − β)x′
)
= βy + (1 − β)y′ and the
function ym(·) is not strictly convex contradicting claim (11). h(·) must be a strictly
quasiconvave function.
The conditions are now gathered to show that the function h(·) also represents
the bargaining solution c(·).
Theorem 8. x∗ = argmaxx∈S h(x) if and only if x
∗ = argmaxx∈S f(x), ∀S ∈ S.
Proof. As the function h(·) is striclty quasiconcave if h(x∗) = h(x′), h(xα) > h(x∗),
for this reason the maximizer of h(·) in S, when S is a convex set, is unique. If
h(x∗) > h(x), ∀x ∈ S by negation of the first result in claim (15) we get f(x∗) ≥
f(x), also by negation of the second result of the same claim, h(x∗) ̸= h(x) implies
f(x∗) ̸= f(x), so f(x∗) > f(x). We may conclude that if x∗ = argmaxx∈S h(x) then
x∗ = argmaxx∈S f(x)
Again by claim (15) when f(x∗) > f(x′), h(x∗) ≥ h(x′), if h(x∗) = h(x′), strict
quasiconcavity of h(·) implies h(xα) > h(x∗) and from what was seen previously this
also means f(xα) > f(x∗), a contradiction once f(x∗) is the maximum, therefore
h(x∗) ≥ h(x′) and h(x∗) ̸= h(x′). We may conclude that x∗ = argmaxx∈S h(x) if
x∗ = argmaxx∈S f(x).
The proof that the social function being maximized is in fact u(x, y) = xy relies
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on the fact that yk(·) are the indifference curves of the function h(·). The next lemma
proves it.
Lemma 6. If h(x, y) = k then y = yk(x).
Proof. Suppose h(x, y) = k and y < yk(x), for any y < ỹ < yk(x), f(x, ỹ) < k, if
f(x, ỹ) ≥ k, then ỹ ∈ {y′ : f(x, y′) ≥ k} and yk(x) = inf{y : f(x, y) ≥ k} ≤ ỹ, a
contradiction. So k = h(x, y) = f
(
1, γ(x, y)
)
> f(x, ỹ), and γ(x, y) ∈ {z : f(1, z) ≥
f(x, ỹ)} and naturally γ(x, y) ≥ inf{z : f(1, z) ≥ f(x, ỹ)} = γ(x, ỹ). This implies
h(x, y) = f(1, γ(x, y)) ≥ f(1, γ(x, ỹ)) = h(x, ỹ), but as y < ỹ this result contradicts
h(·) being strictly increasing in both factors. If h(x, y) = k and y > yk(x) the prrof
is done in the same way.
Theorem 9. The function u(x, y) = xy represents the bargaining solution c(·)
Proof. First we will prove that ∀k, xy
′
k(x)
y(k)
= −1. Let L be a line with c(L) = x∗,
then for a certain k, h(x∗) = k, by lemma (6) y∗ = yk(x
∗), and by claim (12), it
must be that y′k(x
∗) = b[L]. Chose α1 > 0 and calculate yk(α1x) then derive α2 from
α2yk(x
∗) = yk(α1x∗). This way x∗ = (x∗, yk(x∗)) and αx∗ = (α1x∗, α2yk(x∗)) =
(α1x
∗, yk(α1x∗)) belong to the same indifference curve and h(αx∗) = k. Using the
result of claim (12) again, for αx∗ = c(αL) it must be that y′k(α1x
∗) = b[αL] =
α2
α1
y′k(x
∗), where the last equality comes from proposition (1). Simplifying both equa-
tions,
 α2yk(x
∗) = yk(α1x∗)
y′k(α1x
∗) = α2
α1
y′k(x
∗)
⇔
 α2 =
yk(α1x
∗)
yk(x∗)
y′k(α1x
∗)
y′k(x
∗)
= yk(α1x
∗)
α1yk(x∗)
these equations are valid for any α1 > 0 so with α1 =
x′
x∗
replaced in the second, we
get x′
y′k(x
′)
yk(x′)
= x∗
y′k(x
∗)
yk(x∗)
, and we conclude that x
y′k(x)
yk(x)
is equal to all values of x and must
be constant. When b[L] = −1 or Lm1 = Lm2 the line L is symmetric and c(L)1 = c(L)2,
yk(x
∗) = x∗ and at this point, using again the claim (12), y′k(x
∗) = b[L] = −1, so
x∗
y′k(x
∗)
yk(x∗)
= −1 and due to xy
′
k(x)
yk(x)
being constant, x
y′k(x)
yk(x)
= −1.
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Now we will prove that the function u(x, y) = xy represents the bargaining solution
c(·). Start by defining the function u(x) = k1 if h(1, k1) = h(x). Clearly the function
u(·) represents the same ordering as the function h(·). If x∗ = argmaxx∈S h(x) ⇔
h(x∗) > h(x), ∀x ∈ S ⇔ h
(
1, γ(x∗)
)
> h
(
1, γ(x)
)
, ∀x ∈ S then by definition of the
function u(·),u(x∗) = γ(x∗) > γ(x) = u(x), ∀x ∈ S ⇔ x∗ = argmaxx∈S u(x). The
indifference curves are the same under u(·) and h(·). Consider the indifference curve
Hk =
{
x : h(x) = k
}
, it then exists a zk such that h(1, zk) = k, that is (1, zk) ∈ Hk.
So if x′ ∈ Hk ⇔ x′ ∈
{
x : γ(x) = zk
}
⇔ x′ ∈
{
x : u(x) = zk
}
. And the indifference
curves are the same.
Solving the differential equation of the previous claim x
y′k(x)
yk(x)
= −1 we get that
yk(x) =
1
x
ak. For x = 1, yk(1) = k because u(1, k) = k, thus xyk(x) = k. So
u(x, y) = k when xy = k, then u(x, y) = xy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a new method to find Nash’s solution to the bargaining
problem. Peters and Wakker (1991) provides the conditions for the result that the
Nash bargaining solution to be the result of a maximization process. Then, from the
properties of this maximand’s indifference curves the Nash solution is found. The
mathematical arguments used in this paper are mainly of real analysis origin and are
not directly adaptable to different bargaining structures, such as for example those
defined in Peters and Vermeulen (2012), Conley and Wilkie (1996) or to Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975). However, axiomatic bargaining does exhibit algebraic properties
which can be explored in future research to overcome this limitation. Namely, we can
regard the AT axiom as a morphism, and with the right definition of the multiplication
operation on the bargaining sets, each bargaining model can then be interpreted
algebraically. The study of the different axiomatic bargainings under this algebraic
and more general framework will likely extend the understanding we detain of them.
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Appendices
A
Claim 1. There is a concave function gs(x) : [0, S
1] → [0, S2] such that (x, gS(x)) ∈ S
and if (x, y) ∈ S then y ≤ gS(x).
Proof. Consider gS(x) = max(x,y)∈S y. As S is compact and the function f(y) = y is
continuous, gS(x) is well defined for all x. For any two points in x, x
′ ∈ [0, S1], define
x =
(
x, gS(x)
)
and x′ =
(
x′, gS(x
′)
)
, clearly, by definition of gS(·), x,x′ ∈ S. Due
to convexity of S for any α ∈ [0, 1], αx + (1 − α)x′ =
(
αx + (1 − α)x′, αgS(x) +
(1 − α)gS(x′)
)
∈ S, as gS(x̃) ≥ ỹ, ∀y with (x̃, ỹ) ∈ S then gS
(
αx + (1 − α)x′
)
≥
αgS(x) + (1− α)gS(x′), the function is concave.
Proposition 1. For L,L′ ∈ L−, for α = (α1, α2) ≫ 0
1. a[L] = Lm2 and b[L] = −
Lm2
Lm1
2. αL ∈ L− and a[αL] = α2a[L] and b[αL] = α2α1 b[L]
3. ∃α ∈ R2+ such that αL = L′ with α2 =
a[L′]
a[L]
and α1 =
a[L′]
a[L]
b[L]
b[L′]
4. ∀x ∈ R2+ , ∃L ∈ L− such that c(L) = x
Proof. (1)If the set L =
{
(x, y) : y = a + bx
}
∈ L−, then a[L] = a > 0 and
b[L] = b < 0. y(x) = a+ bx < a = y(0), the maximum value of the second argument
is L2m = a. Inverting the equation y(x) = a + bx as x(y) =
1
b
y − a
b
as 1
b
< 0
x(y) ≤ −a
b
= x(0) and the maximum value of the first argument is L1m = −ab , and
b = −L
2
m
L1m
.
(2) If S = {(s1, s2) : s2 = a+ bs1, with s1 ≥ 0, s2 ≥ 0},
αS ={(α1s1, α2s2) : s2 = a+ bs1, with s1 ≥ 0, s2 ≥ 0}
={(α1s1, α2s2) : α2s2 = α2a+
α2
α1
bα1s1, with α1s1 ≥ 0, α2s2 ≥ 0}
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={(s̃1, s̃2) : s̃2 = ã+ b̃s̃1, s̃1 ≥ 0, s̃2 ≥ 0}
In the last equality we used that ã = α2a and b̃ =
α2
α1
b, as a > 0, b ≤ 0, α1 > 0
and α2 > 0, then ã > 0 and b̃ ≤ 0. Therefore αS ∈ L−, a[αL] = α2a[L] and
b[αL] = α2
α1
b[L]
(3) For two lines to be equal, both coefficients of the lines must be equal, if
αL = L′ then a[αL] = a[L′] and b[αL] = b[L′] using the result of point (2) we get
a[αL] = α2a[L] = a[L
′]
b[αL] = α2
α1
b[L] = b[L′]
⇔
α2 =
a[L′]
a[L]
α1 = α2
b[L]
b[L′]
(4) Consider symmetric the line L =
{
(x, y) : x + y = 2
}
, the choice must be
along the line x = y, c(L) = (1, 1), for any x ∈ R2+, take xL and c(xL) = xc(L) = x.
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Abstract
Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equi-
librium outcomes. This paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria
strategies and analyses their weak robustness, namely the use of weakly domi-
nated strategies. The paper then develops a refined equilibrium concept, based
on trembling hand perfection, in order to overcome such weakness. Conclud-
ing that none of the classical equilibrium strategies survives the imposition of
the extra robustness and, albeit using more complex strategies, the equilibrium
outcomes don’t change.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78
Keywords: Multiplayer Bargaining; Equilibrium Refinements; Perfect Equilibria
1
1 Introduction
In n-players bargaining there is an infinite divisible good to be shared among them.
The division is obtained by the following procedure: at each moment a player proposes
a division, the other n−1 players vote in favor or against it. If all agree the division is
made accordingly; if at least one player votes against it, the game goes on to another
round, with another player proposing a different division and a new suffrage taking
place. The game ends when a proposal is accepted by all. At each round, the good
in question loses value by δ.
The classical and better known result on multiplayer bargaining is that all divisions
are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) outcomes of the game, meaning that all
divisions can be agreed in equilibria. Crucial to obtain this result is the existence of a
credible and painful threat for deviators of the ”right” track. Herrero (1985) proposes
an ingenious mechanism of doing this, creating a strategy in which at least one player
is unsatisfied with a deviation proposal. For this strategy she used a state variable, if
the proponent does not propose as implied by the state, the state changes to a new
one in which the player worst off in this division receives everything. Players do not
want to deviate because in the punishment state they will receive nothing. For this
strategy to be an equilibrium the discount value cannot be very small, namely with
3 players δ > 1/2. Haller (1986) noted that an equilibrium for all divisions could
be extended to δ ≤ 1/2. This strategy also uses a state variable and punishment
threats that attribute everything to one player only, the main difference is in the
repliers’ actions, with players accepting only if the proposition is equal to the state -
any difference, even if all repliers are awarded , is rejected. The belief players have
that the proposition will be rejected renders them indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the offer, and they thus opt for refusing it. Other equilibrium strategies can
be developed, namely one with agreement at time T and other with no agreement at
all. On both of these the major force is also the belief that others will reject different
proposals, without it players would act differently from what is defined. Of notice is
that all these equilibria do not depend on the replies, and that it is unorthodox for
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players not to accept better proposals unless they are punished by doing so. This is
a major shortcoming of this equilibrium: players, without being punished by acting
differently, are choosing to play a dominated strategy.
This is an evident weakness of the equilibria concept used. In Haller ’s strategy
players in specific history states accept zero offerings because they do not expect
to receive more in the future if they reject them. They are powerless to change the
outcome, it is a resigned acceptance. In Herrero’s strategy players propose divisions in
which they receive zero. Again this is a hopeless proposition and only happens thanks
to the belief that others will also follow a resigned action course, as players believe
others will reject, they believe their own actions do not have any effect. The need of
unanimity gives total power to all players in terms of rejecting a proposal, and other
players’ actions will have no impact. This case, of the players’ actions having no effect
on the outcome of the game, may result in the best and more accurate strategies not
being played and originates non sensible equilibria. Players only choose their best
available actions in singleton information sets, if, for example, players knew what
others had voted before them, making their information set at the moment of voting
a singleton, then players knew that if they accepted a good proposition then others
could also do it. This conviction would make them vote in favor of the good division.
This type of structure in games and the possible appearance of non sensible equilibria
is very well known, and has been studied and solved by the use of refined equilibria
notions.
In this work we develop two different equilibrium concepts to analyse the game,
based on Selten’s (1975) perfect equilibria, and introduce the possibilities of small
mistakes by the players. Perfect Equilibrium(PE) imposes that all players in all his-
tories commit a minor mistake, and therefore imposes mistakes in an infinite game
with a continuum of actions, to our knowledge a concept with such characteristics was
not defined previously in the literature. Although it involves some different options
it owes much to the work of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) and Carbonell-Nicolau
(2011), that developed existence results of the Perfect Equilibria strategies for nor-
mal form games with a continuum action space with continuous and discontinuous
3
utilities, respectively. The use of trembles involves some distortion of the game and
should be used with parsimony. As the reason for the SPNE not to work is the non
singleton information set at the reply, and in order to introduce the minimum distor-
tions possible, we also create an equilibrium refinement that only imposes trembles
on the replies, Perfect Equilibrium in Replies (PER). When referring simultaneously
to both these concepts we will talk of them as Trembling Hand.
When a perturbed game is played, if the strategy does not punish replies, as is
the case in the strategies already described, players will always accept propositions
that give them more than what they would receive in future if the proposition were
to be refused, (although this may seems obvious it is not what happens in the Haller
equilibrium, in which better propositions are rejected in face of the expected rejection
of the other replier). Thus, they accept this proposition even if the chance of others
accepting it is very small. This property of the Trembling Hand equilibrium strategies
which are simultaneously independent of replies is the pivotal point to show that
Haller ’s strategy is not Trembling Hand. This strategy support the equilibrium by
punishing a deviator with attributing him zero, and he has no possibility of receiving
more unless someone deviates along the way. But if any player can make a mistake,
for example accepting a different proposition, the deviator will never accept zero, he
will keep looking for an opponent to make a mistake. The deviator will always refuse
a zero proposition and the strategies are not equilibrium strategies.
However, if in Herrero we modify the punishment divisions slightly, in a way in
which all players receive a positive quantity, even if very small, and maintain the rest
of the equilibrium structure, then this Modified Herrero strategy is a PER. And with
a further modification it is PE. These strategies serve as a good example because
one is PER and not PE, the other, with the additional modification, is PE and
not PER, which shows that the PE set is not stricter than PER; it also illustrates
the implications of PE definition. With a less restrictive notion the initial modified
strategy would be a PE, however the example also clarifies the rationale for the
restrictive definition of PE.
For δ ≤ 1/2 there is no easy equilibrium solution that works for all points in the
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simplex, there are points in which all players receive a strictly positive fraction of the
good that are not Trembling Hand outcomes for reply independent strategies. So, for
these divisions to be a Trembling Hand equilibrium outcome, we need a strategy that
also punishes the replies. The strategy we will build, strategy ρ, has two punishment
states per player, instead of one as hitherto: one to punish deviations and another one
to punish deviations from deviations. The trick used is that the second punishment
state avoids deviations from the first punishment state and the first punishment
state avoids deviations from the second. Thus, a sensible choice of these punishment
divisions is enough to insure that all strictly positive divisions are outcomes of a
Trembling Hand strategy. As in Haller ’s strategy, in ρ players will only accept the
proposition correspondent to the state, but in this strategy they are punished if they
don’t. The remarkable in this ρ strategy is the undominance of it, it is the only
best reply, and for this reason respects the conditions necessary to be even a stronger
equilibria notion. We can generalize this strategy, the same way as we have done
with Haller ’s, to allow an agreement date latter than the initial moment. For the
sake of completeness, another strategy that permits divisions with players receiving
zero will also be presented. This strategy is naturally weakly dominated, but on the
approximation games it is not. There is a mechanism of awarding the well behaved
players when another one deviates, the chance of receiving this award serves of an
incentive for players to accept receiving or proposing for themselves zero. They are
hoping that a player deviates and they receive the premium for the compliance.
We will now proceed to introduce notation and the classical equilibrium strategies
of Haller and Herrero in section 2. In section 3 the new equilibrium concepts are
defined and a proof that the classical equilibrium strategies are not Trembling Hand
is given. In the section 4 some new strategies, that are Trembling Hand, are defined.
Finally in section 5 a conclusion is provided.
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2 Notation and Classical Equilibria
2.1 Game and Notation
Although the majority of the results to be presented are easily generalized for more
players in this paper we will focus on the game with only 3 players. The set of players
is I = {1, 2, 3}. At the moment t ∈ N a proposal is one point of the unitary simplex
pt = (pt1, p
t
2, p
t
3) ∈ ∆, with ∆ =
{
(x1, x2, x3) :
∑3
i=1 xi ≤ 1, xi ≥ 0
}
and pti the part
attributed to player i. The proponent at t is the player i(t); with i(t) the function
that determines the proponent, it has a cycle of period 3, i(t) : T 7→ I and i(t) = {i ∈
I : ∃m ∈ N0, t = i+3m}. t(i) : I ⇒ T is the correspondence that defines the moments
in which player i proposes, these moments are t(i) = {t ∈ T : ∃m ∈ N0, t = i+ 3m}.
Player’s j 6= i(t) response to the proposal is an action taken on {0, 1}; with atj,
the action of j at t, being 0 if j rejects the proposition received, and 1 if the player
accepts it. So ati ∈ {0, 1} if i(t) 6= i or ati ∈ ∆ if i(t) = i. For the sake of simplicity
define the set of actions available for i at t by
Ati =
{0, 1} if i 6= i(t)∆ if i = i(t)
The vector of all actions taken at moment t is at = (at1, a
t
2, a
t
3) and the space of
all actions at t is At = A
t
1 × At2 × At3 = {0, 1}2 ×∆ = ∆̄.
For t ≥ 1, a stage history can be either a history after or before the proposition
is done, and a distinction between these two cases is necessary. We therefore define
at moment t in history h the stage history is ht,1 for the proposal and ht,2 for the
responses, ht = (ht,1, ht,2). A (t− 1, 2)-history in which t− 1 propositions and voting
have taken place is denoted by h|t−1,2 = (a1, . . . , at−1); and a (t, 1)-history, when a
proposition has already been done at t but no replies have been received yet, h|t,1 =
(a1, . . . , at−1, ati(t)), in which, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t − 1, ak ∈ ∆̄ and ati(t) ∈ ∆; the space
of (t, 2)-stage histories is H t,2 =
∏t
k=1 ∆̄ = ∆̄
t, and the space of all (t, 1)-histories is
H t,1 = H(t−1),2 × ∆ = ∆̄t−1 × ∆. H0,2 stands for ∅ the unique 0-stage history. The
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set of all histories is H =
⋃∞
t=1(H
t,1 ∪H t,2).
The length of a history, τ(h) is a function from the set of histories into the stage
moment τ : H 7→ N0×{1, 2}, so τ(h) = (t, k) t ∈ N0 being the moment of the history,
and k ∈ {1, 2} whether the voting has already been made k = 2 or not k = 1. t(h) is
the moment of history h, so τ(h) = (t(h), k) and i(h) = i(t(h)) the proponent at h.
For a history h with t(h) > t, h|t,k is the history h until stage (t, k). h+ and h− are
respectively the history h plus one more stage or without the last stage, and it will
be used only when the marginal actions are obvious from the context. It is assumed
that at stage (t, k) each player knows h|t,k, that is, each player knows the actions that
were played in all previous stages. (h, h̄) is the history h followed by h̄.
A pure strategy for player i is a function si : H → {0, 1} ∪∆, with si(h) ∈ At(h
+)
i
mapping histories into actions. The set of player i pure strategies is denoted by
Si, and S = S1 × S2 × S3 is the joint pure strategy space. Every pure strategy
s = (s1, s2, s3) ∈ S induces a path after the history h, $s(h). At h the action
will be s(h), then if an agrement has not been reached s
(
h, s(h)
)
are the actions
played, so we can define the future after h when s is the strategy as $s(h) =
{h, s(h), s
(
h, s(h)
)
, s
(
s
(
h, s(h)
))
, . . . }. A strategy s induces, as well, a division d(s)
and a moment in which the agreed division occurs t(s). The moment t(s) = t is
when mini∈−i(h) s
t
i(h
s
t,2) = 1
1, and division is d(s) = ht(s),1. If there is no agree-
ment, by convention, e(s) = +∞ and d(s) = 0. The utility for a given strategy is
Πti(s|h) = vi
(
t(s|h), di(s|h)
)
, is increasing with the share received di(s) and decreas-
ing with the time until agreement t(s), Πti(s|h) = δt(s|h)−td(s|h), payment function
can also be written (in a similar fashion to the definition of payment when mixed
actions are used) as Πti(s|h) =
∑
h̄∈$s(h) δ
t(h̄)−t(h)π(h, h̄), in which π(h̃) is the value of
the division agreed at the last moment of h̃, and therefore is the product of the last
moment actions π(h̃) = h̃t,1h̃t,2j h̃
t,2
k , k, j /∈ −i(h̃).
Herrero (1985) was the first2 to prove that all points in ∆ are equilibria outcomes
when, δ > 1/2. Later Haller noted that if the repliers’ strategies were stricter the
1The usual notation will be followed for a player i ∈ I, −i = I \ {i}
2Although he never published his results, Shaked is also attributed with the creation of such
strategies, see, for example, Sutton (1986) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)
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equilibria could extend to any δ. Due to the dynamic character of the game the
equilibrium concept used is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium that we hereby
define.
Definition 1. s ∈ S is a SPNE if Πti(s|h) ≥ Πti(s′i, s−i|h) ∀h ∈ H,∀i ∈ I and
∀s′i ∈ Si
The utility function in the bargaining game can be written, as noted before, in the
form Πti(s) =
∑∞
τ=1 δ
τaτ with aτ the payments at t+τ , that is either zero or the value
of the agreed division at t+ τ , and is bounded by 1. It is relatively straightforward to
see that if two strategies share the same future path for a long period their actualized
payment will be similar, therefore the utility function is continuous at infinity and
the one shot deviation principle is valid. To prove that a given strategy is an SPNE
we need only to look for alternative strategies that are different on one information
set. For this purpose we define the one shot deviation strategy.
Definition 2. The set of One Shot Deviation(OSD) strategies from si at h is
OSD(si, h) = {γi ∈ Si : γi(h) 6= si(h) and γi(h′) = s′i(h′),∀h′ ∈ H \ h}
2.2 Haller Equilibrium Strategy
In this subsection we will present the equilibrium defined by Haller (1986), a proof
that such strategy is a SPNE will be presented for completeness. 3 This strategy uses
a state function r(h) : H → E that, for any history h, tracks if any player has deviated
from the planed, and induces a punishment for that player. There is a bond between
the state and the division to be proposed under the strategy, for this reason we use
the same symbol for a state and the division associated with it. E = {e0, e1, e2, e3}
is set of states, e0 is any point in ∆, ei is the division in which player i receives 1,
eik =
1 , if k = i0 , if k 6= i . At h ∈ H t,2, if the player i = i(t) did not propose r(h) the
state changes to ei(t+1), in which the player i receives nothing. The state at the initial
3In the proof we are only looking for better pure strategies, if no pure strategy is better then no
mixed strategy can be better either.
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moment h = ∅ is r(h) = e0. Transition takes place immediately after the proposal
and before the replies so for τ(h) = (t, 2), r(h) = r(h−). For τ(h) = (t, 1),
r(h) =
r(h
−) if ht,1 = r(h−)
ei(t+1) if ht,1 6= r(h−)
Now we will present the equilibrium strategy.
Definition 3. Haller Equilibrium Strategy In Haller’s equilibrium strategy for h
such that τ(h) = (t− 1, 2), si(t)(h) = r(h), so the proposition will always be equal to
the state. For τ(h) = (t, 2) replier’s j 6= i(h) strategy is
sj(h) =
1 se h
t,1 = r(h−)
0 se ht,1 6= r(h−)
Repliers accept the proposition if it is equal to the state and reject it if it is
different, note that for replier j the share offered to him is as important as the share
offered to others, what matters is that the proposition is equal to r(h−) so the share
of all players is relevant.
Table 1: Haller’s Strategy
State ej
Player i Proposal e
j
Accept p p = ej
Theorem 1. Haller’s strategy is an SPNEand any e0 ∈ ∆ is anSPNEequilibrium
outcome.
Proof. s is Haller’s strategy with r(∅) = e0, for any but fixed e0 ∈ ∆. We will
prove that there is no history h after which one player i can change his strategy
to s′i ∈ OSD(si, h) and improve his payment. Let us start by noting that due to
r(h) = r(h−) for τ(h) = (t, 2), ht,2 has no influence in the state, whatever are the
responses the state does not change.
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For i = i(t), τ (h) = (t− 1, 2) If all players play according to the strategy s,
i proposes r(h) and all others accept, Πti(s|h) = ri(h). If s′i ∈ OSD(si, h) then
p = s′i(h) 6= si(h) = r(h), i made a different proposal, repliers j, k only accept
if the proposal is p = r(h+) = ei(t+1), the state after the deviated proposition.
So if there is an immediate agreement i’s payoff is Πti(s
′
i, s−i|h) = e
i(t+1)
i = 0, if
there is not Πti(s
′
i, s−i|h) = δΠt+1i (s′i, s−i|h+) = δΠt+1i (s|h+) = δe
i(t+1)
i = 0. Clearly
Πti(s
′
i, s−i|h) ≤ Πti(s|h) for any OSD(si, h), the proponent i(t) has no advantage in
altering his strategy.
For j 6= i(t) and τ (h) = (t, 1) we have two possibilities for the player to act
unaccording to s, either to accept a proposal different from r(h) or to reject the
proposal of r(h). When the proposal is equal to the state ht,1 = r(h), if all players
act by s the proposition is accepted and Πtj(s|h) = rj(h). If s′j ∈ OSD(sj, h), j refuses
the proposition, s′j(h) = 0, we can define the stage history h
t,2 =
(
s′j(h), sk(h)
)
=
(0, 1) and h+ = (h, ht,2). The state does not change, as the state is independent of
the replies, so r(h+) = r(h). j’s refusal delays the agreement one period, because
after h+ all players follow s and the agreement is r(h+) = r(h). Πtj(s
′
j, s−j|h) =
δΠt+1j (s
′
j, s−j|h+) = δΠt+1j (s|h+) = δrj(h+) = δrj(h) ≤ rj(h), and we conclude that
Πt(s′j, s−j|h) ≤ Πtj(s|h). When the proposal is not equal to the state ht,1 6= r(h), that
mean the proponent i(h) has deviated from the strategy and the state is r(h) = ei(t+1).
If −i(h) follow s the proposal is refused, the state is r(h+) = r(h) = ei(t+1), where
h+ = (h, (0, 0)), and Πtj(s|h) = δΠt+1j (s|h+) = δe
i(t+1)
j . If j follows s
′
j ∈ OSD(sj, h)
accepting the proposition, s′j(h) = 1. The proposal will still be declined by the
other player and there will be no change in state caused by j response, and r(h̄+) =
ei(t+1), with h̄+ = (h, (1, 0)). Πtj(s
′
j, s−j|h) = δΠt+1j (s|h̄+) = δe
i(t+1)
j = δΠ
t+1
j (s|h+) =
Πtj(s|h). Player j does not improve by changing strategy.
2.3 Herrero’s Strategy
Being less general than Haller’s strategy Herrero proposed an equilibrium strategy
that is less fragile. In this case the players’ acceptance is not reduced to one division
only, they apparently consider only their own share, and the acceptance rule has a
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threshold. The punishment scheme is activated if a player does not propose what he
was supposed to. A state function defining the state at history h and which division
should be proposed (again there is an identification between state and proposal)
r(h) : H → E, is updated after each proposal but before the replies, so r(h) = r(h−)
when τ(h) = (t, 2). The states are again E = {e0, e1, e2, e3}, with ei the division in
which player i receives the totality, the initial state is r(∅) = e0.
Define k(p, t) as the replier worst off in proposition p made at t (of smaller index
if there is more than one), k(p, t) = min
{
j ∈ I \ i(t) : pj = mink∈I\i(t) pk
}
. The state
is defined in the following way for τ(h) = (t, 1)
r(h) =
r(h
−) if ht,1 = r(h−)
ek if ht,1 6= r(h−)
Briefly, if the player made the expected proposal, ht,1 = r(h−), there is no state
change; if he did not, then the strategy enters in a punishment scheme of i(h) that
gives everything to player k = k(ht,1, t). Herrero’s strategy is resumed on the following
table and formally defined subsequently.
Table 2: Herrero’s startegy
State ej
Player i Proposal e
j
Reply pi ≥ δeji
Definition 4. Herrero’s Strategy The proponent always proposes r(h), si(h)(h) =
r(h), the strategy for repliers j 6= i(h) is
sj(h) =
1 if h
t,1
j ≥ δr(h)j
0 if ht,1j < δr(h)j
Theorem 2. For δ > 1/2 Herrero’s strategy isSPNEfor any eo ∈ ∆.
Proof. We will use the one shot deviation principle once more. Let’s start by see-
ing that at h ∈ H t−1,2 the player i = i(t) gains nothing by acting differently from s;
when all players act accordingly, i utility is Πti(s|h) = r(h)i. If i uses s′i ∈ OSD(s, h)
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and makes a different proposition, p 6= r(h), there is immediately a change of state
to r(h+) = ek with k = k(p, t) 6= i. If h++ = (h, p, r) where r is the reply to
ht,1, r ∈ {0, 1}2, if min rj = 0, at least one player refused the proposition and
Πti(s
′
i, s−i|h) = δΠt+1i (s|h++) = δr(h++)i = δeki = 0 ≤ Πti(si, s−i|h). Then the only
way i can improve is when all players accept. After proposition p 6= r(h), state
becomes ek, with k the player receiving the minimum, according to s for k to ac-
cept pk = min{pj, pk} ≥ δ, then pj ≥ δ the total amount given to the repliers for
both of them to accept the proposal must be at least 2δ, as the total cannot be
bigger than a unity we conclude that δ ≤ 1/2, contradicting the initial hypothesis.
So both repliers can not accept the out of equilibrium proposition simultaneously.
For j 6= i(t)6 6 and τ(h) = (t, 1) the payment for player j under s depends on the ac-
tions of the other replier k as well, if ht,1ι ≥ δr(h)ι, for ι = j, k all repliers will
accept, minι∈−i(h) sι(h) = 1, payment is immediate and equal to h
t,1
j = Π
t
j(s|h); if
any of the repliers reject (due to his share being smaller than the established by the
state), minι∈−i(h) sι(h) = 0 the agreement is delayed one period but the state is not
changed, as the state do not depend on the replies, h+ =
(
h,
(
sj(h), sk(h)
))
∈ H t,2
and r(h+) = r(h). In this case Πtj(s|h) = δΠt+1j (s|h+) = δr(h+)j = δr(h)j. And
we can conclude that Πtj(s|h) ≥ δr(h)j independently of the replies. At this mo-
ment there are two ways in which the players can act contrarily to the strategy
s: to accept a proposal that should be refused or to reject one that should be
accepted. In neither one does the player improve. If sj(h) = 1, player j chooses
s′j ∈ OSD(sj, h), then s′j(h) = 0 his payment is Πtj(s′j, s−j|h) = δΠt+1j (s′j, s−j|h+),
with h+ =
(
h,
(
s′j(h), sk(h)
))
, as r(h+) = r(h), the state do not depend on the
replies, Πt+1j (s
′
j, s−j|h+) = Πt+1j (sj, s−j|h+) = r(h+)j = r(h)j. j’s rejection leads
to Πtj(s
′
j, s−j|h) = δr(h)j, Πtj(s′i, sj|h) ≤ Πtj(s|h). When sj(h) = 0 then a strategy
s′j ∈ OSD(sj, h) has s′j(h) = 1. If player k accepts, sk(h) = 1, the agreement is
immediate and the payment of j is ht,1j . It is smaller than δr(h)j because according
to sj a proposal should only be rejected, sj(h) = 0, if h
t,1 < δr(h)j. If sk(h) = 0 the
agreement is postponed and j’s payment is δΠt+1j (s|h+). We can therefore define the
payment of j as
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Πtj(s
′
j, s−j|h) =sk(h)h
t,1
j + (1− sk(h))δΠt+1j (s′j, s−j|h+)
=sk(h)h
t,1
j + (1− sk(h))δΠt+1j (sj , s−j|h+)
=sk(h)h
t,1
j + (1− sk(h))δr(h+)j
≤sk(h)δr(h)j + (1− sk(h)) δr(h)j = δr(h)j ≤ Πtj(s|h)
It is of note that under Haller’s and Herrero’s strategies all divisions are equi-
librium outcomes, even Pareto dominated divisions, however agreement is always
reached at t = 1. It is possible to use the fact that player’s payment is zero to obtain
anSPNE for which the agreement is reached later, t(s) > 1, a minor adaptation of
Haller’s strategies is enough.4 The two following theorems are proved in appendix A.
Theorem 3. ∀e0 ∈ ∆, ∀T ∈ N, exists a strategy s SPNEwith e(s) = T and d(s) = e0
Another atypical equilibrium outcome is when an agreement is never obtained.
This case happens when at least one player at each round refuse the received pro-
posal, no agreement is then established at a finite moment and the game is played
indefinitely. The next theorem will prove the existence of such kind of equilibrium
strategies.
Theorem 4. There is an SPNEstrategy s ∈ S in which no division is agreed upon
and e(σ) =∞.
3 Trembling Hand Equilibria
3.1 Trembling Hand Equilibria
In Haller’s strategy repliers, without being punished by acting differently, reject
propositions that leave them better off, they are choosing weakly dominated strate-
4The adaptation could be made in Herrero’s strategy, the principle would be the same, if a player
deviates before the agreement date T , the punishment path of Herrero’s strategy is triggered.
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gies. At the moment of an answer, when player j rejects the proposition, whatever k
does, the proposal will still be rejected, the agreement moment will be delayed, and
j’s action is, for the time being, useless, then he can either accept or reject, that his
payment doesn’t change.
This is typical of voting systems, a similar problem is, for example, presented
in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2009), in which three individuals are choosing by
majority rule between a or b, and each player strictly prefers option a to b. The non-
intuitive possibility that all three individuals vote for option b is a Nash equilibrium.
When any two players vote for b, it is a weak best response for the third one to do
so as well. It is the belief that all other players will vote for the worst option that
makes him vote for it as well. The same happens in multiplayer bargaining, when a
replier believes the other is rejecting the proposal, he is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting it. If both players think the same way there may be a rejection of a
good proposal for both. This problem is an amply known weakness of SPNE, and
was in the origin of the sequential and perfect equilibrium concepts, for example.
Van Damme (1991, p.9) identifies the problem with the fact that not all information
sets are singletons,
(...)for a subgame perfect equilibrium to be sensible, it is necessary
that this equilibrium prescribes at each information set which is singleton
a choice which maximizes the expected payoff after that information set.
Note that the restriction to singleton information sets is necessary to en-
sure that the the expected payoff after the information set is well defined.
This restriction, however, has the consequence that not all subgame perfect
equilibria which satisfy this additional condition are sensible.
So, if all information sets are singleton, the SPNE is sensible, if they are not
then there might be a problem in some equilibria strategies. If the information set is
non singleton a choice of an action that is not the best may happen, the use of the
concept is, in this case, questionable. Haller’s strategy clearly demonstrates that a
refined equilibrium concept should be used in the multibargaining game.
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For the purpose of this paper we propose two concepts in the vein of Perfect
Equilibria of Selten (1975), different from SPNE, that try to overcome the described
problem by adding small randomness to player’s actions. This way all player’s actions
are decisive in every moment, all their actions and choices have an impact on the future
payments. The concepts used are very similar in their philosophy, but the first only
imposes trembles on replies, while the second imposes trembles also at the proposition
moment. We adopt an equilibrium notion in which players only make mistakes in
replies, because it is at these moments that the information sets are non singleton.
The proponent’s information set is a singleton, he always knows what the repliers have
just done and all the previous history. His strategy must thus maximize the payment
after all histories, as proposals always impact the outcome, and SPNE is a sensible
equilibrium for these cases. In this way, in order to avoid unnecessary complications
and due to the requirement of trembling inducing distortions to the game, we opted
for introducing the minimum distortions necessary by using the concept of Perfect
Equilibrium in Replies (PER). However there is a limitation in using this concept,
we are imposing mistakes in a moment where players only have two possibilities but
do not impose it when the players have a continuum of possibilities. For the sake
of completeness, we will also develop our analysis for the case in which trembles
happens at every moments of the game, and we will call this Perfect Equilibrium
(PE). The use of two different concepts also shows that the core of results obtained
is not dependent on the particular notion used. Before defining these new concepts
it is indispensable to define what a mixed strategy is.
3.2 Mixed Strategy
A mixed strategy for this game will be defined in terms of behavioral mixed strate-
gies, meaning that to each h the player will chose a probability distribution over
the possibilities Ah available at the time.
5 According to Aumann (1961), to choose a
mixed distribution at each h is equivalent to choosing a mixed strategy over all simple
strategies. This result is Khun’s theorem adaptation for the case of infinite extensive
5With the natural definition Ah = {0, 1} if τ(h) = (t, 1) and Ah = ∆ if τ(h) = (t− 1, 2).
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games with continuum space of actions. Denoting F(X, σX) the set of probabilities
measures over the set X with σ-algebra σX . At moment h, with Ah the actions avail-
able to the players, a behavioral strategy at h for each i is to pick a probability measure
σi(h) ∈ F(Ah,B(Ah))6. A behavioral mixed strategy for player i, σi is a behavioral
mixed strategy for every history σi(h), ∀h ∈ H, the set of all possible behavioral
mixed strategy is Σi. A behavioral mixed strategy is σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3).
To define the payment function it is important to know not only the agreement
distribution over ∆, i.e. to know what is the probability measure on B(∆̄), but also
the moment that agreement is done. For that purpose we will define one probability
measure based on the behavioral mixed strategy, σ. kσ̄h defines the probability over
the future histories of dimension k after h, it is therefore defined on the sigma-algebra
B
(
∆̄k
)
.
kσ̄h will be defined iteratively. We start by the probability measure of the histories
ending on the period next to h. For that, for each h ∈ H t,2, define 1σh(O) = σh(O),
with O ∈ B(∆̄). If at h the proposal was accepted and ht,2 = (1, 1) then no path
was followed and in that case 1σh(O) = 0 for any O ∈ B(∆̄). Define the probability
measure over future histories of size 2 like
2σ̄h(O) =
∫
h̄∈∆̄
σ(h,h̄)(O|h̄)∂
(
1σ̄h
)
In which O|h̄ is the projection of O ∈ B(∆̄)2 on the last coordinate O|h̄ =
{
h̃ ∈
∆̄ :
(
h̄, h̃
)
∈ O
}
, and clearly a measurable set on B(∆̄). Using the same idea it is
possible to define, recursively, k+1σ̄h the probability measure among the histories with
duration k + 1 superior to h when σ is the played strategy, for O ∈ B(∆̄k+1)
k+1σ̄h(O) =
∫
h̄∈∆̄k
σ(h,h̄)(O|h̄)∂
(
kσ̄h
)
.
For h̄ ∈ ∆̄k means that h̄ = (h̄1, h̄2, . . . , h̄k), where h̄j ∈ ∆̄, i.e. h̄j,1 ∈ ∆ and
h̄j,2, h̄j,3 ∈ {0, 1}. Define for h ∈ H t̃,2, the immediate payment at time t̃, π(h) =
6For Ah = ∆ we will use the Borelian σ-algebra
16
ht̃1h
t̃
2h
t̃
3, if both repliers accept π(h) = h
t̃
1, if either rejects π(h) = 0̄. π(h) is clearly
continuous in h. The payment at t = t(h), under the mixed strategy σ can be defined
as
Πti(σ|h) =
∑
k
δk
∫
h̄∈∆̄k
π(h, h̄)∂
(
kσ̄h
)
The expected payment is a discounted sum of a stream of expected values received
at each moment when σ is played, at h player i expects to receive
∫
h̄∈∆̄k π(h, h̄)∂
(
kσh
)
in the moment t(h) + k.
The next result will show the continuity of the function Πti(·|h), so if σn → σ
then Πti(σ
n|h) → Πti(σ|h) for any h. The convergence concept we will use in the
strategies space is the strong convergence of measures, so σn → σ if σnh(O)→ σh(O)
for all O ∈ B(Ah), we mean the setwise convergence, with the metric d(µ, ν) =
suph∈H supA∈B(Ah) |µ(A) − ν(A)|. The next theorem proves the payment function
continuity.
Theorem 5. Πti(σ|h) is continuous for all h ∈ H.
Proof. If σnh → σh, as for each n, 1σnh(O) = σnh(O) then 1σ̄nh(O) → 1σ̄h(O). By
induction and using Fatou’s lemma with varying measure Royden (1968, p. 231),
lim inf
n
k+1σ̄
n
h(O) = lim inf
n
∫
h̄∈∆̄k
σn(h,h̄)(O|h̄)∂
(
kσ̄
n
h
)
≥
∫
h̄∈∆̄k
lim inf
n
σn(h,h̄)(O|h̄)∂
(
kσ̄h
)
=
∫
h̄∈∆̄k
σ(h,h̄)(O|h̄)∂
(
kσ̄h
)
= k+1σ̄h(O)
When lim infn k+1σ̄
n
h(O) ≥ k+1σ̄h(O) is valid for all open sets then k+1σ̄nh weakly
converges to k+1σh, and by Portmaentau lemma we know this implies
∫
h̄∈∆̄k π(h, h̄)∂
(
k+1σ̄
n
h
)
→∫
h̄∈∆̄k π(h, h̄)∂
(
k+1σ̄h
)
, as π(h, h̄) is continuous in ∆̄k. And it follows that Πti(σ|h) is
continuous.
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We can define a best repply to σ at h for player i as
BRi(σ|h) =
{
σ′h ∈ F(Ah,B(Ah)) : Πti(σ′h, σ−h|h) ≥ sup
µh∈F(Ah,B(Ah))
Πti(µh, σ−h|h)
}
3.3 Trembling Hand Equilibria
The questions raised by Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, p.250), justify the use of an
agent strategic form of the game in both Trembling Hand definitions. The PER is
almost a direct translation of Selten’s Perfect Equilibrium for the multiplayer bar-
gaining game. We use approximation games in which both actions at the moment of
replies are played with at least ε probability, and for a strategy to be PER it must be
an accumulation point of the SPNEof the approximation games, with ε ↓ 0. The rea-
son to assume that all actions at all replies must be played with the same probability
is due to the symmetric character of the game. To allow one player to accept with
a different probability than another one is to destroy this character and to implicitly
change an important characteristic of the game. For this reason, even in the PE, we
will always assume equal restrictions at equal moments, that is, at the replies the
restrictions are equal no matter the moment or the player, and at the propositions as
well.
Definition 5. Let Σεi =
{
σi ∈ Σi : σi(k|h) ≥ ε,∀h ∈ H1, k ∈ {0, 1}
}
, σ is a Perfect
Equilibrium in Replies if it is an accumulation point of a sequence of
{
σε
}
{ε↓0},
with σε a best reply at all histories h in the set Σεi, that is
Πti(σ
ε|h) ≥ Πti
(
σ′
ε
h,i, σ
ε
−(h,i)|h
)
,∀σ′εh,i ∈ Σεi ∩OSDi(σε, h) (1)
In contrast to PER, that imposes trembles in a finite set, the Perfect Equilibrium
notion imposes it also in the uncountable set ∆, and thus is more difficult to define.
To our knowledge there is no theory or good examples where to draw from for this con-
cept. The main difficulty is the extensive structure of the bargaining game together
with a continuum of actions (at the propositions). Simon and Stinchcombe (1995)
developed a concept of Perfect Equilibria for normal form games with a continuum of
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actions, Carbonell-Nicolau (2011) creates an alternative but equivalent characteriza-
tion of Perfect Equilibria in the context of games with discontinuous utilities. These
will serve as a basis to define the equilibrium notion on extensive games. The Selten
(1975) PE on a finite action demands that all points must be chosen with a strict
positive probability, on the approximation games; Simon and Stinchcombe (1995)
transposed this imposition in the continuous action case to all open sets which must
be played with positive probability (on the approximation games). So for all h ∈ H2,
if O is an open subset of ∆ then σεi(h)(O|h) > 0. Again if we only used this type
of restriction at each moment we would be destroying the game symmetry. It can
happen that if some actions are chosen with a certain probability (in the trembles) a
strategy is an equilibrium, but if a kind of uniform restriction was set to all actions (in
the trembles), i.e. a blindness imposition on the trembles, then this strategy might
not hold. Later we will present a case where the specific shape of this criteria makes
a difference. In multiplayer bargaining the need a stricter criteria is clear by the sym-
metric nature of the game, if there is not a stronger restriction on the type of allowed
mistakes this symmetric nature can be lost, and this changes and distorts the struc-
ture of the game entirely. For this reason the criteria we will use is σεi(h)(O|h) ≥ ελ(O),
with λ(·) proportional to Lebesgue measure in order for λ(∆) = 1, this way we insure
a certain blindness, and all mistakes are equally (un)probable. σε should also be a
rest reply at all moments of history and converge (strongly) to the equilibrium strat-
egy. In this game there is no obvious reason to assume strong convergence, however
due to the strategic nature of games the approximation strategies should play each
action or set of actions with almost the same probability as the equilibrium strategy,
to assume a more weak convergence notion might lead to equilibrium strategies in
the initial game which were not played in the approximation games.
Definition 6. Σ
ε
h = {σh ∈ Σh : σh(O) ≥ ελ(O), ∀O ⊆ Ah open set}. σ is a Perfect
Equilibria if it is an accumulation point of a sequence of
{
σε
}
{ε↓0} with σ
ε a best
reply at all histories h in the set Σ̄εi, that is
Πti
(
σε|h
)
≥ Πti(σ′
ε
h,i, σ
ε
−(h,i)|h),∀σ′
ε
h,i ∈ Σ
ε
h ∩OSDi(σε, h)
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3.4 Trembling Hand Equilibria and Classical Strategies
One property common to all equilibria presented in section (2) is that replies do not
play a role in the future of the game. In case of the rejection of a proposal, who
rejected the proposal is not relevant to the future path of the game. In this type of
strategies, defined as Reply Independent, when one of the trembling hand concepts
is in use, as there are no future consequences of accepting or rejecting proposals,
and there is always the possibility that the other player accepts, those that leave the
players better off should be accepted. The next result will prove this, but first we
formally define a Reply Independent strategy, as a strategy where the same action is
taken for two histories with the same propositions (but possibly with different replies).
Definition 7. The strategy σ is Reply Independent if for any h and h̃ with τ(h) =
τ(h̃) and ht,1 = h̃t,1, ∀t ≤ t(h), then σ(h) = σ(h̃).
Σp ⊂ Σ is the set of all Reply Independent strategies.
If a strategy is Reply Independent, σ ∈ Σp, when a proposal is rejected the
payment is always the same no matter what the concrete reply vector r ∈ R is,
with R = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)} the set of responses where a proposition is rejected. So
Πt+1i
(
σ|h, r
)
= Πt+1i
(
σ|h, r′
)
, ∀r, r′ ∈ R. We can then define, for a Reply Independent
strategy, the future payment after a proposal being refused pσi (h) = Π
t+1
i
(
σ|h, r
)
,
∀r ∈ R with τ(h) = (t, 1). We are now in conditions to show that if a strategy is
trembling hand equilibrium and reply independent, then good proposals are always
accepted.
Theorem 6. If a simple, reply independent with immediate agreement at each history
strategy σ, is Trembling Hand then σj(1|h) = 1 if ht,1j > pσj (h) and σj(1|h) = 0 for
ht,1i < p
σ
j (h).
Proof. As the strategy is simple it exists a d ∈ ∆ such that σi(h)
(
d
∣∣h) = 1 and
σj
(
1
∣∣h, d) = 1 for j 6= i(h). Therefore, given the definition of a PE, the approximation
strategy σε, for the proponent i(h), must be σεi(h)
(
O
∣∣h) = ελ(O) + (1 − ε)χd(O),
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otherwise the distance between the strategies would be bigger than ε7. For the same
reason, the replier, receiving the expected proposition d, chooses to σεj
(
1
∣∣h, d) = 1−ε.
When a proposition d̃ different from d is received the payoff in each of the possibilities
is
Πtj
(
1, σε−{j,h}
∣∣h, d̃) =σεk(1∣∣h, d̃)d̃j + δσεk(0∣∣h, d̃)Πt+1j (σε∣∣h, d̃, 1, 0)
Πtj
(
0, σε−{j,h}
∣∣h, d̃) =δσεk(1∣∣h, d̃)Πt+1j (σε∣∣h, d̃, 0, 1)+ δσεk(0∣∣h, d̃)Πt+1j (σε∣∣h, d̃, 0, 0)
Simplifying the notation h̃r =
(
h, d̃, r
)
and Πrε = Π
t+1
j
(
σε
∣∣h, d̃, r). Player j accepts
the proposition d̃, with d̃j > δp
σ
j (h̃), if
Πtj
(
1, σε−{j,h}
∣∣∣h, d̃) > Πtj(0, σε−{j,h}∣∣h, d̃)⇔ σεk(1∣∣h, d̃)
1− σεk
(
1
∣∣h, d̃) > δΠ00ε − Π10εd̃j − δΠ01ε
The following claim will be used to calculate Π00ε − Π10ε .
Claim 1. For h1, h2 ∈ H t,1 with the same proposition’s history, hk,11 = h
k,1
2 for k ≤ t,
then
∣∣∣∣Πtj(σε∣∣h1)− Πtj(σε∣∣h2)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 7ε.
Proof. If h1, h2 ∈ H t,1 then a proposition has already been done at t and the payoff
can be divided into the several components one for each possible reply pair
∣∣∣∣Πtj(σε∣∣h1)− Πtj(σε∣∣h2)∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ∣∣∣∣∑
r∈R
σε(r|h1)Πt+1j
(
σε
∣∣h1, r)− σε(r|h2)Πt+1j (σε∣∣h2, r)∣∣∣∣
+ ht,1j
∣∣∣∣σε(1, 1|h1)− σε(1, 1|h2)∣∣∣∣ ≤
≤δ
∑
r∈R
σε(r|h1)
∣∣∣∣Πt+1j (σε∣∣h1, r)− Πt+1j (σε∣∣h2, r)∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣σε(r|h1)− σε(r|h2)∣∣∣∣Πt+1j (σε∣∣h2, r)
+ ht,1j
∣∣∣∣σε(1, 1|h1)− σε(1, 1|h2)∣∣∣∣ ≤
7With χa(B) the indicator function
χa(B) =
{
1 if a ∈ B
0 if a /∈ B
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≤δ
∑
r∈R
σε(r|h1)
(
1− (1− ε)3
)
+ 2εΠt+1j
(
σε
∣∣h2, r)+ 2εht,1j ≤ 7ε
The first inequality is the result of the triangle inequality; the second from the
equality σε(r|h2)Πt+1j
(
σε
∣∣h2, r) = σε(r|h1)Πt+1j (σε∣∣h2, r)+(σε(r|h2)−σε(r|h1))Πt+1j (σε∣∣h2, r);
the third inequality from the fact that after the proposition, |σε(r|h) − σ(r|h)| ≤
ε, then, due to reply independence, σ(r|h1) = σ(r|h2), and by σε
(
p, 1, 1
∣∣h1, r) =
σε
(
p, 1, 1
∣∣h2, r) = (1− ε)3 and therefore ∣∣∣∣Πtj(σε∣∣h1)− Πtj(σε∣∣h2)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1− (1− ε)3.
Calculating Π00ε − Π10ε ,
Π00ε =
∫
p∈∆\d
Πt+1j
(
σε
∣∣h̃00, p)∂(σε(h̃00))+ (1− ε)3d
Π10ε =
∫
p∈∆\d
Πt+1j
(
σε
∣∣h̃10, p)∂(σε(h̃10))+ (1− ε)3d
As seen before, due to the reply independence of σ, the proposition is the same after
h̃00 and h̃10, σε is also equal after h̃00 and h̃10 and Π00ε −Π10ε =
∫
p∈∆\d Π
t+1
j
(
σε
∣∣h̃00, p)−
Πt+1j
(
σε
∣∣h̃10, p)∂(σεi (·|h̃r)). Using the result of claim(1), ∣∣∣Π00ε −Π10ε ∣∣∣ ≤ ∫p∈∆\d 7ε∂(σεi (·|h̃r)) =
7ε2. We know that σεk
(
1
∣∣h, d̃) ≥ ε and for small ε, ε
1−ε > 7ε
2, then it must be that
σεk
(
1
∣∣h, d̃)
1− σεk
(
1
∣∣h, d̃) > Π00ε − Π10εd̃j − δΠ01ε
If the proposition is better than the future payment d̃j > δp
σ
j (h̃) then in the
approximating strategy player j always accepts the proposal σεj(1|h, d̃) = 1− ε.
The same reasoning can be applied for a strategy σ to be PER, the future propo-
sitions, even in σε, are the same whatever the actions of the repliers, and so a better
proposition will always be accepted.
An immediate consequence of the previous result is that Haller’s strategy (and
it’s derivatives) are not Trembling Hand equilibria, since repliers only accept a unique
22
proposal and for that reason it cannot sustain the hypothesis of small errors. Without
penalizing the answers it was relatively clear that this would happen.
Corollary 1. Haller’s strategy is not Trembling Hand equilibrium.
Herrero’s strategy is different, it respects the previous result, but it still maintains
a shortcoming, not all the played strategies are non-dominated, for instance when a
player accepts a division that attributes him zero he is playing a weakly dominated
strategy. The next theorem shows that Herrero’s is not a Trembling Hand equilibrium,
the proof is done in the appendix for the Perfect Equilibrium concept, but it could
be done for PER following the exact same lines, step by step, for this reason we do
not explicitly prove it herein.
Theorem 7. Herrero’s strategy is not a Trembling Hand equilibrium
4 New Equilibra Strategies
4.1 Herrero Modified
On this section we will construct two strategies based on Herrero, HM1 and HM2,
the first is PER and the second PE and in both almost all divisions can be established
as equilibrium outcomes. They serve as an example of two important properties of
the Trembling Hand. Counterintuitevely the set of strategies that are PE is not a
subset of those that are PER. In fact HM1 is PER without being PE, and HM2 is
PE without being PER. And secondly they show, specially HM2, how crucial the
details of PE are definition and how they might affect which strategies are equilibria.
These strategies are equal except for the reply to a very specific proposal, in HM1
that proposal is accepted, in HM2 it is rejected. The main change to the original
Herrero strategy is the states and the punishment divisions which they establish,
instead of the vectors ei, both HM use ē1, ē2, ē3
ēij =
1− 2η if j 6= iη if j = i
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With 0 < η < δ/2 − 1/4. This way we ensure to all players a positive payment,
although small, and this positive payoff creates an incentive for the players not to
reject the proposition, because if they do it the payment they can get devalues with
time.
The function that tracks the state (and therefore the proposition which should be
settled on) is as in Herrero’s strategy, it changes only after the proposition. When
the proposition does not coincide with the state, there is a change to a state that
rewards the worst off player in the ”out of equilibrium” proposition. Formally state
transition is defined in the same way as Herrero’s but with the states changed from
ei to ēi. HM1 is equal to Herrero’s strategy but with the new states instead of e
i.
Both strategies are presented in the next two tables.
Table 3: HM1
State ēj
Player i Proposal ē
j
Accept pi ≥ δēji
The moment in which HM2 is different from HM1 is when the share proposed to
the replier that will not propose on the next round coincides to what he would receive
there, that is the share proposed to him is δēji . Only in this case are the strategies
different with that replier accepting the proposal in HM1 and rejecting it in HM2.
Table 4: HM2
State ēj
Player i
Proposal ēj
Accept
pi > δē
j
i and i 6= i(h+)
pi ≥ δēji and i = i(h+)
Theorem 8. For δ > 1/2, HM1 is PER and it is not PE, HM2 is PE and it is not
PER
Proof. We will start seeing that HM1 is PER and can not be PE, this happens
because in the approximating games the only best reply is when a proposition of
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δēji is received, to accept it, and by this reason HM2 can never be the limit of an
approximating strategy. Take s for the HM1 and s
ε for the approximating strategy.
At h ∈ H t−1,2 for the proponent i = i(t) we will prove that Πti(s|h) > Πti(s′i, s−i|h)
for all s′i ∈ OSD(si, h), and due to continuity of payment function Πti(si, sε−i|h) >
Πti(s
′
i, s
ε
−i|h). If s is played after τ(h) = (t − 1, 2), i receives Πti(s|h) = r(h)i ≥ η.
If it makes a proposition p different from r(h), the state changes before voting to
r
(
h, p
)
= ēk with k = k(p, t) 6= i. If the proposal ht,1 is rejected the future payment
is δēki = δη < η. If it is accepted k = k(p, t) accepts only if h
t,1
k ≥ δ(1 − 2η); as
ht,1j ≥ h
t,1
k , then h
t,1
j ≥ δ(1−2η), and h
t,1
i = 1−
∑
j 6=i h
t,1
j = 1−2δ(1−2η). But, due to
η < δ/2−1/4, 1−2δ(1−2η) < η and for the proposal to be accepted by all the repliers
the proponent must receive less than η ≤ Πti(s|h) = r(h)i. So, no matter whether
the proposal is accepted or rejected, the proponent always gets worst by playing a
different strategy. For sεi to be a best reply it must coincide with si as PER does not
impose any restriction on the proposition distribution sεi
(
O
∣∣h) = si(O∣∣h) = χr(h)(O).
For a replier j 6= i(t)6 6 . The strategy s is simple, reply independent and the
agreement is established at the first moment therefore as proved in theorem (6),
sεj(1|h) = 1− ε if h
t,1
j > δr(h)j and s
ε
j(1|h) = ε if if h
t,1
j < δr(h)j. The only case that
rest to be analysed in when ht,1j = δr(h)j. Define the set of possible histories when
the strategy σε is played after h
Hsε(h) = {h̄ ∈ H : sε(h̄|h) > 0}
For h̄ ∈ Hsε and τ(h̄) = (t + 1, 2), we know that the state of h̄ is r(h) and that
the proposition at h̄t+1,1 was r(h). This because in the proposition stage sε and s
define the same action, si(h̄)(h̄
−) = r(h̄−) = r(h) and sε
i(h̄)
(
r(h)|h̄
)
= 1. This way
h̄t+1,1 = r(h). The proposition coincides with the state and there is no state change,
r(h̄) = r(h). Using the same reasoning for any t′ if τ(h′) = (t′, 2) and h′ ∈ Hsε(h),
we conclude that r(h′) = r(h), and the proposition after h is always the same r(h)
if strategy sε is played. If proposal ht,1 is rejected the continuation payment can be
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written as
Πt+1j
(
sε
∣∣h, r) = δ∑
k
p(at+k = 1)δ
kr(h)j < δr(h)j
In which p(at+k = 1) is the probability that an agreement is reached t + k periods
after h, when sε is played. Then, when the player accepts, his payment is ht,1j s
ε
k(1|h)+
sεk(0|h)Πt+1j
(
sε
∣∣h). If he rejects the payment is Πt+1j (sε∣∣h). So when ht,1j ≥ δr(h)j >
Πtj
(
sε
∣∣h) the best for j it to accept with maximum allowed probability, and sεj(1|h) =
1− ε. The convergent strategy is
sεi(h)(x|h) =
1 if x = r(h)0 if x 6= r(h) sεj(x|h) =
1− ε if h
t,1 ≥ r(h)j
ε if ht,1 < r(h)j
The same derivation is valid for the strategy HM2 to be a PER. By the domi-
nance principle the proposition must be equal to the state; because of strategy’s reply
independence, whenever the proposition is bigger than future earnings to accept it is
the best reply and when it is smaller the best is to reject it; and in case of equality as
the future proponents will always play r(h) the replier should accept the proposition
to avoid devaluation. Therefore the best reply approximation strategy must be equal
to sε, but these strategies converge to HM1, and we conclude that HM2 can not be
PER.
To prove that HM1 was a PER we also proved that HM2 was not PER, because if
a best reply approximation strategy to HM2 existed, it had to be equal to the approxi-
mation strategy to HM1, and this approximation strategy, obviously, cannot converge
to HM2. The same happens with the proof that HM2 is a PE, it will also prove that
HM1 is not a PE because the approximation strategy should be the same. The propo-
sition in HM2 is the same as in HM1 the player always proposes a division equal to the
state, and if he does not he is strongly penalized afterwards, Πti(σ|h) > Πti(σ′i, σ−i|h),
therefore for an approximation strategy σε, Πti(σi, σ
ε
−i|h) > Πti(σ′i, σε−i|h). So, for an
approximation strategy to σ to be a best reply in the approximation game, it should
be equal to σ with maximum probability, so σεi(h)
(
r(h)
∣∣h) = 1− ε and to respect the
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other condition to be PE we must have that for any O ∈ B(∆)
σεi(h)
(
O
∣∣h) = (1− ε)χr(h)(O) + ελ(O)
HM2 is a simple, reply independent with immediate agreement strategy, the deriva-
tion made in theorem(6) is applicable and at history h if the proposition ht,1j is such
that ht,1j > δr(h)j the best reply in the approximation strategy is to accept with
probability 1− ε and if ht,1j < δr(h)j the best is to reject with maximum probability.
Then for j 6= i(h)
σεj(1
∣∣h) =
1− ε if h
t,1
j > δr(h)
ε if ht,1j < δr(h)
Before looking at what happens when ht,1j = δr(h)j two notes are important. First,
all the conclusions were equally valid if instead we were trying to prove that HM1 is
PE. Second, what we determine of the structure of σε is enough to conclude that if
two histories h, h′ ∈ H t−1,2 have the same state, players’ payoff, under the strategy
σε, is the same, because the only moment where the actions can be different is when
one of the players received a proposition pj = δr(h)j, but the measure of this case is
null. The next claim proves this.
Claim 2. If h, h′ ∈ H t−1,2 then Πtj
(
σε
∣∣h) = Πtj(σε∣∣h′) with r(h) = r(h′)
Proof. Define ∆̄∗ =
{
(p, r) ∈ ∆ × {0, 1}2 : pi = δēji , i, j = 1, 2, 3
}
, and 1σ
ε
(
∆̄∗
∣∣h) =
σε
(
∆̄∗
∣∣h) ≤∑i,j σε({p ∈ ∆ : pi = δēji}∣∣h) = ∑i,j ελ({p ∈ ∆ : pi = δēji}∣∣h) = 0. If
∆̄+ = ∆̄ \ ∆̄∗ then σε
(
∆̄+
∣∣h) = 1. By induction
k+1σ̄
ε
(
∆̄k+1+
∣∣h) = ∫
h̄∈∆̄k
σεh,h̄
(
∆̄k+1
+|h̄
)
∂
(
kσ̄
ε
h
)
=
∫
h̄∈∆̄k+
σεh,h̄
(
∆̄+
)
∂
(
kσ̄
ε
h
)
=
∫
h̄∈∆̄k+
σεh,h̄
(
∆̄
)
∂
(
kσ̄
ε
h
)
= k+1σ̄
ε
(
∆̄k+1
∣∣h)
Where the first equality holds because kσ̄
ε
(
∆̄k+\∆̄k+
∣∣h) = 0 by induction hypothesis
and because if h̄ ∈ ∆̄k+ then ∆̄+|h̄ = ∆+. Therefore
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Πtj
(
σε
∣∣h) = ∞∑
k=0
δk
∫
h̄∈∆̄k
π(h, h̄)∂
(
kσ̄
ε
h
)
=
∞∑
k=0
δk
∫
h̄∈∆̄+k
π(h, h̄)∂
(
kσ̄
ε
h
)
=
∞∑
k=0
δk
∫
h̄∈∆̄+k
π(h, h̄)∂
(
kσ̄
ε
h′
)
=
∞∑
k=0
δk
∫
h̄∈∆̄k
π(h, h̄)∂
(
kσ̄
ε
h′
)
=Πtj
(
σε
∣∣h′)
There are two possibilities of ht,1j = δē
i
j, either i = j or i 6= j. If it is the first
case, in the proposition ht,1, j was the worst player, he has received the smaller share
so it must be that ht,1j ≤ 12 , but η is such that δ(1 − 2η) >
1
2
, an implication of
η < δ/2− 1/4, so ht,1j < δē
j
j. This way we need to consider only when the proposition
ht,1 attributes to player j the share ht,1j = δη, and attributes less to the other replier k.
To determine the best reply of j we must compare Πtj(σ
a
j , σ
ε
−j|h) with Πtj(σrj , σε−{j,h}|h),
knowing that the other replier k rejects the proposition with probability 1− ε.Π
t
j(σ
r
j , σ
ε
−{j,h}|h) = (1− ε)δΠ
t+1
j
(
σε
∣∣h, 0, 0)+ δεΠt+1j (σε|h, 0, 1)
Πtj(σ
a
j , σ
ε
−{j,h}|h) = (1− ε)δΠ
t+1
j
(
σε
∣∣h, 1, 0)+ εδη
Due to the state being the same in the histories (h, 1, 0) and (h, 0, 0) we know that
Πt+1i (σ
ε|h, 1, 0) = Πt+1
(
σε|h, 0, 0
)
, by claim (2), the difference in payment between the
two actions resumes itself to Πtj(σ
a
j , σ
ε
−i|h)−Πtj(σrj , σε−j|h) = δε
(
η−Πt+1j
(
σε|h, 0, 1
))
.
First, we will see in detail what is Πt+1j
(
σε|h, 0, 1
)
. It has 3 ”types” of payment:
when there are no mistakes, the proponent proposes r(h) and both repliers accept,
this happens with probability (1−ε)3, and contribution to j’s payoff is (1−ε)3η; when
the proponent does the right proposal but at least one of the repliers do a mistake
and the expected payoff from this histories is (1 − ε)δ
∑
r∈R prΠ
t+1
j
(
σε
∣∣h, r(h), r),
with pr the probability of the reply be r, if r = (k, j) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)} then
pr = (1− ε)k+jε2−k−j; and lastly, when the proponent makes the wrong proposal. For
the moment, let us call this expected value εEj. As before Π
t+2
j
(
σε|h̃, r(h), r
)
does
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not depend on the specific reply r and we can relabel it as Πt+2j , with h̃ = (h, 0, 1).
Summing all up we get
η − Πt+1j
(
σε|h, 0, 1
)
= η −
[
(1− ε)3η + (1− ε)δ
∑
r∈R
prΠ
t+2
j + εEj
]
= η(3ε− 3ε2 − ε3)− (1− ε)
(
1− (1− ε)2
)
δΠt+2j − εEj
= ε
[
η(3− 3ε− ε2)− (2− 3ε+ ε2)δΠt+2j − Ej
]
The signal of Πtj(1, σ
ε
−{j,h}|h) − Πtj(0, σε−{j,h}|h) for small values of ε is equal to
3η−2δη−e, we assumed that Ej → e and used that Πt+2j in the expression converges
to η.It is the signal of 3η− 2δη− e that determines the best action for player j. This
signal depends crucially on the value of e and to understand it we need to look to
the structure of Ej. When a proposition is not done according to the state, there is
a state transition to ēw. Define ∆w the set of points of ∆ that, when proposed, the
state change to ēw. Divide each of these sets in three: ∆1,0w in which, when σ is being
played, player j accepts the propositions but player k rejects; ∆0,1w player j rejects
but player k accepts; and, ∆0,0w in which both players reject
8910
Ej =
∑
w∈−i(t+1)
∑
r∈R
∫
p∈∆rw
δσε(r|h̃, p)Πt+2j
(
σε|h̃, p, r
)
∂σε(h̃) +O(ε)
=
∑
w∈−i(t+1)
∑
r∈R
∫
p∈∆rw
δ(1− ε)2Πt+2j
(
σε|h̃, p, r
)
∂σε(h̃) +O(ε)
=
∑
w∈−i(t+1)
∫
p∈∆w
δ(1− ε)2Πt+2j
(
σε
∣∣ēw)∂σε(h̃) +O(ε)
= δΠt+2j
(
σε
∣∣ēw1)σε(∆w1∣∣h̃)(1− ε)2 + δΠt+2j (σε∣∣ēw1)σε(∆w2 |h̃)(1− ε)2 +O(ε)
8Notice that at least one of the players rejects the proposition namely if the state changes to ek
the player k always reject under σ, and by that ∆0,1k is empty. It is only defined to ease the formulas.
9We are using the big O notation, symbolizing that f(ε) ∈ O(ε) when f(ε)ε ≤ k for small values
of ε for some k
10There is a slight abuse on notation here because σε(∆|h) = ε and we are using it as if σε(∆|h) = 1,
E was multiplied by ε on the payment function.
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The first equality results from the division of the set ∆ into several parts and from
knowing that at each set ∆rw the probability of a reply different from r is at most
ε(1 − ε); the second from the probability of r being (1 − ε)2; the third is due to the
union of the sets ∆rw for a fixed player w and by claim(2) the payoff is equal for all
histories that have the same state, we define Πt+2j
(
σε
∣∣ēw) as the payment in the state
ēw.
Taking limits of the expression for Ej: if the player j is the proponent at t+1 then
he will always receive the same in both states Πt+2j
(
σε
∣∣ēw1) = Πt+2j (σε∣∣ēw2) = η, and
e = δη. And we can calculate that η−Πt+1j
(
σε|h, 0, 1
)
converges to 3− 2δη− δη > 0.
For small values of ε, if j is the next proponent j = i(t + 1), he should accept the
proposition ht,1 when ht,1j = δē
i
j with maximum probability; if j is not the next
proponent, as σε(∆w1|h̃) = σε(∆w2|h̃) = 1/2 the limit of E is e = δ 12(1 − η), and
3η − 2δη − e = 3η − 2δη − δ 1
2
(1 − η) = 1/2
(
6η − 3δη − δ
)
, and it is better for
j to accept the proposition if η > δ
6−3δ . But this inequality is incompatible with
η < δ/2 − 1/4, these conditions cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. Therefore for
small values of ε the replier should reject the proposition ht,1j = δη.
Summing up the conclusions, if ht,1j = δη and r(h) 6= ēj then
σεj(1|h) =
1− ε if j = i(t+ 1)ε if j 6= i(t+ 1) (2)
Clearly σε is convergent to HM2, so it is a PE. For HM1 to be a PE σ
ε must be the
approximation strategy, and therefore HM1 is not a PE.
The subtleties of the PE definition are evident, if we adopted a less stricter no-
tion and didn’t impose the condition that σε(O|h) ≥ ελ(O) but one similar to that of
Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) then HM1 would also be PE. For example if the trem-
bles in the proposition had a very small σε(∆j|h) we could find a different convergent
sequence, but that would mean the proponent was usingthe distribution function on
the trembles strategically.
30
4.2 A Strictly Undominated Equilibrium Strategy for all δ
We saw that if the strategies do not penalize the replies players will accept better
proposals. One clear conclusion is that whenever the proposal is greater than δ, the
repliers will accept it. If this discount factor is small, δ < 1/2, it is possible to
propose a division that both repliers accept. Given that δ < 1/2, pick an ε and set
ptj = δ + ε for j 6= i(h), ptj > δ ≥ δΠt+1j (σ|(h, r)), and due to theorem (6) all j accept
the proposition. Any division d with di(t) < 1− 2δ is not a Trembling Hand.
In this section we will build a strategy that is Trembling Hand equilibrium for all
δ, and for almost all divisions (d(σ)  0̄). This strategy is strictly non-dominated,
so the actions taken at each information set are the unique best reply. To establish
it and according to theorem (6) it is necessary either to use mixed strategies, that
the strategy does not establish the agreement immediately or to penalize the replies.
In this case we opt to penalize the out of equilibrium replies, for this we will use
two punishment ”states” (by player). The set of all states for this strategy is E =
{e0, e1, e2, e3, e1a, e2a, e3a} . The idea of two states per player is to allow to punish a
proposer i when he deviates from ek with eia, and punish with e
i when he deviates
from eia. Again to each state corresponds one particular division, therefore e ∈ E is
a division vector, with the share given to player k being kth-coordinate of e. To the
corresponding state the division vector is
eik =
ε1 if k 6= i mod 3 + 11− 2ε1 if k = i+ 1 eia,k =

ε1 if k ∈ −{i, i mod 3 + 1}
ε2 if k = i
1− ε1 − ε2 if k = i mod 3 + 1
ε’s are chosen in a way that: δε1 < ε2 < ε1; and, ε1 < mini∈I e
0
i . Notice that due
to ε1 < mini∈I e
0
i and
∑
i∈I e
0
i ≤ 1, 3ε1 ≤ 1 and naturally 2ε1 < 1 guaranteeing that
ei ∈ ∆.
The strategy, ρ, defines that players should make a proposition equal to the state
and reject all the propositions which are different (in this sense it is like Haller’s
strategy, but this time robust to minor randomness, because it penalizes out of the
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path answers). State changes happen after the voting, so the transition takes place
in histories that belong to H t,2. The state effectively changes to a different state only
when the proposal or one of the responses is different from what is defined by ρ; when
both are different it is the reply that defines the new state; if both players reply in an
unexpected way it is the player with the smaller index who is punished. The following
table sums up the transition.
State tansition
Different Proposal Different Reply
state player i(h) player k
e0 ei(h) eka
ej e
i(h)
a eka
eja e
i(h) eka
In a rigorous manner, the function r(h) that determines the state, r(.) : H → E, at
the initial state is r(∅) = e0; as there is no state change from (t, 1) to (t, 2) no matter
what the proposition at (t, 1) was, for histories h with τ(h) = (t, 1), r(h) = r(h−);
for a history h ending after a voting stage τ(h) = (t, 2) the state is
r(h) =

e
i(h) if r(h|t−1,2) ∈ {e0, e1a, e2a, e3a}
e
i(h)
a if r(h|t−1,2) ∈ {e1, e2, e3}
ht,1 6= r(h|t−1,2) or ht,2 = 0̄
eka if h
t,2 6= ρj(h|t,1)
The first and second branches define the new state when a player makes a propo-
sition different from the state ht,1 6= r(h|t−1,2) and all repliers act accordingly voting
against the proposal, ht,2 = 0̄; the new state is ei(h) or e
i(h)
a depending on the initial
one. The third branch defines the state when a replier is incongruent with the strat-
egy. k is the player of smaller index who plays differently from what was expected,
k = min{j ∈ −i(h) : ht,2j 6= ρj(h|t,1)}.
The strategy for the proponent i(h) is ρi(h)(x|h) = χr(h)(x). The player i(h) plays
x with probability 1 if x = r(h) and with probability 0 if it is not. For the replier
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j 6= i(h), ρj defines that if a proposal is the same as the state it should always be
accepted, if it is different it should be rejected, formally
ρj(x|h) =
χ{1}(x) if h
t,1 = r(h−)
χ{0}(x) if h
t,1 6= r(h−)
for x ∈ {0, 1}, meaning that j always accepts if the proposal is equal to the state
and always rejects otherwise.
To prove ρ is an equilibrium for any δ we will use the next two claims, both proved
in the appendix. The first proves that a strategy is a Trembling Hand equilibrium,
without the need to look for the specific ε strategy that converges to it, if dominant.
The second claim proves that if a strategy is strictly better than all OSD strategies,
then it is strictly better than all strategies.
Claim 3. When inf
{
Πti(σ|h) − Πti(σ′i, σ−i|h) : ∀h ∈ H,∀σ′i ∈ OSD(σi, h)
}
> 0 then
σ is an Trembling Hand equilibrium.
The classical OSD result state that Πti(s|h) ≥ Πti(s′i, s−i|h) for all s′i ∈ Si is
equivalent to Πti(s|h) ≥ Πti(s̄i, s−i|h) for all s̄i ∈ OSD(si, h) and all h. Given the
previous claim, a similar result but with a strict inequality is useful, this way we only
need to prove the strict inequality for OSD strategies. The following simple claim
proves this result for our game.
Claim 4. If Πti(s|h) > Πti(s′i, s−i|h), for all s′i ∈ OSD(si, h) and for all h ∈ H, then
Πti(s|h) > Πti(s̄i, s−i|h), for all s̄i ∈ Σi \ si and for all h ∈ H
Theorem 9. Πti(ρ|h) > Πti(ρ′i, ρ−i|h), ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ H and ρ′i ∈ Σi.
Proof. If ρ is strictly better than all OSD(ρi, h) for all i and h, then by claim(4)
we get the intended result. In the state e ∈ E after history τ(h) = (t − 1, 2),
when the proposition at t has not been made yet, if all players follow the strategy
ρ, i(h) proposes e, repliers accept, agreement is immediate and the player’s payment
is Πti(ρ|h) = ei. If τ(h) = (t, 1) and the proposal has been made, payment depends
on whether the proposition coincided with the state or not. If it did, agreement is
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immediate; if it did not, agreement is postponed one period, and the proposition is
r
(
h, 0̄
)
. Remember state transition only happens after voting, so e = r(h) = r(h−)
Πti(ρ|h) = χ{e}(ht,1)ei +
(
1− χ{e}(ht,1)
)
δr(h, 0̄)i
The vector of zeros 0̄ appears because, according to the strategy ρ, all players
reject a proposal not equal to state. So if a proposal is equal to state χ{e}(h
t,1) = 1
and Πti(ρ|h) = ei; if not, χ{e}(ht,1) = 0 repliers vote against it and payment is δr(h, 0̄)i.
Now we will see that using OSD strategies leaves the players worst off than getting
along with ρ.
When r(h) = ek, k 6= 0 and τ (h) = (t− 1, 2), with i = i(t), ρ′i ∈ OSD(ρi, h),
player i makes a proposition ht,1 different from ek, all players j ∈ −i reject the
proposition ρj(0|h+) = 1 so ht,2 = 0̄. With h++ = (h, ht,1, ht,2) r(h++) = eia, then
Πti(ρ
′
i, ρ−i|h) = δΠt+1i (ρ′i, ρ−i|h++) = δΠt+1i (ρi, ρ−i|h++) = δr(h++) = δeia,i = δε2. We
already derived Πti(ρ|h) = eki ≥ ε1 as δε2 < ε1 we conclude that player i is strictly
worse.
For τ (h) = (t, 1), two cases for a deviating strategy are possible: ht,1 = r(h−),
the proposal was according to the state or it was not, ht,1 6= r(h−). If it was not
and a player j accepts the proposal, ρ′j ∈ OSD(ρj, h) considering 1 = ρ′j(1|h) 6=
ρj(1|h) = 0. In h the other replier rejects and the proposal is not accepted, then
Πtj
(
ρ′j, ρ−j|h
)
= δΠt+1j (ρ|h+) with h+ = (h, ht,2) and h
t,2
k = χj(k), only j accepts
the proposal. r(h+) = eja and Π
t
j(ρ
′
j, ρ−j|h) = δe
j
a,j = δε2. If j had rejected the
state had changed as well, because ht,1 6= r(h−), but this time to r(h, 0̄) = ei(h)a ,
Πtj(ρ|h) = δΠt+1j (ρ|h, 0̄) = δr(h, 0̄)j = δe
i(h)
a,j ≥ δε1 remembering ε2 < ε1, it is proved
that j’s payment worsens.
If the proposition was equal to the state ht,1 = r(h−), for j not following ρ
means the player rejects ht,1. If it behaved as ρj the agreement was immediate and
Πtj(ρ|h) = ekj ≥ ε1. But if the player j refused and he was the only one to do it,
proposal was rejected and r(h+) = eja. This way Π
t
j(ρ
′
j, ρ−j|h) = δe
j
a,j = δε2; ε1 > δε2,
player j worsens if he does not follow the strategy.
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When r(h) = eka, τ(h) = (t− 1, 2). Suppose proposer i follows ρ′i ∈ OSD(ρi, h),
proposing something different from r(h), by ρ definition all repliers will refuse it, the
state will change to r(h++) = ei and future payment is Πti(ρ
′
i, ρ−i|h) = δeii = δε1 <
ε2 ≤ eka,i = Πti(ρ|h), player i gets strictly worse by playing ρ′i.
τ(h) = (t, 1) and j 6= i(h), two possibilities for the strategy to be OSD of ρj
in pure strategies, when ht,1 = r(h−) and ρ′j(0|h) = 1 or when ht,1 6= r(h−) and
ρ′j(1|h) = 1. In the first case j rejects the ht,1, the agreement is only established in
the next moment, the state changes to r(h+) = eja, then Π
t
j(ρ
′
j, ρ−j|h) = δe
j
a,j = δε2;
if j followed ρj, Π
t
j(ρ|h) = eka,j ≥ ε2 > δε2 = Πtj(ρ′j, ρ−j|h). In the other case,
when j accepts improperly ht,1 6= r(h−), the other replier rejected it and delayed
the agreement to next period, the state changed to eja penalizing j for the proposal’s
acceptance, Πtj(ρ
′
j, ρ−j|h) = δe
j
a,j = δε2. If j had rejected the proposition the state
would change to ei(h) and the payment Πtj(ρ|h) = δe
i(h)
j ≥ δε1, and Πtj(ρ′j, ρ−j|h) <
Πtj(ρ|h).
r(h) = e0, if i = i(h) opts for a OSD(ρi, h), the proposition is not e
0, repliers
refuse it, the state changes to ei, the agreement is delayed to t + 1, and i is harmed
Πti(ρ
′
i, ρ−i|h) = δΠti(ρ|h+) = δε1 < ε1 < mink∈I e0k ≤ e0i = Πti(ρ|h).
For the repliers there are, once more, two hypothesis for OSD in pure strategies,
when ht,1 = r(h−) with ρ′j(0|h) = 1, or when ht,1 6= r(h−) and ρ′j(1|h) = 1. In the
first case the proposition is refused by the other repliers and j is penalized on the deal
agreed in the next period Πtj(ρ
′
j, ρ−j|h) = δe
j
a,j = δε2 < e
0
j = Π
t
j(ρ|h), j is worse off.
On the second case j accepts a proposal that is refused, the agreement obtained in the
next moment is eja where j is clearly worse than in e
i(h), Πtj(ρ
′
j, ρ−j|h) = δΠtj(ρ|h+) =
δε2 < δε1 ≤ δei(h)j = Πtj(ρ|h).
4.3 All divisions are a PE outcome
So far we provided strategies that establish as agreement outcomes only elements of
the set
{
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) :
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ 1, xi > 0
}
. The next strategy using an out off
equilibrium incentive mechanism for players that follow it establishes that all possible
divisions in ∆ are Trembling Hand equilibrium outcomes.
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For that consider the set of states E =
⋃
i 6=j{ei, ei,j, ēi,j}, where ei ∈ ∆ are as
previously defined and the new states eij ∈ ∆ are: eiji = γ1, e
ij
j = γ2, and e
ij
k = 0, for
k /∈ {i, j}, for example e31 = (γ2, 0, γ1); ēiji = γ3, ē
ij
j = γ4, and ē
ij
k = 0, for k /∈ {i, j},
so, for example, ē23 =
(
0, γ3, γ4
)
. For each history h there is a state r(h) ∈ E. The
strategy for h ∈ H t−1,2 is for the proponent to always propose a division equal to the
state si(h)(h) = r(h); for h ∈ H t,1 the player j ∈ −i(h) accepts if the proposal was
equal to the state and rejects otherwise.
sj(h) =
1, if h
t,1 = r(h−)
0, if ht,1 6= r(h−)
To define the state transition we need to use a function from history to the set of
subsets of player g(h) : H2 → 2I , that tracks which players moved as defined in s at
the last moment ht = (ht,1, ht,2).
g(h) =
{
i ∈ I :
(
i 6= i(h) and si(h|t,1) = ht,2i
)
or
(
i = i(h) and si(h
|t−1,2) = ht,1
)}
When all players follow s the agreement is immediate, the proponent plays r(h)
and both repliers accept it, so if h was not an ending history, some of the players did
not play according to the strategy and either the proponent or at least one replier
deviated. Therefore there is an impossibility of g(h) = I in a non ending history h.
That is, a history with ht,2 6= (1, 1) must have g(h) 6= I.
There is an order for the players at each moment of time determined by the next
moment that the players propose. Define at each t and for each player i, ti = min{t̃ :
t̃ > t and t̃ ∈ t(i)}, and we say i proposes before j at t, i ≺t j, if ti < tj. Take ḡ(h) to
be the ordered pair with the same elements of g(h) ordered by ≺t(h). One example,
if g(h) = {1, 3} and t(h) = 4 the next proponent is player 2, then player 3 followed
by 1, so 3 ≺4 1 and ḡ(h) = (3, 1).
Transition occurs only after the voting stage, so if τ(h) = (t, 2), r(h) = r(h−).
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For h = (t, 2)11
r(h) =

r(h|t,1), if g(h) = ∅
eḡ(h), if i(h) /∈ g(h)
ēḡ(h), if i(h) ∈ g(h)
Players that did not follow the strategy are punished by receiving zero in the next
state. A player is willing to accept (or propose) 0 based on the possibility of the
other player making a mistake, and in that case, the well behaved player receives a
premium. The proof that this strategy is a Trembling Hand equilibrium is fastidious
and cumbersome and left for the appendix.
Theorem 10. The strategy s is a PE12.
5 Conclusion
The present work serves the purpose of refining the equilibrium theory of the multi-
player bargaining. After introducing common SPNE equilibrium strategies the fol-
lowing is an attempt of creating a sound equilibrium refinement of repeated with
continuum of action games. It proves that none of the classical equilibria resists mi-
nor refinements, but that using more complex strategies it is possible to sustain any
division as an equilibrium outcome.
11For notation convenience on the definition of r(h) let ēi = ei
12The strategy defined is PER as well, and all points in ∆ are also PER outcomes. In fact a
simpler strategy can sustain any division as a PER, one with less states, in particular with half the
states of s, with γ1 = γ3 = 2/3 and γ2 = γ4 = 1/3
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Appendices
A
A.1 Equilibria with e(s) 6= 1
Theorem 3. ∀e0 ∈ ∆, T ∈ N, exists s ∈ S SPNEwith e(s) = T and d(s) = e0
Proof. For any e0 ∈ ∆ and T ∈ N, r(h) defines the state for any history, there is one
more state than in Haller’s strategy, the set of states is E =
{
δT+1e0, e0, e1, e2, e3
}
. For
the initial history the state is r(∅) = δT+1e0; when t > 0 and h ∈ H t,2 is r(h) = r(h−);
and for h ∈ H t,1 is
r(h) =

r(h−) if ht,1 = r(h−) and t 6= T − 1
e0 if ht,1 = r(h−) and t = T − 1
ei(t+1) if ht,1 6= r(h)
The strategy is like in Haller’s to propose a division equal to the state si(h)(h) =
r(h) with τ(h) = (t− 1, 2), and when τ(h) = (t, 1) repliers j 6= i(h) follow
sj(h) =
1 if h
t,1 = r(h) and t ≥ T
0 if ht,1 6= rt−1(h) or t < T
We need to prove two distinct points, first that e(s) = T and d(s) = e0; second
that s is SPNE. The first result is relatively straightforward lets define $s as the
history path when the strategy s was played since the beginning. If all players act
accordingly to s, sj(h) = 0 for all repliers j 6= i(h) and history h with t(h) < T , then
the time of agreement must be t(s) ≥ T . At the stage (T −1, 1), r($|T−1,1s ) = δT+1e0,
proposition is done, and according to the transition state function the state changes
to e0 and repliers both reject the proposition. At time T proposition will be e0,
considering i = i(T ), si($
|T−1,2
s ) = e0 = r($
|T−1,1
s ), repliers will accept sj(ψ
|T,1) = 1.
The agreement is established at t(s) = T and the division reached d(s) = e0.
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s is SPNE. If there was some deviation on propositions the strategy enters in
a punishment scheme, meaning that r(h) ∈
{
e1, e2, e3
}
and at these states it just
replicate Haller’s strategy, which we already proved is an SPNE. If a history h has
t(h) ≥ T the strategy is just equal to Haller’s so it respects SPNEcondition. To
prove s is an SPNE it is only missing that s is the best option for histories with
t(h) < T and in which the players did not deviate, h = ψτ(h). If the proponent
i = i(h) does not deviate is payment is Πtj(s|h) = δT−te0i if he proposes something
different, both repliers reject the proposal and the game enters in a punishment of i
Πtj(s
′
i, s−i|h) = δΠt+1j (s|h+) = eki = 0. The proponent does not improve. If j 6= i(h),
τ(h) = (t, 1) and ht,1 = r(h) the agreement will be reached in T − t periods, the
payment of following s is Πtj(s|h) = δT−te0i . When j plays s′j ∈ OSD(sj, h), s′j(h) = 1
player j contradicts s accepting the proposal, but replier k still rejects it and so,
with h+ =
(
h, (0, 1)
)
, Πtj(s
′
j, s−j|h) = δΠt+1j (s|h+) = δ
[
δT−t−1e0
]
= Πtj(s|h). Player j
receives the same, not improving by changing strategy.
A.2 Equilibria with e(s) =∞
Theorem 4. There is a strategy s ∈ S SPNEin which no division is agreed upon and
e(σ) =∞.
Proof. This strategy involves players that are not interested in bargaining, they want
all or nothing, this way they always propose everything to themselves and reject
everything that is less than it. So, the strategy is the following, for any proponent
i = i(h), si(h) = e
i. For any replier j 6= i, sj(h) =
1 if h
t,1 = ej
0 if ht,1j 6= ej
. It is clear
that no agreement can be reached in finite time, the replier j only accept ej and the
other replier, k, ek, therefore they will never accept the same proposal, so ∀h ∈ H,
Πti(s|h) = 0 and by convention t(s) =∞. We still need to prove that s is an SPNE.
When τ (h) = (t− 1, 2), whatever the proposal s′i ∈ OSD(si, h) of i = i(h) it will
be always rejected by one of the repliers, and i(h) payment does not increase by
using it. So, whatever the proposition h̄t,1 = s′i(h), Π
t
i(s
′
i, s−i|h) = δΠt+1i (s|h̄) = 0.
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When τ (h) = (t, 1), the replier j 6= i(h) cannot improve his payment. If under s
he rejected the proposal, sj(h) = 0 on the alternative strategy s
′
j ∈ OSD(sj, h) he
must accept it, 1 = s′j(h). The payment of j is: h
t,1
j if k accepted the proposition;
and is δΠt+1j (s|h+) = 0 , if k rejected it, with h+ = (h, (1, 0)),. So j’s payment is
Πtj(s
′
j, s−j|h) = sk(h)h
t,1
j + (1− sk(h)) δΠt+1j (s|h+) = sk(h)h
t,1
j . But sk(h) = 1, only
when ht,1 = ek, meaning that ht,1j = e
k
j = 0, and Π
t
j(s
′
j, s−j|h) = 0. Replier cannot
improve by accepting when before he was rejecting. If under s the replier accepted
the proposal, that meant the proposal was ht,1 = ej, but the other replier rejected
it, so Πtj(s|h) = δΠt+1j (s|h+) = 0. If s′j(h) = 0 then nothing really changes the game
goes to the next round and players will again try to get everything to themselves,
so Πtj(s
′
j, s−j|h) = δΠt+1j (s|h+) = 0 the change of reply does not improve replier’s
payoff.
A.3 Herrero’s strategy is not a PE
Theorem 7. Herrero’s strategy is not a PE.
Proof. Let σ be the Herrero’s strategy, assume it is PE and σε is the approximation
sequence converging to it, σε
ε↓0−→ σ, with σε having the properties of definition (6).
Claim 5. When i is the proponent at h, ∃ε̄ > 0, ∀ε < ε̄, Πti(σε|h) > ε.
Proof. Consider γi ∈ ∆ is a vector with γij = γ0/2 for j 6= i and γii = 1 − γ0, with
γ0 > 0. Define the strategy σ
′
i ∈ Σεi in which i proposes with probability 1 − ε the
vector γi, and rejects any offer made with probability 1− ε. So σ′εi(x|h) = 1− ε when:
i(h) 6= i and x = 0; or when i(h) = i and x = γi.
At the history h, if i proposes γi the state will be r(h+) = ek, with h+ = (h, γi),
for j 6= k, γ0/2 > 0 = Πtj(σ|h); and for the replier k we have γ0/2 < δ = Πtk(σ|h+)
then by theorem (6), for small ε
σεj(1|h+) = 1− ε (3)
σεk(1|h+) = ε (4)
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Defining ah ∈ {0, 1} as ah = 0 if an agreement is not reached in the stage that starts
at h and ah = 1 if an agreement is obtained. We can calculate p(ah = 0) as the
probability of no agreement at h ∈ H t,1 when
(
σ′εi , σ
ε
−i
)
is being played and i is the
proponent i(h) = i .
p
(
ah = 0
)
=
∫
h̄∈∆
σε−i(R
∣∣h, h̄)∂(σ′iε) ≥ ∫
h̄∈∆
σε−i
(
{0, 1} × {0}
∣∣h, h̄)∂(σ′iε)
=
∫
h̄∈∆
σεj
(
0
∣∣h, h̄)∂(σ′iε) ≥ σ′εi(γi∣∣h)σεj(0∣∣h, γi)
=(1− ε)2
Notice that the lower bound p
(
ah = 0
)
≥ (1 − ε)2 is independent of the his-
tory and for any t such that i(t) = i we get that the probability of no agree-
ment at t has the same lower bound, we can then define at in coherence with ah
and calculate p
(
at = 0
)
≥ (1 − ε)2 if i(t) = i. The probability of agreement
p
(
ah = 1
)
≥ σ′εi
(
γi
∣∣h)σεj(1∣∣h, γi)σεk(1∣∣h, γi) = (1 − ε)2ε, and p(at = 1) ≥ (1 − ε)2ε,
with i(t) 6= i.
If the proponent is i(h) = j 6= i then the probability of no agreement in the
moment after h, must be p
(
ah = 0
)
≥ 1 − ε because in σ′εi player i refuse any
proposition with probability 1− ε.
p
(
ah = 0
)
=
∫
h̄∈∆
σ′
ε
−j(R
∣∣h, h̄)∂(σεj) ≥ ∫
h̄∈∆
σ
′ε
i (0
∣∣h, h̄)∂(σεj)
=
∫
h̄∈∆
(
1− ε
)
∂
(
σεj
)
= 1− ε
In this case, it happens as when i(h) = i, the calculations to find the lower bound
do not depend on the specific history and therefore p(at = 0) ≥ 1 − ε. Define qt as
the probability of not obtaining an agreement on the round that starts at t, i.e. qt
is the probability a disagreement is obtained in t, t+ 1, t+ 2, qt = p(at = 0)p(at+1 =
0)p(at+2 = 0) ≥ (1− ε)2(1− ε)(1− ε) = η1.
Denoting Pt+k by the probability an agreement of γ is reached at t + k. If at
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t, i(t) = i, then the probability the agreement is immediate is Pt = p(at = 1) ≥
σ
′ε
i (γ
∣∣h)σεj(1∣∣h, γ)σεk(1∣∣h, γ) = (1 − ε)2ε = η0; for an agreement to be delayed until
t+3, then no agreement can happen in t, t+1 or t+2, so Pt+3 = qtp(at+3 = 1) ≥ η1η0;
for Pt+3k we must have no agreement in any round starting at t + 3τ , 0 ≤ τ < k,
therefore Pt+3k =
k−1∏
τ=0
qt+τp(at+3k = 1) ≥ ηk1η0. Now we can calculate a lower bound
for the payment of player i under the strategy σ
′ε
i
Πti(σ
′ε|h) =
+∞∑
k=0
δk
∫
h̄∈∆̄k
π(h, h̄)i∂
(
kσ
′ε
h
)
≥
∑
k∈t(i)
δk
∫
h̄∈∆̄k
π(h, h̄)i∂
(
kσ
′ε
h
)
=
+∞∑
k=0
δ3k
∫
h̄∈∆̄3k
π(h, h̄)i∂
(
3kσ
′ε
h
)
≥
+∞∑
k=0
δ3k(1− γ)Pt+3k
≥
+∞∑
k=0
δ3k(1− γ)ηk1η0 =
(1− γ)η0
1− δ3η1
=
(1− γ)(1− ε)2
1− δ3(1− ε)4
ε
As (1−γ)(1−ε)
2
1−δ3(1−ε)4 →
1−γ
1−δ3 . If γ < δ
3, Πti(σ
′
i, σ
ε
−i|h) > ε for small values of ε.
For σ to be an PE it must be an accumulation point of a sequence of approximating
games, consider the ε approximating game and the σε equilibrium. We will look for
a particular history in which no convergent σε to σ is simultaneously the best reply.
For that consider the history h with τ = (t, 1), in which player 1 was the proponent,
i(h) = 1, and the proposition done was equal to the state ht,1 = r(h−) = e3; in this
specific history player 3, by theorem (6), accepts with maximum probability, 1− ε.
For player 2 consider the strategies σa2 , σ
r
2 ∈ OSD(σε2, h) in which σa2(1|h) = 1,
σr2(0|h) = 1. For σ to be a PE, for small ε, Πt2(σa2 , σε−2|h) ≥ Πt2(σr2, σε−2|h) To simplify
the following formulas we write Πt+12
(
σε
∣∣h, r) = Πrε
If player 2 accepts the proposition his payment is
Πt2(σ
a
i , σ
ε
−i|h) =δσε3(0|h)Πt+12
(
σε
∣∣h, (1, 0))+ δσε3(1|h)e32
=δεΠt+12
(
σε
∣∣h, (1, 0)) = δεΠ1,0ε
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If 2 rejects his payment is
Πt2(σ
r
i , σ
ε
−i|h)) =δσε3(0|h)Πt+12
(
σε
∣∣h, (0, 0))+ δσε3(1|h)Πt+12 (σε∣∣h, (0, 1))
=δεΠt+12
(
σε
∣∣h, (0, 0))+ δ(1− ε)Πt+12 (σε∣∣h, (0, 1))
=δεΠ0,0ε + δ(1− ε)Π0,1ε
Rewriting the necessary inequality for σ to be PE,
Πt2
(
σa2 , σ
ε
−2
∣∣h) ≥ Πt2(σr2, σε−2∣∣h)⇔ εΠ1,0ε ≥ εΠ0,0ε + (1− ε)Π0,1ε
⇔ε
(
Π1,0ε − Π0,0ε
)
≥ (1− ε)Π0,1ε ⇔
Π1,0ε − Π0,0ε
Π0,1ε
≥ 1− ε
ε
(5)
Because of:
• Π1,0ε = Πt+12
(
σε
∣∣∣h, (e3, 1, 0)) < 1;
• Π0,0ε = Πt+12
(
σε
∣∣∣h, (e3, 0, 0)) > ε, because σεi must be a best reply to σε at
all histories h, then Πt+12
(
σε
∣∣∣h, (e3, 0, 0)) ≥ Πt+12 (σ′ε2, σε−2∣∣∣h, (e3, 0, 0)) > ε by
claim (5);
• Π0,1ε = Πt+12
(
σε
∣∣∣h, (e3, 0, 1)) > ε by the same reason as previous point.
the inequality (5) can’t be verified, σ is not a PE.
A.4 Dominating Strategy is Trembling Hand
Claim 3. When inf
{
Πti(σ|h) − Πti(σ′i, σ−i|h) : ∀h ∈ H,∀σ′i ∈ OSD(σi, h)
}
> 0 then
σ is PE and a PER.
Proof. This proof is tailored for the PE, but it’s adaptation for the existence of PER
is immediate and direct. First we will prove that the strategy σ to be in the theorem
conditions need to be simple, that is ∀h ∈ H, ∃{a} ∈ Ah such that σi(a|h) = 1
Lemma 1. If Πti(σ|h) > Πti(σ′i, σ−i|h), ∀σ′i ∈ OSD(σi, h) then σi(.|h) is a simple
strategy.
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Proof. If σi(.|h) is not a simple action, there exists a A ⊆ Ah, such that σi(A|h) > 0
and σi(A
c|h) > 0, where Ac = Ah \ A. Define σ′i(O|h) =
σi(O∩A|h)
σi(A|h) and σ
′′
i (O|h) =
σi(O∩Ac|h)
σi(Ac|h) .
Πti(σ|h) =
∫
a∈Ah
Πti(a, σ−h|h)∂σi(.|h)
=σ(A)
∫
a∈A
Πti(a, σ−h|h)∂
(
σi(.|h)
σ(A)
)
+ σ(Ac)
∫
a∈Ac
Πti(a, σ−h|h)∂
(
σi(.|h)
σ(Ac)
)
=σ(A)
∫
a∈A
Πti(a, σ−h|h)∂σ′i(.|h) + σ(Ac)
∫
a∈Ac
Πti(a, σ−h|h)∂σ′′i (.|h)
=σ(A)
∫
a∈Ah
Πti(a, σ−h|h)∂σ′i(.|h) + σ(Ac)
∫
a∈Ah
Πti(a, σ−h|h)∂σ′′i (.|h)
=σ(A)Πti(σ
′
i, σ−i|h) + σ(Ac)Πti(σ′′i , σ−i|h)
By hypothesis Πti(σ|h) > Πti(σ′i, σ−i|h) and Πti(σ|h) > Πti(σ′′i , σ−i|h) but as Πti(σ|h) =
σi(A|h)Πti(σ′|h) + σi(Ac|h)Πti(σ′′|h) we would conclude that Πti(σ|h) > Πti(σ|h). So
σi(.|h) must be simple.
For each ε > 0 define σεi (O|h) = (1−ε)σi(O|h)+ελi(O|h), if h ∈ H t,2, with λ(·) the
measure proportional to Lebesgue measure; and σεi (O|h) = (1− ε)σi(O|h) + ελi(O|h)
in which λi(O|h) = |O|2 , O ⊆
{
0, 1
}
. It is clear that σε(O|h) → σi(O|h) and to be
a PE we just need to insure it is the best reply. Next result proves that there is an
absolute convergence of Πti(σ
ε|h) to Πti(σ|h) in h.
Lemma 2. ∀ξ > 0, ∃ε̄ > 0, that ∀h ∈ H, and ∀ε < ε̄, |Πti(σε|h)− Πti(σ|h)| < ξ
Proof. By the previous lemma (1) σ is simple, accordingly it is possibly to define the
path after h when σ is played $σ(h) = {h, h0σ, h1σ, . . .}, ($σ(h) can be finite). Without
loss of generality we suppose player 1 is proposing, h0σ = (h
0
σ,1, h
0
σ,2, h
0
σ,3), and
σε(h0σ|h) = σε1(h0σ,1|h)σε2(h0σ,2|h, h0σ,1)σε3(h0σ,3|h, h0σ,1)
Due to σεi ≥ (1− ε)σi,
σε(h0σ|h) ≥
[
(1−ε)σ1(h0σ,1|h)
][
(1−ε)σ2(h0σ,2|h, h0σ,2)
][
(1−ε)σ3(h0σ,3|h, h0σ,1)
]
= (1−ε)3
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we are only considering when the players follow σ, which happens for each player
with probability 1− ε. Then 1σε(h0σ|h) ≥ (1− ε)3, and
∫
h̄∈∆̄
π(h, h̄)∂
(
1σ̄
ε
h
)
= π(h, h0σ)(1− ε)3 +
∫
h̄∈∆̄
π(h, h̄)∂
(
1σ̃
ε
h
)
= π(h, h0σ)(1− ε)3 +R1
Where 1σ̃
ε
h(O) = 1σ
ε
h(O)−(1−ε)3χh0σ(O), for anyO ∈ B(∆̄), andR1 =
∫
h̄∈∆̄ π(h, h̄)∂
(
1σ̃
ε
h
)
.
The next moment if σ is played after h is the triple of actions h1σ, the probability of
observing (h0σ, h
1
σ), when σ
ε is played is 2σ
ε(h0σ, h
1
σ|h) ≥ 1σε(h0σ|h)σε(h1σ|h, h0σ), by the
same reasoning as before σε(h1σ|h, h0σ) ≥ (1− ε)3, and 2σε(h1σ|h) ≥ (1− ε)6. Hence,
∫
h̄∈∆̄2
π(h, h̄)∂
(
2σ̄
ε
h
)
= π(h, h0σ, h
1
σ) 2σ̄
ε(h0σ, h
1
σ|h) +
∫
h̄∈∆̄2
π(h, h̄)∂
(
2σ̃
ε
h
)
= π(h, h0σ, h
1
σ)(1− ε)6 +R2
With the natural definition for R2 =
∫
h̄∈∆̄2 π(h, h̄)∂
(
2σ̃
ε
h
)
and 2σ̃
ε
h(O) = 2σ
ε
h(O)−
(1 − ε)6χ(h0σ ,h1σ)(O) for any O ∈ B(∆̄
2).Abusing slightly on the notation, defin-
ing h
|k
σ = (h, h0σ, . . . h
k
σ) and developing the previous calculations for all the mo-
ments, the payment when σε is played is Πti(σ
ε|h) =
∑
k δ
k
∫
h̄∈∆̄k π(h, h̄)∂
(
kσ
ε
h
)
=∑
k δ
k
[
π(h
|k
σ )(1 − ε)3k + Rk
]
. With Rk =
∫
h̄∈∆̄k π(h, h̄)∂
(
kσ̃
ε
h
)
≤
∫
h̄∈∆̄k 1∂
(
kσ̃
ε
h
)
=
kσ̄
ε
h(∆̃
k) = 1− (1− ε)3k. We may write Πti(σ|h) =
∑
k δ
kπ(h
|k
σ ) consequently
∣∣∣Πti(σ|h)− Πti(σε|h)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∑
k
δkπ(h|kσ )
(
1− (1− ε)3k
)∣∣∣+∑
k
δkRk
≤
∑
k
δk
(
1− (1− ε)3k
)
+
∑
k
δk
(
1− (1− ε)3k
)
= 2
∑
k
(
δk −
(
δ(1− ε)3
)k)
= 2
1
1− δ
− 1
1− δ(1− ε)3
= 2δ
1− (1− ε)3
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− ε)3)
≤ 2δ3ε− 3ε
2 + ε3
(1− δ)2
= f(ε)
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Any σ′εi ∈ OSD(σεi , h) can be built as σ′
ε ∈ Σε can be written as σ′εi(O|h) =
(1−ε)σ′i(O|h)+ελi(O|h), with σ′i ∈ OSD(σi, h) and λi(O|h) defined as before. It can
be proved in the same way as the previous claim that
∣∣∣Πti(σ′εi , σε−i|h)−Πti(σ′i, σ−i|h)∣∣∣ <
f(ε).
Then with a = inf
{
Πti(σ|h)−Πti(σ′i, σ−i|h) : ∀h ∈ H,∀σ′i ∈ OSD(σi, h)
}
, if ξ = a
2
,
then it is possible to find ε such that,
∣∣∣Πti(σ|h) − Πti(σε|h)∣∣∣ < a2 and ∣∣∣Πti(σ′i, σ−i|h) −
Πti(σ
′ε
i , σ
ε
−i|h)
∣∣∣ < a2 . Therefore Πti(σε|h) > Πti(σi|h) − a2 ≥ Πti(σ′i, σ−i|h) + a2 >
Πti(σ
′ε
i , σ
ε
−i|h), and σε is in fact the best reply for any h in Σε.
A.5 OSD Dominating Strategy is Dominating
Claim 4. If Πti(s|h) > Πti(s′i, s−i|h), for all s′i ∈ OSD(si, h) and for all h ∈ H, then
Πti(s|h) > Πti(s̄i, s−i|h), for all s̄i ∈ Σi \ si and for all h ∈ H
Proof. By lemma (1) the strategy s is a simple strategy. We will now see that si also
strongly dominate all s̄i ∈ Si when s is being played. As s is a simple strategy we can
define the sequence of future histories after h, H(s|h), and has only one sequence.
For the strategy s̄ assume it is also simple and that the future play ends on finite
time, therefore (h, h̄1, . . . , h̄T ) = H(s̄|h), is the only path of the strategy s̄ after h.
The payment only depend on this path and so we can easily define that Πti(s̄|h) =
δTπ(h, h̄1, . . . , h̄T )i; and, as (h, h1, . . . , hT ) = H(s|h), Πti(s|h) = δTπ(h, h1, . . . , hT )i.
Now supported on the strategy s̄ we will construct T strategies that are equal to
s̄ at one stage of history and equal to s everywhere else. These new strategies will
be either equal to s or OSD(s, ·). For that purpose define h̃0 = h, for 1 ≤ k ≤ T ,
h̃k = (h, h̄1, . . . , h̄k) and the strategy s̃
k for player i as
s̃ki (h̃) =
 si(h̃) if h̃ 6= h̃ks̄i(h̃) if h̃ = h̃k
So s̃k is in fact either a OSD(si, h̃k) or is equal to si everywhere, if s̄i(h̃
k) = si(h̃
k).
For the other players j 6= i s̃j = s̄j = sj. Using these new strategies s̃k(·) we can
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rewrite Πti(s|h)−Πti(s̄|h) = Πti(s|h̃0)−Πti(s̃0|h̃0) + Πti(s̃0|h̃0)−Πti(s̄|h), and repeating
this procedure for Πti(s̃
1|h̃1) we get
Πti(s|h)− Πti(s̄|h̃0) =
[
Πti(s|h)− Πti(s̃0|h̃0)
]
+
[
Πti(s̃
0|h̃0)− δΠt+1i (s̃1|h̃1)
]
+
[
δΠt+1i (s̃
1|h̃1)− Πti(s̄|h)
]
=
[
Πti(s|h)− Πti(s̃0|h̃0)
]
+ δ
[
Πt+1i (s|h̃1)− Πt+1i (s̃1|h̃1)
]
+
[
δΠti(s̃
1|h̃1)− Πti(s̄|h)
]
For the equality we used that s̃0(h̃0) = s̄(h̃) = s̄(h̃0) = h̄1, so if T > 1, h̄1 is a non
ending history, and Πti(s̃
0|h̃0) = δΠt+1i (s̃0|h̃0, h̄1) = δΠt+1i (s|h̃1), by definition s̃0 is
equal to s for all histories different from h̃0. Repeating T times we get
Πti(s|h)− Πti(s̄|h) =
T−1∑
k=0
δk
(
Πt+ki (s|h̃k)− Πt+ki (s̃k|h̃k)
)
+ δT−1Πt+T−1i
(
s̃T−1|h̃T−1
)
− Πti(s̄|h)
=
T−1∑
k=0
δk
(
Πt+ki (s|h̃k)− Πt+ki (s̃k|h̃k)
)
The equality results from s̃T−1
(
h̃T−1
)
= s̄(h̃T−1) = h̄T , as this is an ending history,
Πt+T−1i (s̃
T−1
∣∣h̃T−1) = δπ(h̃T−1, h̄T ), so δT−1Πt+T−1i (s̃T−1|h̃T−1) = Πti(s̄|h). As si and
s̄i are different, at least one of s̃
k
i is different from si and s̃
k
i ∈ OSD(si, h̃k), by hy-
pothesis Πt+ki (s|h̃k) > Πt+ki (s̃k|h̃k), for the others we know Πt+ki (s|h̃k) = Πt+ki (s̃k|h̃k)
and we conclude Πti(s|h)− Πti(s̄|h) > 0.
If H(s̄|h) is of infinite size, let the size of history h be t = t(h) and τ be the size
of the first history in H(s̄|h) in which the strategies s and s̄ define different actions,
so s̄(h̃τ ) 6= s(h̃τ ), and s̄(h̃τ ′) = s(h̃τ ′), for any 0 ≤ τ ′ < τ . Set ε = Πt+τi (s|h̃τ ) −
Πt+τi (s̃
τ
∣∣h̃τ ), ε > 0 due to s̃τi ∈ OSD(si, h̃τ ) and the hypothesis that si is strictly
better than all OSD at the departure history. The first t+ T moments of H(s̄|h) are
h̃T , if T is such that δ
T−τ < ε. Developing the same calculations as before
Πti(s|h)− Πti(s̄|h) =
T−1∑
k=0
δk
(
Πt+ki (s|h̃k)− Πt+ki (s̃k|h̃k)
)
+ δT−1Πt+T−1i
(
s̃T−1|h̃T−1
)
− Πti(s̄|h)
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≥ δτε+ δT−1Πt+T−1i
(
s̃T−1|h̃T−1
)
− Πti(s̄|h) > 0
A.6 All divisions are a PE outcome
Theorem 10. The strategy s is a PE.
Remember that the strategy is
sj(h) =
1, if h
t,1 = r(h−)
0, if ht,1 6= r(h−)
with g(h) the set of player that did not follow the strategy
g(h) =
{
i ∈ I :
(
i 6= i(h) and si(h|t,1) 6= ht,2i
)
or
(
i = i(h) and si(h
|t−1,2) 6= ht,1
)}
the state transition is
r(h) =

r(h|t,1), if g(h) = I
eḡ(h), if i(h) /∈ g(h)
ēḡ(h), if i(h) ∈ g(h) 6= I
For s to be a PE there must exist a sequence of approximating strategies sε, with
sε
ε↓0−→ s. This strategy is a totally mixed strategy, and in replies both possibilities
assume positive probability, but the action that doesn’t coincide with s is played only
with ε probability, so for j 6= i(h) and h ∈ H t,1
sεj(1|h) =
1− ε, if h
t,1 = r(h|t−1,2)
ε, if ht,1 6= r(h|t−1,2)
For h ∈ H t−1,2, we assume that in sεi(h)(h), i(h) plays r(h) with probability 1− ε and
has a uniform distribution on ∆, sεi(h)(O|h) = ελ(O). It is clear that sε → s, and for
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s to be a PE we need prove that sε is a best reply.
Before calculating the payment there are some facts about sε that facilitate the
job. Note that the strategy, as function of h, only depends on the state of history
e = r(h), so it could be defined sε(a|h) = sε(a|e) for a ∈ Ah. When sε is played
after h the future states are determined by the initial state r(h) = e, the actions
taken (dependent on sε(a|e)) and by the proponent at h, i(h). So for two different
histories h and h̃ if they share the proponent i(h) = i(h̃) and the state r(h) = r(h̃)
then the future play will have the same distribution, i.e. ks
ε
h = ks
ε
h̃
for all k ∈ N. By
this reason the future payment is the same at h and at h̃, Π
t(h)
i (s
ε|h) = Πt(h̃)i
(
sε|h̃
)
.
Therefore, we can define equivalent classes of histories where the future payment
is the same if the strategy sε is played. For e ∈ E and i ∈ I define the classes
[e, k] =
{
h ∈ H : r(h) = e and i(h) = k
}
.
Without loss of generality we focus on player 1 and for notation simplicity define
Π
t(h)
1 (s
ε|h) = Πke , if h ∈ [e, k]. When all players follow sε, 1 is the proponent, p the
proposal and e the state, 1’s payment Π1e is composed of several parcels presented in
the following table.
Table 5: Π1e parcels
Player 1
p = e p 6= e
Player 2
Accept Reject Accept Reject
Player 3
Accept e1 Π
2
e31 p1 Π
2
ē2
Reject Π2e21 Π
2
e1 Π
2
ē3 Π
2
ē23
The content on the table will be explained through the example of one cell. Sup-
pose player 1 proposed e and player 2 accepted, as it should, but player 3 rejected,
the proposition is rejected and agreement is delayed, the players that followed the
strategy s were 1 and 2, g(h) = (1, 2), as 1 was the proposer, next round proposer is
2 so ḡ(h) = (2, 1). The proposer, player 1, played accordingly, the new state will be
e21, and 1’s payment that comes from future agreement is δΠ2e21 . All the possibilities
are covered in the table. To obtain 1’s expected payoff we multiply each possibility
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by the respective probability.
Π1e =(1− ε)
[
e1s
ε
−1
(
1, 1|ht,1 = e
)
+ δsε−1
(
0, 1|ht,1 = e
)
Π2e31+
δsε−1
(
1, 0|ht,1 = e
)
Π2e21 + δs
ε
−1
(
0, 0|ht,1 = e
)
Π2e1
]
+ E1
=e1(1− ε)3 + δε(1− ε)2Π2e31 + δε(1− ε)2Π2e21 + δ(1− ε)ε2Π2e1 + E1
(6)
For two different states e and ẽ all but the first term on (6) are equal, so Π1e−Π1ẽ =
(e1−ẽ1)(1−ε)3. This equality simplify extremely Πke , for example, we use the fact that
player 1 receives nothing in the states e2, e3 and ē23, to state that Π1e2 = Π
1
e3 = Π
1
e23 .
The expected payment from a proposition p different from the state when 1 is
the proponent can be: p1 if accepted by all repliers, (this happens with probability
ε2, propositions that are different from state are accepted only with ε probability by
each player); δΠ2e2 if player 3 rejected and 2 accepted; δΠ
2
e3 if player 2 rejected and
3 accepted; and δΠ2ē23 if both players rejected the proposition p 6= e, and the state
changed to ē23
E1 =
∫
p∈∆\r(h)
p1ε
2 + δε(1− ε)Π2e2 + δ(1− ε)εΠ2e3 + δ(1− ε)2Π2ē23∂
(
sεi(h)
)
=
∫
p∈∆\r(h)
p1ε
2 + δ(1− ε2)Π2e2∂
(
sεi(h)
)
=p̄s
ε
ε3 + δε(1− ε2)Π2e2
The payoff of player 1 when 2 and 3 are the proponents is:
Π2e =e1(1− ε)3 + δε(1− ε)2Π3e12 + δε(1− ε)2Π3e32 + δε2(1− ε)Π3e2 + E2
Π3e =e1(1− ε)3 + δε(1− ε)2Π1e13 + δε(1− ε)2Π1e23 + δε2(1− ε)Π1e3 + E3 (7)
Developing the same fastidious calculous for the trembling on propositions when
player 2 and 3 are the proponents, E2 and E3, that we did for E1, replacing ∆̃ =
∆ \ r(h) and remembering that ē31 = (γ4, 0, γ3) and ē12 = (γ3, γ4, 0) we get
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E2 =
∫
p∈∆̃
pε2 + δε(1− ε)Π3e3 + δ(1− ε)εΠ3e1 + δ(1− ε)2Π3ē31∂sε2(h)
=p̄s
ε
ε3 + δ(1− ε)
∫
p∈∆̃
εΠ3e2 + ε
[
(1− ε)3 + Π3e2
]
+ (1− ε)
[
γ4(1− ε)3 + Π3e2
]
∂sε2(h)
=p̄s
ε
ε3 + δ(1− ε)
∫
p∈∆̃
ε(1− ε)3 + γ4(1− ε)4 + (1 + ε)Π3e2∂sε2(h)
=p̄s
ε
ε3 + εδ(1− ε)4 [ε+ γ4(1− ε)] + εδ(1− ε2)Π3e2
E3 =
∫
p∈∆̃
pε2 + δε(1− ε)Π1e1 + δ(1− ε)εΠ1e2 + δ(1− ε)2Π1ē12∂sε3(h)
=p̄s
ε
ε3 + δ(1− ε)
∫
p∈∆̃
ε
[
Π1e2 + (1− ε)3
]
+ εΠ1e2 + (1− ε)
[
Π1e2 + γ3(1− ε)3
]
∂sε3(h)
=p̄s
ε
ε3 + δ(1− ε)
∫
p∈∆̃
(1− ε)3 [ε+ γ3(1− ε)] + (1 + ε)Π1e2∂sε3(h)
=p̄s
ε
ε3 + εδ(1− ε)4 [ε+ γ3(1− ε)] + εδ(1− ε2)Π3e2
We will focus on the state e2, later we prove no more state needs to be analysed.
Replacing e by e2 and using relations like Πke12 = Π
k
e13 , Π
2
e13 = Π
2
e2 + γ1(1 − ε)3 and
Π2e1 = Π
2
e2 + (1− ε)3 in the equations (6) and (7).
Π1e2 =δε(1− ε)2Π2e31 + δε(1− ε)2Π2e21 + δε2(1− ε)Π2e1 + E1
=δε(1− ε)
[
2(1− ε)Π2e31 + εΠ2e1
]
+ E1
=δε(1− ε)
[
2(1− ε)
(
Π2e2 + (1− ε)3γ2
)
+ ε
(
Π2e2 + (1− ε)3
)]
+ E1
=δε(1− ε)
[
(2(1− ε) + ε) Π2e2 + 2(1− ε)4γ2 + ε(1− ε)3
]
+ E1
=δε(1− ε)
[
(2− ε)Π2e2 + (1− ε)3 (2(1− ε)γ2 + ε)
]
+
[
p̄s
ε
ε3 + δε(1− ε2)Π2e2
]
=δε(1− ε)
[
3Π2e2 + (1− ε)3 (2(1− ε)γ2 + ε)
]
+ p̄s
ε
ε3
=3δε(1− ε)Π2e2 + δε(1− ε)4 [2(1− ε)γ2 + ε] + p̄s
ε
ε3
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Π2e2 = δε(1− ε)2Π3e12 + δε(1− ε)2Π3e32 + δε2(1− ε)Π1e2 + E2
= δε(1− ε)
[
(1− ε)Π3e12 + (1− ε)Π3e32 + εΠ1e2
]
+ E2
= δε(1− ε)
[
(1− ε)
(
Π3e2 + γ1(1− ε)3
)
+ (1− ε)Π3e2 + εΠ1e2
]
+ E2
= δε(1− ε)
[
(2− ε)Π3e2 + γ1(1− ε)4
]
+ E2
= δε(1− ε)
[
(2− ε)Π3e2 + γ1(1− ε)4
]
+
[
p̄s
ε
ε3 + εδ(1− ε)4 [ε+ γ4(1− ε)] + δε(1− ε2)Π3e2
]
= 3δε(1− ε)Π3e2 + εδ(1− ε)4 [ε+ (1− ε)(γ4 + γ1)] + p̄s
ε
ε3
Π3e2 =δε(1− ε)2Π1e13 + δε(1− ε)2Π1e23 + δε2(1− ε)Π1e3 + E3
=δε(1− ε)
[
(1− ε)
(
Π1e2 + γ1(1− ε)3
)
+ Π1e2
]
+ E3
=δε(1− ε)
[
(2− ε)Π1e2 + γ1(1− ε)4
]
+
[
p̄s
ε
ε3 + εδ(1− ε)4 [ε+ γ3(1− ε)] + εδ(1− ε2)Π3e2
]
=3δε(1− ε)Π3e2 + εδ(1− ε)4 [ε+ (γ3 + γ1)(1− ε)] + p̄s
ε
ε3
We get the following system of equations
Π1e2 = 3δε(1− ε)Π2e2 + δε(1− ε)4 [ε+ (1− ε)2γ2] + p̄s
ε
ε3
Π2e2 = 3δε(1− ε)Π3e2 + εδ(1− ε)4 [ε+ (1− ε)(γ4 + γ1)] + p̄s
ε
ε3
Π3e2 = 3δε(1− ε)Π1e2 + εδ(1− ε)4 [ε+ (1− ε)(γ3 + γ1)] + p̄s
ε
ε3
With ξ0 = 3δε(1−ε), ξ1 = εδ(1−ε)4 and β1 = ε+(1−ε)2γ2, β2 = ε+(1−ε)(γ4+γ1),
β3 = ε+ (1− ε)(γ3 + γ1) we can rewrite the system as
Π1e2 = ξ1β1 + ξ0Π
2
e2 + p̄
sεε3
Π2e2 = ξ1β2 + ξ0Π
3
e2 + p̄
sεε3
Π3e2 = ξ1β3 + ξ0Π
3
e1 + p̄
sεε3
Solving the system we get the values of Πke2 , for k = 1, 2, 3
54

Π1e2 =
ξ1
1−ξ30
(β1 + ξ0β2 + ξ
2
0β3) + p̄
Π2e2 =
ξ1
1−ξ30
(β2 + ξ0β3 + ξ
2
0β1) + p̄
Π3e2 =
ξ1
1−ξ30
(β3 + ξ0β1 + ξ
2
0β2) + p̄
And can now calculate the following limits for later use.

lim
ε↓0
Π1e2/ε = 2δγ2
lim
ε↓0
Π2e2/ε = δ(γ4 + γ1)
lim
ε↓0
Π3e2/ε = δ(γ3 + γ1)
(8)
To analyse the best response of player 1 in state e2 when sε is being played we
consider the strategies sa1, s
r
1 ∈ OSD(sε1, h) in which sa1(1|h) = 1, sr1(0|h) = 1. For s
to be a PE, for small ε, Πt1(s
a
1, s
ε
−1|h) ≥ Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h)
When player 3 is the proponent and proposed e2 with r(h−) = e2, the payment
for player 1 in each of his actions is:
• Πt1(sa1, sε−1|h) = 0.(1− ε) + δεΠ1e13 = δεΠ1e13
• Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h) = (1− ε)δΠ1e23 + εδΠ1e3
And the difference between the two payoffs is
Πt1(s
a
1, s
ε
−1|h)− Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h) =δεΠ1e13 −
[
(1− ε)δΠ1e23 + εδΠ1e31
]
=δε
[
Π1e3 + γ1(1− ε)3
]
− (1− ε)δΠ1e32 − εδΠ1e3
=δεγ1(1− ε)3 − (1− ε)δΠ1e32
=(1− ε)δ
(
γ1ε(1− ε)2 − Π1e2
)
=(1− ε)εδ
(
γ1(1− ε)2 −
Π1e2
ε
)
As
Π1
e2
ε
→ 2δγ2, if γ1 > 2δγ2 the inequality Πt1(sa1, sε−1|h) ≥ Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h) is verified
for small values of ε.
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If in the state e2 player 3 made a proposition e 6= e2 player 1 payment in case
of acceptance is Πt1(s
a
1, s
ε
−1|h) = e1sε2(1|h, e) + δsε2(0|h, e)Π1e2 ≤ ε + δ(1 − ε)Π1e2 or in
case of rejecting Πt1(s
r
1, s
ε
−1|h) = δsε2(1|h, e)Π1e1 + δsε2(0|h, e)Π1ē12 . As sε2(1|h, e) → 0,
Π1e2 → 0 and Π1ē12 → γ3, Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h)−Πt1(sa1, sε−1|h)→ δγ3 > 0, for small ε the best
option to player 1 is to reject the proposal.
If player 2 proposed e2 with r(h−) = e2,the payment for player 1 in each of his
actions is:
• Πt1(sa1, sε−1|h) = 0.(1− ε) + δεΠ3e12 = δεΠ1e13
• Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h) = (1− ε)δΠ1e32 + εδΠ1e2
And the difference between the two payoffs is
Πt1(s
a
1, s
ε
−1|h)− Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h) =δεΠ3e12 −
[
(1− ε)δΠ3e32 + εδΠ3e2
]
=δε
[
Π3e2 + γ1(1− ε)3
]
− (1− ε)δΠ3e2 − εδΠ3e2
=δ(1− ε)
(
εγ1(1− ε)2 − Π3e2
)
=δε(1− ε)
(
γ1(1− ε)2 −
Π3e2
ε
)
As seen in (8)
Π3
e2
ε
→ δ(γ3 + γ1), and
[
Πt1(s
a
1, s
ε
−1|h) − Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h)
]
/ε → γ1 −
δ(γ3 + γ1) and if γ1 >
δ
1−δγ3 the necessary inequality is verified.
In the case player 2 made a proposition different from the state, it can be proved
that player 1 is better by rejecting the proposition, this is done in the same way as
when player 3 proposed a different division. Nothing changes in the proof.
When player 1 is proposing, and state is e2, consider the twoOSD(sε1, h), s
nd
1 (e
2|h) =
1, the ”non-deviating” strategy in which 1 always proposes e2 after h, and the ”devi-
ating” strategy with player always proposing e, sd1(e|h) = 1, different from e2. For s
to be Perfect Equilibria Πt1(s
nd
1 , s
ε
−1|h) ≥ Πt1(sd1, sε−1|h) for small values of ε.
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Πt1(s
d
1, s
ε
−1|h) ≤ 1.ε2 + δε(1− ε)Π2e3 + δε(1− ε)Π2e2 + δ(1− ε)2Π2ē23
= ε2 + δ(1− ε2)Π2e2
Πt1(s
nd
1 , s
ε
−1|h) = δε(1− ε)Π2e31 + δε(1− ε)Π2e21 + δε2Π2e1
= 2δε(1− ε)Π2e31 + δε2Π2e1
= δ(2− ε)εΠ2e2 + 2δε(1− ε)4γ2 + δε2(1− ε)3
= δ(2− ε)εΠ2e2 + δε(1− ε)3 [2γ2(1− ε) + ε]
Πt1(s
nd
1 , s
ε
−1|h)−Πt1(sd1, sε−1|h) ≥
[
δ(2− ε)ε− δ(1− ε2)
]
Π2e2 + δε(1− ε)3 [2γ2(1− ε) + ε]− ε2
= δ(2ε− 1)Π2e2 + δε(1− ε)3 [2γ2(1− ε) + ε]− ε2
= δε
{
(2ε− 1)
Π2e2
ε
+ (1− ε)3 [2γ2(1− ε) + ε]−
ε
δ
}
And the expression inside the curly brackets, using again (8), converges to −δ(γ1+
γ4) + 2γ2, and if 2γ2 > δ(γ1 + γ4) the necessary inequality is assured.
The set of inequalities for s to be a PE are
γ1 ≥ 2δγ2
γ1 ≥ δ1−δγ3
2γ2 ≥ δ(γ1 + γ4)
⇔

γ1 ≥ 2δ1+2δ
γ1 ≥ δ1−δγ3
γ1 ≤ 2−δ2+δ +
δ
2+δ
γ3
(9)
We assumed γ1+γ2 = γ3+γ4 = 1. These equations are all compatible, if γ1 >
2δ
1+2δ
and γ3 < min
{
1−δ
δ
, 2−δ
1+2δ
1−δ
δ
}
and solution, for each δ exists.
We will now see that for the other states e ∈ E, player 1 never improve is payment
by deviating from strategy sε. First when 1 is the proponent. Notice that for the pro-
ponent the expected payment of a deviation does not depend on the state, it is always
equal no matter what the initial state was, Πt1(s
′
1, s
ε
−1|e) = Πt1(s′1, sε−1|e2). Hence, if the
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proposition is equal to the state, as Πt1(s
ε|e) ≥ Πt1(sε|e2), and if in e2 deviating was not
profitable in e it is not as well, Πt1(s
ε|e) ≥ Πt1(sε|e2) ≥ Πt1(s′1, sε−1|e2) = Πt1(s′1, sε−1|e).
When 1 is the replier and the proposition is not equal to the state e, 1’s ex-
pected payment by rejecting the proposal is the same as when rejecting a propo-
sition not equal to the state and the state was e2. So if r(h−) = e and ht,1 6= e,
and r(h̃−) = e2 and h̃t,1 6= e2. With sr1 ∈ OSD(sε1, h) and s̃r1 ∈ OSD(sε1, h̃), are
the OSD strategies that reject the deviating proposition at h and h̃, respectively,
Πt1(s
r
1, s
ε
−1|h) = Πt1(s̃r1, sε−1|h̃). The same is valid if the player accepts the deviating
proposition, his payment is exactly the same in state e to what it was in state e2.
Defining sa1 ∈ OSD(sε1, h) and s̃a1 ∈ OSD(sε1, h̃) as the OSD strategies that accept
the deviating proposition at h and h̃, respectively, Πt1(s
a
1, s
ε
−1|h) = Πt1(s̃a1, sε−1|h̃). Ac-
cordingly, if in r(h̃) = e2 there was no advantage in accepting a deviating proposal,
Πt1(s
a
1, s
ε
−1|h̃) ≥ Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h̃) in r(h) = e there is no advantage also, because the
payments are equal in both states, Πt1(s
a
1, s
ε
−1|h) ≥ Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h).
The same reasoning can be applied to the histories in which the last proposition
was equal to the state r(h) = ht,1 = e. The player’s payoff by rejecting the proposition
is equal to the payoff when he rejects r(h̃) = h̃t,1 = e2. That is, the OSD strategies
that reject the propositions, sr1 ∈ OSD(sε1, h) and s̃r1 ∈ OSD(sε1, h̃), have the same
payment Πt1(s
r
1, s
ε
−1|h) = Πt1(s̃r1, sε−1|h̃). As Πt1(sε|h) − Πt1(sε|h̃) = (e1 − e21)(1 − ε)3.
Due to the state’s definition, for any e ∈ E, e1 ≥ e21, therefore Πt1(sε|h) ≥ Πt1(sε|h̃),
and we conclude that Πt1(s
ε|h) ≥ Πt1(sε|h̃) ≥ Πt1(s̃r1, sε−1|h̃) = Πt1(sr1, sε−1|h). Not to
deviate is the best for player 1 when the proposition coincide with the state. This
way 1 has no advantage in choosing a different strategy for any of states in E.
Due to the symmetry of the strategies used in sε to exist a state in which any
player i had something to gain by deviating then there must also exist a state where
1 would gain by playing the same deviating strategy. As there is not such case, there
is no player and no state in which there is a profitable deviation, for this reason sε is
a best reply to itself, and s is a PE.
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